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INTRODUCTION
1

“[F]atherhood is in vogue.” Married fathers are dedicating more
2
time to their children than ever before. As a result of mothers’ increasing presence in the workforce and a developing cultural empha3
sis on fathers as nurturers, married fathers are assuming a larger
4
share of child-rearing responsibilities than their own fathers ever did.
The mass media has embraced this nurturing and emotionally attuned
5
“modern father” —a sharp departure from the traditional father of
the 1950s, whose role was primarily that of breadwinner and authority
figure. These new generation fathers are present in the delivery room
6
7
8
when their children are born, change diapers, take paternity leave,
1

Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., Good Dads-Bad Dads: Two Faces of Fatherhood, in THE
CHANGING AMERICAN FAMILY AND PUBLIC POLICY 193, 193 (Andrew J. Cherlin ed.,
1988).
2
Susan Steinman, Joint Custody: What We Know, What We Have Yet to Learn, and the
Judicial and Legislative Implications, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 739, 740 (1983).
3
See DAVID POPENOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER 1 (1996) (noting that Americans expect fathers today to be more involved with their children than fathers in past generations); Jerry Adler, Building A Better Dad, NEWSWEEK, June 17, 1996, at 58, 59 (“Men
today ‘have permission to care for their children that they didn’t have a generation
ago’ . . . .” (quoting Betty Thomson of the Center for Demography and Ecology at the
University of Wisconsin)).
4
See Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., Fathering in the Inner City: Paternal Participation and
Public Policy, in FATHERHOOD: CONTEMPORARY THEORY, RESEARCH, AND SOCIAL POLICY
119, 121 (William Marsiglio ed., 1995) (“[T]he segment of highly dedicated dads
seems to be growing . . . .”); Adler, supra note 3, at 61 (“A Newsweek poll found that
seven out of 10 American fathers spend more time with their children than their own
fathers did; nearly half think they are doing a better job . . . .”).
5
See Furstenberg, supra note 1, at 193 (noting that Bill Cosby is the prototypical
modern father: a full partner in parenting). In the 1980s, bookstores were bombarded
with titles aimed at these modern fathers, such as How to Father, Expectant Father, Pregnant Fathers, The Birth of a Father, Fathers Almanac, Father Power, How to Father a Successful
Daughter, and, of course, Bill Cosby’s Fatherhood, “one of the best-selling books in publishing history.” Nancy R. Gibbs, Bringing Up Father, TIME, June 28, 1993, at 53, 58; see
also Scott Coltrane, The Future of Fatherhood: Social, Demographic, and Economic Influences
on Men’s Family Involvements, in FATHERHOOD: CONTEMPORARY THEORY, RESEARCH,
AND SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 4, at 255, 256 (“Starting in the 1970s, films like Kramer
vs. Kramer, Mr. Mom, Three Men and a Baby, and Mrs. Doubtfire began celebrating men’s
love for children, even if the men were initially shown as comically inept. Similarly,
television comedies like Full House and Who’s the Boss[?] began to show men as loving
parents and relatively competent housekeepers.”). One Fine Day (Twentieth Century
Fox 1996) (depicting a single male parent), Two and a Half Men (CBS television series,
2003– current) (featuring divorced fathers), The Bernie Mac Show (Fox television series,
2001– current) (depicting spouses participating equally in parenting), and The Cosby
Show (NBC television series, 1984–1992) (same) may also be attributed to this trend.
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prepare their children’s meals, and take time off from work to take
them to the doctor and nurse them back to health. They attend parent-teacher meetings, school plays, and soccer/basketball/Little
League games, and they know the names of their children’s teachers
and playmates. A small but increasing number of these modern fathers place child-rearing responsibilities above career advancement—
seeking employment with flexible or reduced schedules—so they can
9
dedicate more time to their children. A few have even exited the
workplace completely to assume primary responsibility for their children’s care, while their wives assume the traditionally male role of
10
economic provider. In short, modern fathers—although still rela-

6

See Gibbs, supra note 5, at 58 (noting that “90% percent of fathers are in attendance at their child’s birth”). This is in contrast to the pre-1970 norm where hospitals
did not allow fathers in the delivery room, and some fathers were not even in the vicinity. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 3, at 60 (relating the story of a man who went to work
while his child was being delivered because “[b]ack then [32 years ago], the next day
was soon enough for a new father to visit his son”).
7
Today, fathers can enroll in courses that teach them “how to change, feed, hold
and generally take care of” a baby. Gibbs, supra note 5, at 61. Indeed, some public
men’s bathrooms now have diaper changing stations. Id.
8
See Janet Shibley Hyde et al., Fathers and Parental Leave: Attitudes and Experiences,
14 J. FAM. ISSUES 616, 629 (1993) (finding that fathers take on an average five days of
parental leave). A January 1993 survey by DuPont found that 5% of its employees who
participated in its family leave program were men. See DuPont Employees Highly Satisfied
with Leave Policy, Company’s Study Finds, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Jan. 25, 1993, at A-14
(cited in Robing R. Cockey & Deborah A. Jeon, The Family Medical Leave Act at Work:
Getting Employers to Value Families, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y 225, 229 n.20 (1996)); see also
Gibbs, supra note 5, at 55 (reporting that 7% of male employees at Eastman Kodak
took family leave in 1993).
9
See Keith H. Hammonds, The Daddy Trap, BUS. WK., Sept. 21, 1998, at 56, 56-64
(discussing nontraditional work arrangements); GALLUP ORG., 1996 GALLUP POLL ON
FATHERING: “FATHERS IN AMERICA,” (finding that most men believe that their “employer recognizes the strain” caused by work and family demands), available at
http://www.fact.on.ca/rel_supp/gallup.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2005). See generally
JAMES A. LEVINE & TODD L. PITTINSKY, WORKING FATHERS: NEW STRATEGIES FOR
BALANCING WORK AND FAMILY (1997) (finding that many men experience conflict balancing work and family life and seek flexible schedules).
10
Approximately two million fathers are primary caregivers for their children and
working wives. Buzz McClain, Please Give the ‘Mr. Mom’ Stereotype a Timeout—Again,
FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, May 18, 2003, available at http://www.dfw.com/mld/
startelegram/living/5875857.htm?1c. Although few fathers actually leave the workplace, many express a willingness to do so. See Michael Segell, The American Man in
Transition, AM. HEALTH, Jan. 1989, at 59-60 (discussing a survey which showed that
“51% of fathers polled would quit their jobs and stay home with their children if
money were not a problem”).
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11

tively unusual —are assuming many of the child-rearing tasks traditionally performed by mothers.
When one compares this new generation of married fathers to divorced fathers, however, the contrast is rather bleak. There are ap12
proximately 1.1 million divorces in the United States each year.
About half of these divorcing couples have minor children, resulting
in approximately one million children each year experiencing their
13
parents’ separation or divorce. Within three years of divorce, fifty
percent of fathers have either ceased contact with their children or
14
see them quite infrequently. The irony of married fathers becoming

11

The modern father is by no means the norm. Many married fathers are not involved in their children’s day-to-day care. See POPENOE, supra note 3, at 19 (noting that
although the overall number of nurturing fathers has increased, their numbers remain
quite low); Furstenberg, supra note 4, at 120-21 (noting that most fathers in intact
families have traditionally spent little time directly participating in child care or interacting with their children); Alan J. Hawkins & David J. Eggebeen, Are Fathers Fungible?
Patterns of Coresident Adult Men in Maritally Disrupted Families and Young Children’s Wellbeing, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 958, 959 (1991) (noting that “most fathers are minimally
involved with their children even when they live with them”). Further, women today
are still doing twice as much work caring for their children as men. Adler, supra note
3, at 61 (citing James A. Levine, director of the Fatherhood Project of the Families and
Work Institute).
12
See Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Births,
Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths: Provisional Data for September 2001, NAT’L VITAL STAT.
REP., May 24, 2002, at 1 (determining this figure based on a rate of 4.0 divorces (including annulments) per 1,000 individuals during the twelve months ending September 2001), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr50/nvsr50_08.pdf.
Although the Department of Health and Human Services’s statistics do not separate
divorces from annulments, the latter tend to be rare. Louanne S. Love, The Way We
Were: Reinstatement of Alimony After Annulment of Spouse’s “Remarriage,” 28 J. FAM. L. 289,
292 (1989–1990).
The divorce rate in the United States has increased dramatically since the 1960s.
Although it has stabilized and even dropped since the 1980s, see ARTHUR J. NORTON &
LOUISA F. MILLER, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PUB. NO. P23-180, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE,
AND REMARRIAGE IN THE 1990S 1 (1992), as of 2001, the divorce rate was still fortyseven percent, see Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, supra.
13
Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr.
1993, at 47, 50 (“Each year a million children go through divorce or separation . . . .”).
“When couples with children separate, they face a period of months or even years during which the terms of their legal divorce will be worked out and a custody decree issued.” ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL
AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 71 (1992). Because “the transition period from . . .
separation to about six months to one year afterward is most critical in establishing”
paternal involvement, for purposes of this Article, “divorce” refers to the final separation, not the legal divorce decree. Edward Kruk, The Disengaged Noncustodial Father:
Implications for Social Work Practice with the Divorced Family, 39 SOC. WORK 15, 16 (1994).
14
See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text (discussing fathers’ post-divorce
contact with their children).
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more involved parents as an almost equal number of men become
15
“absent fathers” has not been lost on commentators, who note that
“[m]en today are better fathers when they’re around—and worse
16
when they’re not.” For many children, their parents’ divorce is the
17
beginning of their fathers’ gradual divorce from them. Why do so
18
many divorced fathers disengage from their children? Are children
worse off when their fathers disappear from their lives? Some studies,
many commentators, and most Americans, believe so.
Absent fathers are frequently blamed for many of their children’s
social, emotional, and behavioral problems. Commentators have argued that children who grow up without fathers are more likely than
children who grow up in marital families with both of their biological
parents to use drugs, perform poorly in school, drop out of high
school, become teen parents, be idle (out of work and school), engage in antisocial or criminal activity, get divorced themselves, or
19
commit or attempt suicide. These commentators further assert that
fathers are essential to children’s emotional and mental development,
and they propose that the law should encourage parents to stay to-

15

Scholars often utilize the frequency and quality of contact within a one-year period to define an “absent parent.” See Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. et al., The Life Course of
Children of Divorce: Marital Disruption and Parental Contact, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 656, 663
(1983) (noting that “[m]ost outside parents had seen their child rarely or not at all in
the previous year”); Christine Winquist Nord & Nicholas Zill, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Non-Custodial Parents’ Participation in Their Children’s Lives: Evidence from the
Survey
of
Income
and
Program
Participation
(Aug.
14,
1996),
at
http://fatherhood.hhs.gov/SIPP/noncusp1.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2005) (showing
that 31.7% of fathers in its 1990 study had failed to spend time with their children in
the previous 12 months).
16
Adler, supra note 3, at 61 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting sociologist
Andrew Cherlin); see also Coltrane, supra note 5, at 257 (noting the increase in these
polar extremes: highly involved fathers and absent fathers).
17
See Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. & Christine Winquist Nord, Parenting Apart: Patterns of Childrearing After Marital Disruption, 47 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 893, 896 (1985)
(concluding that, in the majority of cases, marital disruption effectively destroys the
relationship between children and their noncustodial fathers).
18
Although living apart from their children may make it difficult for parents to
remain involved in their children’s upbringing, unlike fathers, mothers who live apart
from their children after divorce often maintain significant contact with them. See
Irene M. Cohen, Post Decree Litigation: Is Joint Custody to Blame?, 36 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 41, 44 (1998) (discussing a 1983 study finding that 86% of noncustodial mothers had seen their children in the past year and one-third saw their
children at least weekly); Furstenberg et al., supra note 15, at 663 (finding that 69% of
noncustodial mothers see their children at least monthly, as compared to 33% of noncustodial fathers).
19
See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the educational and social benefits of parental
involvement).
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20

gether—for example, by abolishing no-fault divorce. If parents stayed
21
together, they posit, many of society’s problems could be solved.
Child development experts and social scientists, however, debate
whether the absence of a father is a significant cause of these negative
outcomes. In contrast to the studies relied upon by fathers’ advocates,
some studies have found no correlation between paternal involvement
22
and children’s well-being. When studies have found a positive correlation between paternal absence and an increased risk of behavioral,
mental, and social problems among children, some commentators
have argued that such correlation results from fathers’ failure to pay
child support, not father absence per se. They point to the substantial
decrease in residential mothers’ and children’s standard of living after
divorce as the cause of children’s emotional and behavioral prob23
lems. In other words, fathers are not essential to children, but economic support is. Accordingly, these scholars advocate stronger en-

20

See SANFORD BRAVER, DIVORCED DADS: SHATTERING THE MYTHS 241-44 (1998)
(advocating the repeal of no-fault divorce); POPENOE, supra note 3, at 222-23 (proposing a two-tier system of divorce law that would make dissolving marriages with children
more difficult).
21
Forcing parents to stay together for the sake of the children is problematic for
many reasons. First, a two-parent high conflict home is not necessarily better for children than a single-parent peaceful home. See Patrick C. McKenry et al., Predictors of
Single, Noncustodial Fathers’ Physical Involvement with Their Children, 153 J. GENETIC
PSYCHOL. 305, 307 (1992) (discussing post-divorce relationships); JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: HOW CHILDREN AND
PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 218 (1980) (discussing positive results in happy, singleparent homes). Second, although obtaining a divorce was difficult during the fault
era, couples typically found ways around the law, for example, by divorcing in foreign
countries or in sister states with laxer requirements, or simply by living apart for the
rest of their lives. E.g., Clagett v. King, 308 A.2d 245, 246 (D.C. 1973) (considering the
validity of a divorce decree obtained in Mexico); Fink v. Fink, 346 N.E.2d 415 (Ill. App.
1976) (dealing with a divorce decree obtained in Nevada by an Illinois resident); Peter
Nash Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31 FAM. L.Q. 269, 270-71
(1997) (discussing divorces obtained on the basis of fabricated faults). In short, even
during the fault era, parents who wanted to separate generally did so.
22
See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 105 (1995) (“[T]here are studies that
find no effect on children’s mental health from father absence.”). But see infra Part
II.C (discussing the effect of paternal involvement on children’s development).
23
Children living with a single mother are six times more likely to be poor than
children living with two parents. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
1997 POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES, 41 fig.18-2 (1998) (showing that the
poverty rate was 32.4% for female householder families with no husband present and
5.6% for married couple families); see also FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR. & ANDREW J.
CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES: WHAT HAPPENS TO CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART 45
(1991) (“Divorce often results in a sharp drop in the standard of living of children and
their custodial parents.”).
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forcement of child support awards and governmental support of children and mothers to prevent poverty after divorce.
Even if it is true that what matters is economic support and not
paternal involvement per se, absent fathers are still a cause for concern because fathers who maintain significant contact with their children after divorce are more likely to pay child support than fathers
24
who do not maintain contact. Children whose fathers pay child support generally experience fewer emotional and behavioral problems
25
than children whose fathers do not. Although the federal and state
governments spend billions of dollars each year to enforce child sup26
port awards, their efforts have been only marginally successful.
Thus, society and the government may wish to consider encouraging
paternal involvement as it may lead to the payment of child support.
Children consistently report that they wish they had more contact
with their fathers and that they feel abandoned when their fathers are
27
not involved in their lives. Thus, independent of any correlation between paternal disengagement and children’s educational, social, and
behavioral development, children’s emotional well-being in and of itself may be sufficient reason to encourage paternal contact. Unfortunately, because society and the law have traditionally treated fathers as
primarily economic providers, paternal disengagement has not been
perceived as a cause for alarm. Indeed, paternal absence following divorce has been accepted as almost normal. In light of the evidence
suggesting that paternal disengagement is harmful to children, I argue that it is crucial that fathers not abandon their children after divorce.

24

See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text (comparing the child support
payment rate of fathers who maintain some contact with their children with that of uninvolved fathers).
25
See Douglas B. Downey, The School Performance of Children from Single-Mother and
Single-Father Families: Economic or Interpersonal Deprivation?, 15 J. FAM. ISSUES 129, 132
(1994) (describing studies finding that “the father’s financial support was related to
lower problem behavior among children”); Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. et al., Paternal Participation and Children’s Well-Being After Marital Dissolution, 52 AM. SOC. REV. 695, 698-99
(1987) (comparing the effects of different levels of paternal support payments on children’s well-being).
26
In some states the total collection rate is less than ten percent. JANE KNITZER &
STANLEY BERNARD, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, MAP AND TRACK: STATE
INITIATIVES TO ENCOURAGE RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD app. C at 162 tbl.6 (1997).
27
See infra notes 169-77 (examining children’s feelings regarding absent fathers).
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In recent years, legal scholars have produced a significant body of
28
scholarship devoted to the law’s effect on social norms. Norms theorists have argued that the law can and does influence social norms of
29
30
31
marriage and divorce, parenting, sex and race discrimination —
and even norms of smoking, littering, recycling, and cleaning up after
32
our dogs. This Article uses social norms theory to explore how the
law may have contributed to fathers’ disengagement after divorce, and
how it can and should facilitate a norm of involved fatherhood,

28

For a sampling of these works, see generally Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115
(1992); Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231 (2001); Robert D.
Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law,
14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215 (1994); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social
Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253 (1999); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative
Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms:
The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781 (2000). Numerous journals have also
devoted symposia to law and social norms. Symposium, Law, Economics & Norms, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996); Symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic
Analysis of Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998); Symposium, The Legal Construction of
Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000); Symposium, The Legal Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (1998).
29
See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86
VA. L. REV. 1901, 1954 (2000) (arguing that contemporary divorce law has, at least indirectly, contributed to a weakening of spousal commitment norms).
30
See, e.g., id. at 1948-49 (presenting an analysis of “the impact of child support
statutes on parental norms”); see also Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 407-08 (1997) (describing the potential impact on parental norms of laws imposing child safety regulations); David D. Meyer,
Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L REV. 753,
806 (1999) (“Laws that give a child’s caregivers the status of long-term custodians but
deny them the status of parents carry an explicit social meaning, that the caregivers are
something less than the true parents to the child . . . .”); Sarah E. Waldeck, Using Male
Circumcision to Understand Social Norms as Multipliers, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 455, 492-99
(2003) (describing how social norms factor into parents’ decisions whether to circumcise their infant sons).
31
See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 585
(1998) (noting that “[d]uring the period of segregation, social norms punished people
for refusing to discriminate . . . [but a]fter the law imposed desegregation, new social
norms developed to punish discrimination”); Gertrud M. Fremling & Richard Posner,
Status Signaling and the Law, with Particular Application to Sexual Harassment, 147 U. PA.
L. REV. 1069, 1069 (1999) (positing a connection between status and offensiveness in
the law of sexual harassment); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1008,
1026-27 (1995) (discussing “intra-group cooperation and inter-group conflict” and
how these phenomena interplay with social norms).
32
See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914,
918, 937 (1996) (listing various types of social norms).
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thereby encouraging nonresidential fathers to remain actively in33
volved in their children’s upbringing.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I illustrates the law’s
ability to influence social norms in the family context. This Part surveys how the law’s treatment of no-fault divorce and child support has
changed social norms of marriage, divorce, and parental responsibility.
Part II begins by exploring current societal expectations of postdivorce fatherhood and the law’s role in maintaining these expectations. It then analyzes the empirical evidence of paternal disengagement after divorce, and both the literature suggesting that fathers’
presence is important to children’s development and the literature
arguing that economic support is what matters. It is well established
that raising children is a challenging undertaking and that two people
sharing the responsibilities of parenthood are generally better than
one. To the extent that the second person will be the father in the
34
majority of cases, I argue that the father is important not only for his
33

Although unmarried fathers are even less likely than divorced fathers to maintain contact with or support children with whom they do not reside, this Article focuses
on divorced fathers only. My focus is on how the law can encourage fathers to maintain and nurture a parental relationship with their children, rather than on how the
law can facilitate a relationship where one has never existed. The vast majority of divorced fathers share or have shared a parental relationship with their children by virtue of having lived with them. In contrast, many unmarried fathers have never established paternity or shared a parental relationship with their children. POPENOE, supra
note 3, at 20. Thus, encouraging them to parent their children may require a different
approach than the mechanisms I propose, which are aimed at encouraging divorced
fathers to parent. Cf. Frank L. Mott, When Is a Father Really Gone? Paternal-Child Contact
in Father-Absent Homes, 27 DEMOGRAPHY 499, 500 (1990) (“From a psychological perspective, it is not unlikely that the implications of never having had a father present in
the home are quite distinct from having had a father present, albeit for only a short
time.”). Consequently, any discussion of unmarried fathers is beyond the scope of this
Article.
34
I am not arguing that two women or a mother and her new husband cannot
successfully raise a child. Same-sex couples and stepparent families can, and do, successfully raise children. The majority of divorced mothers, however, do not remarry,
and if they do, that marriage is more likely to fail. See Peggy O’Crowley, For Better or
Worse, Jerseyans Accept the End of Marriage, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Oct. 5, 2003 (stating
that, while “four out of 10 first marriages will end in divorce,” two out of three subsequent marriages end in divorce), available at http://www.nj.com/specialprojects/
index.ssf?/specialprojects/divorce/end.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2005). Divorced
mothers are also unlikely to have a female partner as a coparent. Although it is impossible to know how many divorced custodial mothers cohabitate with women partners
or are in lesbian relationships, it is safe to say that they are a small minority of divorced
mothers. See generally Dan Gilgoff, The Rise of the Gay Family, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
May 24, 2004, at 40, 40-41 (estimating that “upwards of a million” children are being
raised by single gay parents and around 160,000 families have two gay parents). As of
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economic contribution, but also because, in most cases, he will be the
logical second person to participate with the residential parent in
35
child rearing.
Part III examines the reasons some fathers nurture their children
while others, including fathers who were very involved in their children’s upbringing during the marriage, disengage from their children
after divorce. This Part summarizes current custody approaches and
analyzes assertions that child custody laws are biased against fathers.
It also addresses divorced fathers’ complaints that “visitation” itself deters them from exercising a parental role after divorce.
Part IV examines the role of social norms in encouraging or deterring nonresidential fathers from parenting their children, and it
proposes that the law adopt a presumption of joint legal custody and
require that nonresidential parents participate in their children’s upbringing. Drawing on norms theorists’ analyses of how social norms
arise, this Part argues that—even with minimal or no legal enforcement—these legal reforms can trigger a norm of paternal involvement
after divorce.
I. LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS
Norms theorists have defined social norms as “social attitudes of
approval and disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what
36
ought not to be done.”
Because people “care what others, even

2002, there were seventy-two million children residing in the United States. JASON
FIELDS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PUB. NO. P20-547, CHILDREN’S LIVING ARRANGEMENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS: MARCH 2002, at 1 (2003). Children who reside
with a lesbian mother and her partner are clearly a small minority. Thus, as a practical
matter, the “natural” or default coparent in most cases will be the divorced father.
35
Although an increasing number of single mothers never intended to involve the
biological father in their children’s upbringing, see, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal.
Rptr. 530, 531 (Ct. App. 1986) (describing a woman’s refusal to include the biological
father of her child in the child’s upbringing); DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS
AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM 81 (1995) (estimating
that “a rapidly growing minority of middle-class mothers”—up to nine percent of all
childbirths—make “the deliberate decision to bear and raise a child without a father”);
Carol A. Donovan, The Uniform Parentage Act and Nonmarital Motherhood-by-Choice, 11
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 193, 193 (1982-1983) (stating that “[a]n increasing
number of unmarried women are choosing to become mothers. . . . intending to raise
their child without the father’s participation”), most women who decide to bear a child
do so with the expectation that the father will be raising the child along with them.
36
Sunstein, supra note 32, at 914; see also Cooter, supra note 31, at 587 (“[A] norm
exists when almost everyone in a community agrees that they ought to behave in a particular way in specific circumstances, and this agreement affects what people actually
do.”).
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37

strangers, think of them,” social norms give community members the
power and authority to punish those who engage in undesirable be38
havior by expressing disapproval or shaming them. Individuals follow social norms because they fear “external nonlegal sanctions,” such
as being shunned by their neighbors or colleagues, and/or because
they have internalized the obligation and will experience guilt if they
39
violate the norm. To illustrate, an individual may engage in an unpleasant task such as recycling (even though the risk of legal sanction
is minimal) because (1) she fears her neighbors’ disapproval (the external nonlegal sanction) if they discover that she does not recycle,
and (2) she feels obligated to recycle because she has internalized the
norm that good neighbors recycle (self-sanction).
There is a growing body of scholarship devoted to the relationship
40
between the law and social norms in the family context. For exam-

37

Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339,
342 (2000).
38
Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697,
1699 (1996); see also Sunstein, supra note 32, at 915 (“[S]ocial norms are enforced
through social sanctions that are, to say the least, pervasive.”). A norm resembles a law,
“except that a private person [such as a neighbor] sanctions the violator of a norm,
whereas a state actor [such as a police officer or judge] sanctions the violator of a law.”
Posner, supra, at 1699; see also Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2000) (noting that “a law is
an obligation backed by a state sanction” and “a social norm is an obligation backed by
a social sanction”). Of course, the same behavior could elicit both legal and nonlegal
enforcement.
39
McAdams, supra note 30, at 340; see also Cooter, supra note 31, at 585 (“When
many people in a community internalize an obligation, it becomes a social norm.”).
For example, as Professor Sunstein has illustrated, law enforcement officers generally
do not enforce laws requiring dog owners to clean up after their dogs, but such laws
signal appropriate behavior and implant the expectation of social disapproval, and
hence shame, in those who deviate from that behavior. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2032-33 (1996). Thus, people clean up
after their dogs because they would be ashamed if it became apparent to their neighbors that they do not clean up after their dogs, even though violation of the law is unlikely to lead to any legal sanctions. Id. at 2032.
40
See, e.g., Scott, supra note 29, at 1905 (arguing that no-fault divorce laws may
have “undermined beneficial norms that contributed to marital stability”); see also
STEVEN L. NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN’S LIVES 23 (1998) (discussing how domestic relations laws reflect social norms); William Bishop, ‘Is He Married?’: Marriage as Information, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 245, 248-54 (1984) (discussing the signaling effects of the institution of marriage and the consequences for social norms); Meyer, supra note 30, at
806 (discussing the effects of guardianship and adoption laws on social norms of parenthood); Eric A. Posner, Family Law and Social Norms, in THE FALL AND RISE OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 256, 268-72 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) (discussing the influence
of social norms on marriage laws); Waldeck, supra note 30, at 502 (arguing that the law
can be used to change norms for circumcision).
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ple, Professor Waldeck has argued that the law can shift social norms
41
of neonatal circumcision toward a norm of noncircumcision, and
Professors Brinig and Buckley have argued that divorce rates have
42
been heavily influenced by social norms. Similarly, Professor Scott
has argued that legal reforms have inadvertently weakened social
43
norms of marriage as a lifelong commitment. In this Part, I focus on
Professor Scott’s work on law and social norms in the context of marital commitment and parenting to illustrate how the law has generally
influenced social norms in the family context.
Divorce rates have risen dramatically in the last thirty years.
Scholars have cited many reasons for the increase in marital instability, such as women’s entry into the workforce, the women’s move44
45
ment, the sexual revolution, and the increase in American families’
46
geographic mobility. Without denying the impact of these factors on
the divorce rate, Professor Scott argues that the law’s recognition of
no-fault divorce in the 1970s led to an increase in the proportion of
47
couples ending their marriages. She notes that, until relatively recently, Americans thought of marriage as a lifelong commitment, in
part, because the law made it virtually impossible for couples to di-

41

Waldeck, supra note 30, at 502.
Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding and Monitoring Theories, 73 IND. L.J. 393, 415 (1998) (noting that current divorce rates may reflect a decline in social stigma).
43
Scott, supra note 29, at 1905.
44
See id. at 1936 (citing women’s entry into the workforce and the women’s
movement as possible contributing factors); see also Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W.
Allen, “These Boots are Made for Walking”: Why Most Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 AM. L.
ECON. REV. 126, 129 (2000) (noting that “women file for divorce more often than
men” and that “some evidence suggests they are more likely to instigate separation”
(emphases omitted)).
45
See Kris Franklin, Note, “A Family Like Any Other Family:” Alternative Methods of
Defining Family in Law, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1027, 1043 (1990-1991) (arguing that as a result of the sexual revolution, “marriage was no longer either inevitable or necessarily permanent, since sex was more freely available both before and outside of the matrimonial bond”).
46
See Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, and the Problematic Persistence of
Traditional Marital Roles, 34 FAM. L.Q. 1, 7-14 (2000) (noting that states with a higher
rate of “in-migration” have higher divorce rates).
47
Scott, supra note 29, at 1954 & n.143; cf. JUSTIN WOLFERS, DID UNILATERAL
DIVORCE LAWS RAISE DIVORCE RATES? A RECONCILIATION AND NEW RESULTS 13 (Stanford Law Sch., John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 264, Aug.
2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding that no-fault divorce
laws “led to an immediate spike in the divorce rate,” but that this effect dissipated over
time such that no effect could be detected after a decade), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=444620.
42
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vorce. The law’s refusal to allow couples to legally end their marriages
without good cause, along with its imposition of criminal and financial
penalties on spouses who violated norms of appropriate marital be48
havior, reinforced social norms of marriage as a permanent union.
Although the community informally enforced marital commitment
49
norms by shaming and shunning individuals who violated such
50
norms, the law’s requirement of fault grounds for divorce further re51
inforced those norms by censuring violators. The law even influenced the creation of norms of appropriate behavior within a marriage by defining marital norms. For example, by making adultery,
cruelty, or habitual drunkenness grounds for divorce, the law clarified
the type of behavior that was unacceptable within a marriage and, by
implication, signaled that behavior that the law did not sanction was
52
not so egregious.
Although few newlyweds contemplate that their marriage might
53
end in divorce, Professor Scott argues that by making it easier for

48

These penalties include, for example, adultery laws. Professor Scott argues that,
by making adultery a crime, recognizing the tort of interference with marital relations,
and penalizing the wrongdoer spouse when distributing the marital assets, the law
made it costly for spouses and third parties to violate the marital norm of sexual fidelity. Scott, supra note 29, at 1931. The law’s refusal to recognize nonmarital intimate
relationships further reinforced marital commitment norms. Id. at 1904.
49
“Shunning” is a long-term sanction:
administered some time after the wrongdoing is detected and may be carried
out by persons other than the person who discovered the violation. The enforcer can damage the violator’s reputation by gossiping or badmouthing.
Members of the community then may “shun” or stigmatize the miscreant or
block him from attaining status positions.
Geoffrey P. Miller, Norm Enforcement in the Public Sphere: The Case of Handicapped Parking,
71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 895, 904 (2003).
50
Fault grounds for divorce included adultery, desertion, extreme cruelty, etc.
See, e.g., Ala. Code § 20-2-1 (2004) (stating that, for example, the court has the power
to grant a divorce upon the filing of one party if the other has committed adultery, has
been absent for more than one year, or has become an alcoholic or drug addict following marriage).
51
Scott, supra note 29, at 1924 (arguing that the law influenced social norms surrounding marriage by defining marital norms and by sanctioning norm violations
when community enforcement and self-enforcement (guilt) did not deter violators).
52
Id. at 1931.
53
Indeed, one study of engaged and recently married couples found that, while
most of the couples surveyed were well aware that the divorce rate is close to fifty percent, all of them were sure that their marriage would not end in divorce. See Lynn A.
Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993) (finding that “the median response of the marriage license applicants was 0% when assessing the likelihood that they personally would divorce” (emphasis omitted)).
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spouses to end their marriage, no-fault divorce laws inadvertently
54
“signal that marriage is a transitory commitment.” Further, in contrast to the fault grounds setting forth behavioral rules during the
marriage, no-fault laws—by “effectively abolish[ing] concrete rules of
marital commitment”—leave spouses and community members without guidance as to appropriate standards of behavior, leaving each
spouse to decide for him- or herself whether his or her behavior is ap55
propriate. Professor Scott asks, “if relational failure justifies divorce,
what effort must be expended before declaring that the relationship
has truly failed? To what extent and in what ways are the parties
56
obliged to act so as to avoid marital failure?” No-fault divorce laws
do not provide any answers. Rather, their lack of concrete behavioral
expectations and their provision of an easy exit destabilize marriages
that could have survived in a fault-based system by weakening the
commitment norms that discourage spouses from giving up on their
57
marriages when difficulties arise. Legal reforms also weakened the
likelihood and effectiveness of community enforcement (i.e., shaming
of norm violators) because communities find it difficult to determine
whether a certain behavior violates a norm when there are no longer
58
Acany clear expectations of marital behavior and commitment.
cording to Professor Scott, once it became easier to obtain a divorce,
more couples divorced, making divorce more common and commu59
nity enforcement of marital commitment norms less effective. The
community can sanction a small number of norm violators, but when
many couples are ending their marriages community enforcement of
the norm is less likely and less effective in influencing the behavior of
potential violators.
Professor Scott has also shown—by analyzing the impact of child
support legislation on parenting norms—how the law has influenced
54

Scott, supra note 29, at 1902-03. Professor Scott argues that the legal recognition of nonmarital cohabitation relationships (i.e., palimony) has also influenced the
social meaning of marriage. Id. at 1943.
55
Id. at 1905.
56
Id. at 1952.
57
See id. at 1952-54 (arguing that “the broad normative commitment standard
embraced by most individuals entering marriage is no longer particularized by guidelines describing specific behavioral expectations”). Following the withdrawal of legal
enforcement, the number of persons divorcing increased. This increase included both
those couples who would have been trapped in failed marriages before no-fault divorce
laws, but also those for whom the withdrawal of legal enforcement undermined marital
stability. Id.
58
Id. at 1952.
59
Id. at 1954.
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social norms regarding noncustodial parents’ financial responsibility
for their children. In the 1970s and early 1980s, there was a general
societal consensus that parents should continue supporting their children after divorce, but failure to pay child support was not treated by
60
the law as a serious offense. Although society disapproved of fathers
61
who failed to pay child support, throughout this era legal enforce62
ment of child support obligations remained lax, and “there was initially some uncertainty about the parameters of parental responsibil63
ity.”
Currently, there is a strong norm of financial responsibility for
64
nonresidential fathers. Fathers who do not pay child support are
now portrayed as criminals and are clearly ostracized in many communities. For example, major newspapers post photographs of
“deadbeat” fathers—those who are delinquent in their child support
65
payments—on their front pages, and state agencies’ websites feature
66
“wanted” ads of deadbeat parents. Why does society now treat non-

60

See id. at 1947-48 (discussing the rise in the publicity and social stigmatization of
irresponsible parents).
61
Id.
62
“Until the mid-1980s, the federal government and most states treated childsupport obligations as a private matter” between the child’s mother and father. Anne
C. Case et al., Explaining Trends in Child Support: Economic, Demographic, and Policy Effects, 40 DEMOGRAPHY 171, 187 (2003).
63
Scott, supra note 29, at 1948.
64
See, e.g., Scott Altman, A Theory of Child Support, 17 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 173,
190 (2003) (stating that nonpayment of child support violates a social norm).
65
See Susan Edelman, Deadbeat-Dad Dragnet: Feds Nab Well-Off Men Whose Kids Live
in Poverty, N.Y. POST, Aug. 4, 2002, at 12 (listing New York’s top ten deadbeat fathers),
available at 2002 WL 24774401; Heidi Evans, City’s Deadbeat Dads’ Hall of Shame: Millions
Owed by the Men Who Shirk Child Support, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 3, 2002, at 6 (listing New
York’s most delinquent noncustodial fathers), available at 2002 WL 3165597; see also
Paul Rioux, Cops Book 14 Parents as Suspected Deadbeats, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
Oct. 10, 2002, at B1 (listing the names and addresses of delinquent parents who were
arrested for nonpayment), available at 2002 WL 25259499; Jason Straziuso, Miss. Seeks
‘10 Most Wanted’ Deadbeat Dads, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), Sept. 4, 2002, at B7
(reporting that the state of Mississippi would post photographs and information about
the ten most wanted deadbeat parents in post offices, in county buildings, and online),
available at 2002 WL 24946557.
66
See, e.g., Most Wanted Delinquent Parents, L.A. County Child Support Servs. Dep’t,
at http://childsupport.co.la.ca.us/dlparents.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2005) (listing
names of parents wanted for failure to pay child support); 25 Most Wanted, Wanted by
the State of New Mexico for Neglecting their Children for Not Paying Child Support, Child Support Enforcement Div., N.M. Human Servs. Dep’t, at http://www.state.nm.us/hsd/
wanted.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2005) (same); Wanted for Failure to Pay Child Support,
Div. of Child Support Enforcement, Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., at http://www.de.state.az.us/
dcse/wanted.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2005) (same); Wyoming’s Most Wanted Irresponsible
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payment of child support as an egregious violation of a parenting
norm? According to Professor Scott, child support laws strengthened
67
vague norms of parental financial responsibility. Although for years
there existed a general societal consensus that parents should support
their children after divorce, the enactment of federal child support
68
legislation in the 1980s and 1990s formally expressed this consen69
sus. Further, the federal government’s requirement that states enact
child support guidelines, along with the creation of a comprehensive
federal enforcement system, prescribed concrete rules delineating
nonresidential parents’ financial obligations, thereby quantifying the
70
norm.
As shown in Part II.C.3, many parents do not comply with child
support orders. It is undeniable, however, that compliance has increased since the enactment of federal child support enforcement leg71
islation. As Professor Scott has argued, enforcement legislation has
been at least somewhat effective, not only because of its strict en72
forcement mechanisms, but also because it stimulated informal en-

Parents, Wanted Program, Child Support Enforcement, Wyo. Dep’t of Family Servs., at
http://dfsweb.state.wy.us/csehome/wywant02.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2005) (same).
67
Scott, supra note 29, at 1948.
68
See Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-521, 106 Stat. 3403
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (imposing “a criminal penalty for flight to avoid” child support obligations); Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.)
(revising the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program to emphasize child
support and establishment of paternity); Child Support Enforcement Amendments of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and
42 U.S.C.) (requiring mandatory income withholding and providing for incentive
payments to states for improving effectiveness of child support enforcement).
69
See Scott, supra note 29, at 1948 (“Child support legislation expressed a societal
consensus that non-custodial parents continue to bear responsibility for their children . . . .”).
70
See id. (explaining that the federal “guidelines provided concrete rules to quantify the obligation”).
71
See Altman, supra note 64, at 174 (noting that enforcement of child support has
improved). Compare TIMOTHY GRALL, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PUB. NO. P60-212,
CHILD SUPPORT FOR CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND FATHERS: 1997, at 7 tbl.B (2000) (finding that out of 3.6 million custodial divorced mothers in the United States, roughly 1.7
million, or 47%, received child support payments in 1997), with Case et al., supra note
62, at 171-72, 181-85 (noting that “30% of children received some child-support income in 1976” and linking the enforcement of child support during the 1980s to the
rise in child-support payments).
72
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 228(a) (2000) (providing for federal criminal prosecution
of parents who owe $5,000 or more in child support obligations or have unpaid obligations for more than one year); 42 U.S.C. §§ 666(a)(8), (b)(3) (2000) (providing for
automatic wage withholding for noncustodial parents); 42 U.S.C. § 666(f) (2000)
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73

forcement. Many of the penalties imposed on delinquent parents
seek to obtain compliance by interfering with the parents’ ability to go
about their daily lives—for example, by revoking their driver’s or pro74
fessional licenses. According to Professor Scott, however, there is
another purpose behind many of these formal sanctions: “to stimulate norm internalization and to employ informal community en75
forcement as a supplement to formal sanctions.” To illustrate, the
Virginia Child Support Enforcement Agency “boots” delinquent par76
ents’ cars by attaching pink or blue immobilizing boots to the wheels.
The primary purpose is to deprive delinquent parents of the use of
their vehicles in order to motivate them to pay child support. However, the conspicuously marked boots also serve to shame the delinquent parent by making it apparent to friends, colleagues, neighbors,
and family members that the owner is a “deadbeat.” The policy promotes compliance because the delinquent parent not only fears the
loss of the car’s utility, but also wishes to “avoid community disap77
proval.” Similarly, the suspension of a father’s driver’s or professional license alone may not motivate him to comply with a child support order, but the added risk that others in the community will learn
of the sanction and know that he does not support his children makes
violating the norm of parental financial responsibility significantly
more costly.
As Professor Scott has shown, legal reforms designed to reinforce
desirable social norms of parental financial obligation have been at
least somewhat effective and relatively uncontroversial. Clearly, the
78
law sometimes influences “norms of family obligation.” Below, I explore how the law has contributed to the creation and maintenance of
a norm of economic fatherhood.

(providing for nationwide personal jurisdiction by requiring states to adopt the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act).
73
Scott, supra note 29, at 1926.
74
Id. at 1948.
75
Id. at 1948 & n.129 (stating that the “withdraw[al of] driving privileges and professional licenses” is likely “to generate community gossip”).
76
Id. at 1926.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 1904.
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II. CURRENT NORMS OF POST-DIVORCE FATHERHOOD
A. Ambiguous Expectations
For most of the twentieth century, social scientists have treated fathers as less important to children’s mental and emotional develop79
ment than mothers. This perception has led to differing expectations of mothers and fathers after divorce. For example, when a
couple with children gets divorced, we still expect that the mother will
80
have residential custody and the father will have visitation. Indeed,
society still presumes that a mother who does not reside with her children after divorce must be unfit—a drug addict or psychologically un81
stable—and that she has “lost” or “relinquished” custody. At the
same time, we assume that a nonresidential divorced father does not
82
want and should not have residential custody.

79

See ROSS D. PARKE, FATHERS 4 (1981) (noting that psychologists have studied
the importance of mothers but have intentionally neglected fathers “because of our
assumption that they [are] less important than mothers in influencing the developing
child”); Jerry W. McCant, The Cultural Contradiction of Fathers as Nonparents, 21 FAM.
L.Q. 127, 129 (1987) (stating that many people believe “children cannot experience
healthy development without maternal influence but they may get along quite well
without a father”); Richard Louv, The Crisis of the Absent Father, PARENTS, July 1993, at
54-55 (noting that “until very recently, the father’s role as a nurturer was viewed . . . as
secondary to the mother’s”).
80
Most social scientists, along with nonresidential fathers, dislike the term “visitation” because it is demeaning to parents, implying that they “visit” as opposed to parent or spend time with their children. Courts and legislatures have recently become
more sensitive to how they label nonresidential parents’ time with their children and
many states now use terms such as “parenting time” instead of visitation. See, e.g., Jack
P. Haynes, Focus on the Children, MICH. B.J., June 2002, at 27, 27 (“Since 1996, Michigan
statutes have exclusively used the term ‘parenting time’ because the term ‘visitation’
often has been considered demeaning or minimizing to a non-custodial parent.”); see
also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27a (West 2002) (using the term “parenting time”);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.1705 (2002) (same); BLANKENHORN, supra note 35, at 155
(discussing criticisms of the term “visiting father”); NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING
FATHERHOOD 136-37 (2000) (asserting that “shared parenting” is a euphemism for
“visitation”); WARREN FARRELL, FATHER AND CHILD REUNION: HOW TO BRING THE
DADS WE NEED TO THE CHILDREN WE LOVE 187 (2001) (asserting that “visitation” suggests winners and losers and “reflects the era of the absentee father,” while “parent
time” evokes the image of having two parents and promotes fathers’ post-divorce involvement in their children’s lives).
81
See Joan B. Kelly, Further Observations on Joint Custody, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 762,
767-69 (1983) (stating that women are “presumed by society, lawyers, the courts, and
themselves to have a right to keep the children in their care and protection”).
82
See McCant, supra note 79, at 134 (arguing that there is “strong cultural bias and
discrimination when [a father] seeks either custody or joint custody of his children”).
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Although society now encourages men to become more involved
83
with childbirth and child rearing when they live with their children,
divorced fathers still “face ambiguous messages from their families,”
society, and the law about their responsibilities to children with whom
84
they do not live. Commentators have noted that, although the law
has made clear that fathers must financially support their children after divorce, society and the law lack clear rules as to other (nonfinan85
cial) paternal responsibilities. Consequently, nonresidential fathers
86
are confused as to their proper roles after divorce. In most cases, a
divorced mother will continue taking care of the children as she did
during the marriage and, even in those rare cases where her children
do not live with her after divorce, society still recognizes her as a
87
mother. In contrast, society treats a divorced father as less of a fa88
ther.

83

See text accompanying notes 2-11 (detailing the developing role of fathers in
society).
84
Judith A. Seltzer, Relationships Between Fathers and Children Who Live Apart: The
Father’s Role After Separation, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 79, 81 (1991); see also TERRY
ARENDELL, FATHERS & DIVORCE 172 (1995) (quoting a father as stating that “[m]ost
divorced fathers do not get support and understanding from their own relatives” and
that because most people have been raised by their mothers while their fathers
worked, his adult family members do not understand why he is “so miserable with [visitation]”); Scott Coltrane & Neal Hickman, The Rhetoric of Rights and Needs: Moral Discourse in the Reform of Child Custody and Child Support Laws, 39 SOC. PROBS. 400, 407
(1992) (noting that fathers complain that judges “routinely remove fathers from their
children’s lives and relegate men to ‘little more than financial providers and occasional visitors’” (quoting Jack Arbuthnot, Fathers’ Rights, 1 DAD 7, 41 (1990))).
85
See Seltzer, supra note 84, at 81 (explaining that the father’s role after separation is undefined, such that “[r]ecently divorced fathers gingerly attempt to establish
ways to stay involved in their children’s lives but are uncertain about how their children and ex-wives will react to these attempts”); see also ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 172
(explaining that, while continuing financial obligations are clear, other parental responsibilities are not); DOWD, supra note 80, at 139 (asserting that while fathers’ “support obligations have been strengthened and regularized, no corresponding duty of
care has developed”); McKenry et al., supra note 21, at 308 (noting that it is unclear
what the role of the noncustodial father should be and that the divorce literature offers little guidance as to an appropriate role).
86
ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 172-73.
87
See id. at 171 (noting that women are mothers regardless of marital status because there is legal and cultural support for motherhood); POPENOE, supra note 3, at
25 (“Whatever their marital state, when women bear children they generally assume
responsibility for those children and continue to care for them over the course of their
lives. For men, this is not the case.”).
88
See ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 171 (noting that unlike mothers, fathers’ parental identity is disrupted by divorce as there is no conception of fatherhood that parallels the cultural idealization of motherhood). Fathers feel that society treats them as if
they are “not part of the family, [not] part of society anymore [after divorce].” Id. at
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As a result of our differing perceptions and expectations of mothers and fathers, and their commitment and importance to their children, the societal norm of post-divorce fatherhood is still primarily
89
economic. In many communities, so long as a divorced father pays
child support—even if he does nothing else for his children—he is
90
perceived as a decent, maybe even a good, father. Even if he has little contact with his children, so long as he supports them financially
he will not elicit the moral opprobrium of most of his neighbors, coworkers, or relatives. We have only to look at the labels used to describe fathers who do not financially support their children (“deadbeats,” “deadbeat dads”) and the law’s and media’s obsession with
91
such fathers and contrast it with the lack of attention given to fathers
I refer to as “emotional deadbeats” to conclude that society condemns
economic deadbeat dads but apparently cares little about emotional
deadbeats.
As Professor Dowd has argued, because being a father is equated
with being an economic provider and little else, paternal disengage92
ment does not violate societal expectations of fathering. Thus, society nonchalantly accepts that many fathers will abandon their children
after divorce. “[T]he pattern of post-divorce fathering as limited or
93
nonexistent nurturing is accepted as ‘natural.’” Further, many people assume that fatherhood is of little significance to most men and
that they can easily walk away from their children after divorce with94
out suffering any negative psychological or emotional consequences.

64; see also BLANKENHORN, supra note 35, at 65 (1995) (“Compared to mothers, fathers
are less born than made. As a social role, fatherhood is less the inelastic result of sexual embodiment than the fragile creation of cultural norms.”).
89
See Nancy E. Dowd, Rethinking Fatherhood, 48 FLA. L. REV. 523, 529 (1996) (noting that “[t]he dominant expectation and focus of the divorce model is economic fathering, i.e., the payment of child support”); Seltzer, supra note 84, at 80-81 (pointing
to the “[w]ide variation in postdivorce” levels of paternal involvement as evidence that
there are no “clear rules or norms” of post-divorce fatherhood).
90
DOWD, supra note 80, at 139.
91
See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (citing newspapers and government websites that stigmatize delinquent parents as “deadbeats”).
92
See Dowd, supra note 89, at 530 (discussing the “economic model” of fatherhood
and describing “post-divorce fathering as limited or nonexistent”).
93
Id. She notes that society would be seriously alarmed if mothers were abandoning their children at similar rates as fathers because we have different expectations of
what it means to be a mother. See id. at 523 (noting that fathers abandon their children far more often than do mothers).
94
Id.
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95

As shown below, these assumptions are largely inaccurate, yet they
enable society to see fathers’ roles after divorce as largely economic.
96
The law shares this view of economic fatherhood. In most states,
so long as nonresidential fathers pay child support, they have satisfied
97
their legal obligations to their children. The law does not require
that nonresidential fathers see their children, provide them with
moral or educational guidance, or meet their friends and teachers. It
merely requires that they support their children financially; it does
98
not require that they parent them. By failing to demand that nonresidential divorced fathers take a more active role in their children’s
lives, and by imposing few consequences when they abandon their
children, the state enables disengaged parenthood and sends fathers
99
the message that their presence is not important.
The law also does little to encourage nonresidential divorced fathers to participate in their children’s upbringing. Judges in the vast
majority of states routinely order or approve custody and visitation arrangements that leave mothers with a significantly larger share of parental responsibilities after divorce or separation and that limit fa100
By focusing on
thers’ responsibilities to paying child support.

95

See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
Although child support laws are gender neutral, because most nonresidential
parents are men, it is usually fathers who are ordered to pay child support. Thus, the
economic terms of nonresidential parenthood are primarily imposed on fathers. See
Dowd, supra note 89, at 530 (discussing the application of technically gender neutral
custody laws).
97
See id. at 529 (“[F]athers are not legally sanctioned for failure to spend time
with their children that they committed to spend under custody and visitation
schemes.”).
98
See McCant, supra note 79, at 139 (“[A father’s] legal duty is to provide financially for his child. There are no obligations to create more meaningful social relations with his offspring.” (quoting ARTHUR D. COLMAN & LIBBY COLMAN, EARTH
FATHER/SKY FATHER: THE CHANGING CONCEPT OF FATHERING 122 (1981))).
99
See, e.g., ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 172 (discussing undefined paternal responsibilities post-divorce, aside from financial obligations). The state does not require
very much from nonresidential mothers, either. It does not require that they maintain
contact with their children or participate in their upbringing. Society, however, does
expect mothers—even if they do not have custody—to continue nurturing their children and shuns those relatively few mothers who do not. Id. at 171. Thus, social
norms encourage nonresidential mothers to nurture their children even if the law
does not. Cf. id. at 144 (“[P]aternal absence was not met with wholesale condemnation
from others.”).
100
Cf. Dowd, supra note 89, at 529 (finding that “most custody and visitation
schemes envision only a limited fathering role,” one that is mostly economic); Furstenberg, supra note 1, at 209 (arguing that social norms contribute to maintenance of the
status quo by denying fathers the resources to assume greater parental responsibility).
96
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fathers’ financial contributions, to the exclusion of their nonpecuniary contributions, the law perpetuates an economic model of fa101
therhood. Indeed, one commentator has argued that “[b]y sending
a distinct message to divorced fathers that they are not essential to the
raising of children beyond supplying a percentage of their paychecks
to the mother . . . and perhaps a couple of hours a week of ‘visitation’ . . . the state has encouraged divorced fathers to abandon true
102
As another commentator has noted, sociolegal
fatherhood.”
“[s]upport for the nurturing aspect of fatherhood is very limited [in103
deed].”
Many fathers themselves define their parenting roles after divorce
104
primarily in economic terms. They believe they have little influence
105
Many divorced fathers who
in their children’s lives after divorce.
pay child support and see their children sporadically describe themselves as good fathers precisely because they compare themselves, not
106
By this stanto mothers or married fathers, but to absent fathers.
dard, any level of involvement with their children indicates that they
are doing a pretty good job of parenting. Thus, far from seeing their
own limited involvement in their children’s upbringing as deviant,
“[p]arental association of any kind evoke[s] a stance of self101

See, e.g., Greer Litton Fox & Priscilla White Blanton, Noncustodial Fathers Following Divorce, 20 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 257, 260 (arguing that through custody laws, visitation, and child support, “society at large becomes an important player in constructing the post-divorce family,” because “[n]ormative expectation and values about
appropriate family relations are expressed through custody, visitation, and child support”).
102
Cynthia A. McNeely, Lagging Behind the Times: Parenthood, Custody, and Gender
Bias in the Family Court, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 891, 895 (1998).
103
Dowd, supra note 89, at 526.
104
See Marilyn Ihinger-Tallman et al., Developing a Middle-Range Theory of Father Involvement Postdivorce, in FATHERHOOD: CONTEMPORARY THEORY, RESEARCH, AND SOCIAL
POLICY, supra note 4, at 57, 74 (suggesting that because fathers view their post-divorce
role as that of economic provider, economic well-being and stable employment will
tend to strengthen their involvement with their children).
105
See James W. Loewen, Visitation Fatherhood, in FATHERHOOD TODAY: MEN’S
CHANGING ROLE IN THE FAMILY 195, 205 (Phyllis Bronstein & Carolyn Pape Cowan
eds., 1988) (finding that while only 20% of noncustodial fathers believed they had
much influence over their children, custodial mothers thought even that was an overstatement); John Leo, A Family Plan for Uncle Sam, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 30,
1992, at 22 (citing a study by Sylvia Ann Hewlett that found that many absent fathers
were surprised by research indicating that fathers are important to children); Louv,
supra note 79, at 54 (noting that some fathers vaguely understand the importance of
fathering and its impact on children, but cannot express why it is so important).
106
See ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 157-58 (reporting that men interviewed for the
study considered even small parenting efforts to be laudable, as compared with fathers
they knew who disengaged completely).
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congratulation” because in a sense, those fathers who have some
(even if sporadic) involvement with their children are surpassing the
107
Further, one study
norm of uninvolved fatherhood after divorce.
found that most divorced fathers believe paternal absence is acceptable “under certain circumstances” and thus are not willing to condemn those fathers who have disappeared from their children’s lives
108
completely.
Although many fathers have accepted this sociolegal norm of economic fatherhood, this may be starting to change. An increasing
number of fathers are playing an integral role in their children’s up109
bringing after divorce, and among middle- and upper-class fathers
especially, there has been an increase in the level of involvement after
110
divorce.
The increase in the proportion of involved, nurturing fa111
thers and the proliferation of fathers’ rights organizations and
112
books on post-divorce fatherhood suggest that an increasing num107

Id., at 158. One father in Arendell’s study said: “[A]t least I haven’t checked
out like lots of guys in my situation have. I’ve hung in there and struggled. But most
guys just leave, hang it up and leave.” Id.
108
See id. at 144.
109
See McCant, supra note 79, at 141 (noting that many fathers are rejecting the
sole provider role and want to be nurturers as well).
110
Cf. Furstenberg, supra note 4, at 119-20 (observing that socioeconomic status
and race serve as indicators of post-divorce paternal involvement).
111
See Alison S. Pally, Father by Newspaper Ad: The Impact of In Re The Adoption of a
Minor Child on the Definition of Fatherhood, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 169, 190 (2004)
(“By the mid-1980s there were over 200 Fathers’ Rights groups in every state.”). Promise Keepers—the largest fathers’ organization in the United States—was formed in
1990, and by 1996, 1.1 million men attended Promise Keepers events at twenty-two stadiums nationwide. Wade F. Horn, You’ve Come a Long Way, Daddy, POL’Y REV., JulyAug. 1997, at 24, 28. It “has a full-time staff of more than 400, and an annual budget of
nearly $100 million.” Id. Some other visible organizations are the American Coalition
for Fathers and Children, Fathers for Equal Rights, the National Congress for Men and
Children, the National Fatherhood Initiative, and Parents Without Partners. For more
information on these organizations, see ACFC, at http://www.acfc.org (last visited Jan.
30, 2005) (American Coalition for Fathers and Children); Men’s Movement Organizations, at http://www.menweb.org/throop/orgs/orgs.html#fatherequal (last visited Jan.
30, 2005) (Fathers for Equal Rights); National Fatherhood Initiative, at http://
fatherhood.org (last visited Jan. 30, 2005); NCFC – National Congress for Fathers and
Children Quick Cover Page, at http://www.ncfc.net (last visited Jan. 30, 2005); Parents
Without Partners Home Page, at http://www.parentswithoutpartners.org (last visited
Jan. 30, 2005).
112
See generally ARENDELL, supra note 84 (giving voice to the male perspective of
divorce, based on interviews with seventy-five divorced men); BLANKENHORN, supra
note 35 (arguing that fatherlessness is at the root of America’s most important social
problems); BRAVER, supra note 20 (asserting, based on over 1,000 interviews with divorced couples, that the negative image of divorced dads is undeserved mythology);
DOWD, supra note 80 (proposing a new definition of fatherhood centered on nurtur-

944

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 153: 921

ber of Americans are starting to believe that fatherhood entails more
than financial responsibility. Indeed, more men are seeking joint or
113
sole custody and fathers’ advocates are fighting against what they
perceive as a maternal preference in the courts and for fathers’ rights
114
to remain a part of their children’s lives after divorce. In addition,
an increasing number of Americans surveyed believe that children
115
benefit when their fathers are involved in their upbringing; and the
media is increasingly portraying in a positive light fathers who are ac116
The fact that a sigtively involved in their children’s upbringing.
nificant percentage of divorced fathers and their current partners are
117
members of fathers’ rights organizations, and that many judges and

ing); FARRELL, supra note 80 (arguing that society is becoming increasingly supportive
of men’s roles in the family after divorce); JEFFERY M. LEVING, FATHERS’ RIGHTS:
HARD -H ITTING & FAIR ADVICE FOR EVERY FATHER INVOLVED IN A CUSTODY DISPUTE
(1997) (offering advice to fathers on how to stay involved in their children’s lives after
divorce); ROSS D. PARKE & ARMIN A. BROTT, THROWAWAY DADS: THE MYTHS AND
BARRIERS THAT KEEP MEN FROM BEING THE FATHERS THEY WANT TO BE (1999) (identifying sociological barriers that prevent men from being more involved with their families); POPENOE, supra note 3, (explaining the historic causes of modern fatherlessness
and proposing methods for rebuilding fatherhood and marriage); RICHARD A.
WARSHAK, THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION: THE FATHER FACTOR AND THE MOTHERHOOD
MYSTIQUE (1992) (arguing that the myth that mothers are uniquely suited to raise
children has harmed children of divorce by reducing their contact with their fathers).
113
McCant, supra note 79, at 141.
114
See Dowd, supra note 89, at 530 (noting that the fatherhood movement’s common ground is its claim that the legal system disregards fathers’ desires to nurture
their children after marital disruption); Herma Hill Kay, No-Fault Divorce and Child Custody: Chilling Out the Gender Wars, 36 FAM. L.Q. 27, 36 (2002) (noting that the fathers’
movement seeks legislation for joint custody and friendly-parent laws, i.e., laws favoring
as custodian the parent who will encourage the other parent’s relationship with the
child); Thom Weidlich, Dads’ Rights Advocates Come of Age, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 13, 1995, at
A1, A21 (reporting that fathers’ rights’ advocates want mediation, parent counseling, a
presumption of joint custody, and enforcement of their visitation rights).
115
See Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38
UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1460 (1991) (“In modern America, unlike in earlier decades, most
people believe that children need mothers and fathers in their lives.”); Horn, supra
note 111, at 29 (“A 1996 Gallup Poll found that 79 percent of Americans believe ‘the
most significant family or social problem facing America is the physical absence of the
father from the home.’”); Basia Hellwig, How Working Women Have Changed America,
WORKING WOMAN, Nov. 1986, at 129, 137 (“Nine in ten Americans today agree that it
is important for fathers to spend as much time with their children as mothers do . . .”).
116
See supra note 5 and accompanying text (listing films and television shows depicting nurturing fathers).
117
See ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 48 (noting that most men in the study were
aware of the men’s movement and seventeen out of seventy-five had been involved in it
for more than a few months). Interestingly, women comprise half the members of the
fathers’ movement, and many hold influential positions. Glenn Sacks & Dianna
Thompson, Why Are There So Many Women in the Fathers’ Movement?, MINNEAPOLIS STAR

2005]

BEYOND ECONOMIC FATHERHOOD

945

118

politicians sympathize with their concerns, is further evidence that
societal expectations of post-divorce fatherhood may be slowly shifting
away from a norm of primarily economic fatherhood. Society may fi119
At the
nally be ready to embrace a more involved role for fathers.
very least, some Americans are wondering whether divorced fathers
120
should be providing more than just child support to their children.
The law has also started to recognize that fathers are important.
As discussed below, fathers’ advocates have been successful in abolishing express maternal preferences in child custody laws and lobbying

TRIB., June 21, 2002, available at http://www.glennsacks.com/why_are_there.htm (last
visited Jan. 30, 2005).
118
See ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 49 (noting that “state legislators, judges, [and]
family law attorneys” are members of fathers’ rights organizations, although some remain unofficial due to their professional status as upholders of the law); Weidlich, supra note 114, at A1 (quoting a family lawyer, who noted that fathers’ groups were
originally composed of “angry men and not many professionals . . . [but n]ow we have
a lot of lawyers, doctors, politicians, [and] journalists” among the members, and as a
result, the movement is “more mainstream”). Indeed, in 2001, President Bush appointed a former president of the National Fatherhood Initiative as assistant secretary
of family support in the Department of Health and Human Services. William C. Smith,
Dads Want Their Day: Fathers Charge Legal Bias Toward Moms Hamstrings Them as FullTime Parents, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2003, at 38, 43. Many fatherhood movement leaders believe their organizations have been influential in getting Americans to realize that fathers are important. See Horn, supra note 111, at 24 (praising the emergence of the
fatherhood movement and the growing awareness of the problem of fatherlessness); cf.
Judith Stacey, Dada-ism in the 1990s: Getting Past Baby Talk About Fatherlessness, in LOST
FATHERS: THE POLITICS OF FATHERLESSNESS IN AMERICA 51, 71 (Cynthia R. Daniels
ed., 1998) (arguing that misguided claims by fathers’ movement scholars about the
harms of fatherlessness have led to dangerous legislative proposals, such as repealing
no-fault divorce).
119
Of course, economic fatherhood and nurturing fatherhood are not mutually
exclusive. A father can support his children financially and emotionally just as “modern” fathers who reside with their children do.
120
The media has been integral to the fathers’ rights movement’s success in disseminating its message that fathers matter. Indeed, fathers’ rights advocates credit
Vice President Dan Quayle’s attack on television sitcom character Murphy Brown during his reelection speech in 1992 with bringing the fathers’ rights movement to the
forefront. See Horn, supra note 111, at 27 (suggesting that Vice President Quayle’s
comment was the “birth of a movement”). Arguing that many of America’s social
problems are a result of the absence of fathers, Quayle remarked that “[i]t doesn’t
help matters when prime-time TV has Murphy Brown—a character who supposedly
epitomizes today’s intelligent, highly paid, professional woman—mocking the importance of fathers by bearing a child alone and calling it just another ‘lifestyle choice.’”
Id. at 28. According to fathers’ rights advocates, Quayle’s speech brought many influential scholars and commentators to the forefront to defend Quayle’s position that fathers matter. See id. (listing articles and books echoing Vice President Quayle’s argument); see also PARKE & BROTT, supra note 112, at 3 (noting publications written since
1990 about the demise of fatherhood); Whitehead, supra note 13, at 47 (arguing that
Vice President Quayle’s belief is supported by social science evidence).
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for joint custody statutes. Indeed, in almost half the states, there is a
121
presumption or preference for joint legal custody, and judges increasingly award nonresidential divorced fathers significant visitation.
Regrettably, although Americans are beginning to realize that fathers should nurture their children even after the marital relationship
has ended, change is slow. There is still little or no stigma attached to
paternal disengagement. We do not condemn fathers who abandon
their children emotionally as we do fathers who abandon their children financially. Rather, we glorify those fathers who are active participants in their children’s upbringing precisely because they are surpassing our expectations of post-divorce fatherhood. Correspondingly,
we accept disengaged nonresidential divorced fathers as merely “normal.” In the following sections, I analyze the empirical evidence of
paternal disengagement after divorce and its negative effects on children and society.
B. Paternal Disengagement
Approximately eighty percent of children reside with their moth122
ers after divorce. Although most nonresidential divorced fathers are
awarded visitation rights, the majority have little or no contact with
123
their children. Studies have found that nearly sixty percent of children whose parents had separated had seen their fathers only several
times or less in the previous year, and almost thirty percent had not
121

See infra note 326 and accompanying text (listing states with a preference for,
or presumption of, joint legal custody).
122
See ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 38 (“More than 85% of children whose parents
are divorced are in the custody of their mothers.”); TERRY A. LUGAILA, U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, PUB. NO. P20-514, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH
1998 (UPDATE) 36 tbl.6 (1998) (reporting that of the 7.1 million children living with a
single divorced parent in March 1998, eighty percent were living with their mothers);
Nancy E. Dowd, Law, Culture, and Family: The Transformative Power of Culture and the
Limits of Law, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 785, 791 n.27 (2003) (“Maternal custody . . . remains at roughly 90%.”). But see MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 13, at 74 (finding
that 67.6% of children whose parents were divorced or separated were living with their
mothers).
123
See Leo, supra note 105, at 22 (citing a University of Pennsylvania study finding
that forty-two percent of children of divorced parents had not seen their fathers in a
year); see also Furstenberg, supra note 4, at 120-21 (“The great majority of fathers who
live apart from their children see them infrequently and support them irregularly.”
(citations omitted)); Valarie King, Nonresident Father Involvement and Child Well-Being:
Can Dads Make a Statement?, 15 J. FAM. ISSUES 78, 79 (1994) (“[T]he great majority of
nonresident fathers have infrequent contact with their children . . . .”); Seltzer, supra
note 84, at 79 (“Often fathers and children completely lose touch with each other.”
(citations omitted)).
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124

seen them at all in the previous year. An alarming twenty-three percent of divorced fathers had not had any contact with their children in
125
Although counterintuitive, at least one study reat least five years.
veals that those fathers who were most involved in their children’s upbringing during the marriage are among those who are most likely to
126
These
have little or no contact with their children after divorce.
formerly involved fathers apparently cope with the pain of not living
with their children and not being able to parent them on a daily basis
127
128
by withdrawing or focusing their energies elsewhere.
124

Seltzer, supra note 84, at 85. Seltzer’s study does not distinguish between children whose parents were never married and those whose parents were married and
subsequently divorced or separated. See also Sara McLanahan, Growing Up Without a
Father, in LOST FATHERS: THE POLITICS OF FATHERLESSNESS IN AMERICA, supra note
118, at 85, 91 (stating that about twenty-nine percent of children have no contact with
their noncustodial fathers); Nord & Zill, supra note 15 (reporting that almost thirty-two
percent of nonresident fathers had not visited their children in the past year). But see
ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 6, 142 (noting that, although national studies have found
that approximately thirty to fifty percent of divorced fathers have had no contact with
their children in at least one year, only fifteen percent of the seventy-five divorced fathers interviewed in New York admitted to not having any contact with their children
in at least one year, and another twenty percent admitted to visiting only occasionally);
Furstenberg & Nord, supra note 17, at 894 (finding that in a nationally representative
sample forty-nine percent of children whose parents had divorced or separated had
not seen their nonresident parent in at least one year).
Fathers who do not visit their children tend not to maintain contact through letters or telephone. Indeed, children are more likely to have face-to-face contact with
their fathers than to have contact through telephone calls or letters. Seltzer, supra
note 84, at 85.
125
Furstenberg et al., supra note 25, at 696. In contrast, only 6.8% of children who
did not reside with their mothers had not had any contact with them in the last five
years. Furstenberg, supra note 15, at 663 tbl.6.
126
Geoffrey L. Greif, When Divorced Fathers Want No Contact with Their Children: A
Preliminary Analysis, 23 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE, 1995, at 75, 76 (citing a study showing that fathers who were very involved during the marriage were more likely than uninvolved fathers to reduce contact with their children after divorce). But see ROSS D.
PARKE, FATHERHOOD 195 (1996) (“[P]redivorce parenting is not a good barometer of
how involved a father will be with his children after the divorce.”); Kruk, supra note 13,
at 20 (citing three studies finding “little association between the closeness of fatherchild relationships before and after divorce”).
127
See Greif, supra note 126, at 76 (“The implication is that, in order to deal with
their unhappiness over their changing parental status, fathers withdraw.”); see also infra
Part III.C (discussing reasons fathers disengage from their children).
128
Fathers who do not maintain relationships with or support their children from
a previous marriage are often actively involved in raising the children with whom they
currently reside—their stepchildren or biological children from their current marriage
or relationship. See Furstenberg, supra note 4, at 121 (“[M]en may eschew responsibilities for children from a prior marriage even as they assume them in a new family.”).
Social scientists refer to this phenomenon as “child swapping,” whereby men relinquish support (both financial and emotional) of children from their first marriage in
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Sadly, only twenty-five percent of children whose parents are di129
vorced see their fathers at least weekly. Unfortunately, those fathers
who do spend time with their children are often not parenting them,
130
but rather, are entertaining them.
The majority of nonresidential
fathers behave more like uncles, or what commentators refer to as
131
“Disneyland Daddies,” than fathers. Rather than helping their chilfavor of the biological children or stepchildren from their current marriage or relationship. Furstenberg, supra note 1, at 203; see also POPENOE, supra note 3, at 33
(“Many studies have shown that stepfathering acts to diminish contact between original
fathers and their biological children.”).
129
Seltzer, supra note 84, at 86 (finding that after divorce, 12.4% of children saw
their fathers several times per week and another 12.4% saw them weekly); see also
McLanahan, supra note 124, at 91-92 (looking at both marital and nonmarital children
and finding that only thirty-five percent of children whose parents live apart see their
fathers weekly).
Older children see their fathers even less frequently since paternal contact gradually decreases over time. See Furstenberg, supra note 15, at 664 (noting that contact
between children and their nonresident fathers starts to drop off twelve months after
separation and drops off dramatically after the second year); Furstenberg & Nord, supra note 17, at 895 tbl.1 (finding that the average child sees their nonresident parent
7.4 days a month in the first two years after separation, but only twice a month after
that; and after ten years, seventy-four percent of children have no contact with their
nonresident parents); Maggie Gallagher, Father Hunger, in LOST FATHERS: THE
POLITICS OF FATHERLESSNESS IN AMERICA, supra note 118, at 163, 167 (noting that ten
years after divorce, “two-thirds of all children of divorce have virtually no contact with
their fathers”); Loewen, supra note 105, at 210 (citing studies finding that “most visitation fathers play only peripheral roles in their children’s lives by about the third year
after divorce”).
130
See Czapanskiy, supra note 115, at 1449 (noting that very few children stay overnight at their noncustodial parent’s home or engage in daily activities with them, and
instead the parent’s “contact is sporadic and primarily social,” rather than parental);
McKenry et al., supra note 21, at 307 (citing a study that found that nonresidential fathers are emotionally distant from their children, and may seem to act more like a
friend than a parent).
Some scholars have remarked that noncustodial fathers’ interaction with their
children after divorce may not be all that different from their interaction with them
when they resided in the same household, as most fathers in intact families have traditionally spent little time directly participating in child care or interacting with their
children. See Czapanskiy, supra note 115, at 1435 (“The average father living with his
child spends less than ten minutes a day caring for his child . . . .”); Furstenberg, supra
note 4, at 121 (noting that some scholars argue that “this pattern of shadow fathering—a family role without much substance—in fact parallels relatively weak ties among
fathers and their children who reside together”).
131
See Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative Custody
After Divorce, 64 TEX. L. REV. 687, 710 (1985) (noting that when children see their nonresidential fathers on holidays and weekends only, they perceive the relationship as
“pure fun and games” rather than as a parent-child relationship). Noncustodial fathers who parent their children by including them “in mundane everyday routines
such as shopping, reading, visiting, doing homework, or simply watching television to-
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dren with their homework or doing routine chores with them, most
nonresidential divorced fathers take their children to dinner, the
132
In other words, they visit with their children,
movies, or the mall.
but they do not parent them.
One could argue that fathers’ disengagement from their children
is problematic only if children are worse off as a result of their fathers’
absence. As shown below, empirical evidence suggests that paternal
absence may have a negative impact on children’s emotional, social,
and mental development, but the evidence is inconclusive.
C. Paternal Involvement and Children’s Development
Many Americans firmly believe that children benefit from main133
taining significant contact with both parents after divorce. Many social scientists agree. Contrary to psychologists’ belief throughout most
of the twentieth century that children bond only with their primary
caretaker (usually the mother), child development experts have now
discovered that children develop close bonds with both parents and
that both the maternal and paternal bonds may be important to chil134
Studies have found a strong correlation bedren’s development.
tween nonresidential fathers’ frequent visitation and children’s adgether have better-adjusted children than the ‘Disneyland’ fathers.” PARKE, supra note
126, at 200.
132
See FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 23, at 36 (noting that, even when fathers visit their children regularly, they “assume a minimal role in the[ir] day-to-day
care and supervision,” behaving “more like close relatives than parents”); Jay D.
Teachman, Contributions to Children By Divorced Fathers, 38 SOC. PROBS. 358, 360 tbl.1,
361 (1991) (finding that “[o]ver 75 percent of divorced fathers have never participated
in the schooling of their children,” and eighty-five percent have never helped their
children with their homework).
133
See King, supra note 123, at 79 (“The assumption behind these calls for greater
father involvement is that such involvement will have positive benefits for children.”).
134
See Kelly, supra note 81, at 767.
[M]ost theoretical constructs focus almost entirely on the mother-child relationship because they were developed at a time when fathers were not believed to play an important role in the psychological development of a child.
It was only in the late 1960s that the child development field discovered the
father.
Id. Over the past three decades, scholarship in this area has recognized the importance of paternal as well as maternal bonds. See, e.g., John F. Coverdale, Missing Persons: Children in the Tax Treatment of Marriage, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 475, 478-500
(1998) (citing several social science studies that acknowledge this point); Robert D.
Hess & Kathleen A. Camara, Post-Divorce Family Relationships as Mediating Factors in the
Consequences of Divorce for Children, J. SOC. ISSUES, 1979, at 79, 94 (finding that a child’s
relationship with the noncustodial father is as important as the relationship with the
custodial mother).
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justment to the divorce. Children who have regular contact with their
fathers tend to have higher self-esteem and fewer behavioral problems
135
than children who have little or no contact with their fathers. Studies have also found that children adapt better to divorce when their
parents share social and financial responsibility for their care than
136
Researchers
when one parent bears these responsibilities alone.
have cautioned, however, that when parents do not cooperate with
each other and visitation takes place in a high-conflict setting, the
137
Not surprisbenefits to the child can be minimal or nonexistent.
ingly, children are unlikely to benefit from a relationship with the
nonresidential parent if the parents are unable to interact and communicate in a civilized manner, and the children are caught in the
138
middle of their battles.

135

See McKenry et al., supra note 21, at 307 (“Research has repeatedly indicated
that the child’s subsequent adjustment is strongly related to regular and frequent patterns of visitation in nonconflictual settings.”); Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A
Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. REV. 497, 500 (1988) (“Research shows that children
adjust better to divorce if they have frequent contact with both parents . . . .”); see also
PARKE, supra note 126, at 201 (“[T]he most crucial factor influencing a good readjustment [after divorce] was a stable, loving relationship with both parents between whom
friction had largely dissipated, leaving regular dependable visiting patterns that the
parent with custody encouraged.” (quoting Judith S. Wallerstein & Joan B. Kelly, California’s Children of Divorce, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Jan. 1980, at 67, 71) (emphasis added to
original)); POPENOE, supra note 3, at 150 (finding that children who feel close to their
fathers after divorce are more likely to adjust to the divorce); Ihinger-Tallman et al.,
supra note 104, at 60 (citing studies which “conclude that fathers are important to
children’s postdivorce adjustment because father contact is associated with fewer behavioral problems, higher self-esteem, and other positive indices of children’s development.”); Loewen, supra note 105, at 196 (“Empirical studies are unanimous that one
of the most important indicators of success is the quality of post-divorce relationships
with both parents.”). But see Furstenberg et al., supra note 25, at 699 (finding no correlation between children’s well-being after divorce and contact with the nonresidential
father).
136
Schepard, supra note 131, at 704; Seltzer, supra note 84, at 79.
137
See Seltzer, supra note 84, at 97 (noting that encouraging post-divorce parental
cooperation may, by increasing contact between the parents, result in increased parental conflict and thus hardship for the child); see also WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note
21, at 224 (finding that post-divorce parental conflict was distressing to the children
and “correlated significantly with their poor psychological adjustment”); McKenry et
al., supra note 21, at 307 (“Research has repeatedly indicated that the child’s subsequent adjustment is strongly related to regular and frequent patterns of visitation in
nonconflictual settings.” (emphasis added)).
138
See PARKE, supra note 126, at 202 (“[W]hen a divorced father disagrees with his
former wife about child rearing, when he has a negative attitude toward her, and when
he is emotionally immature, it is better that he have little contact with the family.”);
Mo-Yee Lee, A Model of Children’s Postdivorce Behavioral Adjustment in Maternal- and DualResidence Arrangements, 23 J. FAM. ISSUES 672, 676 (2002) (“The positive impact of joint
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1. Educational and Societal Benefits
Aside from children’s “smoother” emotional adjustment to divorce when both parents remain a part of their lives, there may be
educational and social benefits derived from paternal involvement.
Researchers have found a positive correlation between paternal in139
volvement and both higher IQ and better school performance.
They have also found that children with absent fathers tend to have
lower grades, higher truancy and high-school dropout rates, and lower
college attendance rates than children who grew up with both par140
ents.
Researchers have also found a positive correlation between pater141
nal absence and delinquent behavior and drug abuse.
Even after
controlling for family income, boys from father-absent homes have
much higher delinquency rates than boys growing up with two par-

custody or dual residence on parent-child relationships is likely to disappear . . . in a
high conflict coparenting situation.”).
139
Gibbs, supra note 5, at 61.
140
See JEFF GROGGER & NICK RONAN, THE INTERGENERATIONAL EFFECTS OF
FATHERLESSNESS ON EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND ENTRY-LEVEL WAGES 2 (U.S.
Dep’t of Labor, Nat’l Longitudinal Survey 96-30, 1995) (“[C]hildhood fatherlessness
decreases educational attainment and adult wages . . . .”), available at http://www.bls.gov/
ore/pdf/nl950080.pdf; McLanahan, supra note 124, at 86-87 (noting that father-absent
children “twice as likely to drop out of high school, 2.5 times as likely to become teen
mothers, and 1.4 times as likely to be idle”); Whitehead, supra note 13, at 66, 69-70
(stating that children in father-absent families are more likely to experience “academic
difficulties” and are almost twice as likely to drop out of high school; also, only seventeen percent of children in father-absent families, as compared to thirty-three percent
of children from two parent homes, are ranked as high-achievers); id. at 74 (“Sixtyseven percent of the college-age students from disrupted families attended college, as
compared with 85 percent of other students who attended the same high schools.”).
Interestingly, at least one study suggests that while fatherlessness leads to lower
educational attainment amongst whites and Latinos, black children in single parent
homes may acquire more education than black children living with both parents.
GROGGER & RONAN, supra, at iii. This finding is counterintuitive and Grogger and
Ronan acknowledge that any conclusion requires further research. At the very least, it
suggests that data should be broken out across races when studying the effects of father
absence. Id. at iii, 24; see also McLanahan, supra note 124, at 88 (“[W]ith respect to
educational achievement, father absence has the most harmful effects among Hispanics and the least harmful effects among blacks.”).
The evidence does not suggest, however, that father-absence is the only, or primary, reason behind children’s poorer educational outcomes. For example, even if all
children grew up in two-parent families, the high school dropout rate would decrease
by only thirty-three percent. Id. at 87.
141
See Whitehead, supra note 13, at 47 (concluding that children of single-parent
families are more inclined “to abuse drugs[] and to be in trouble with the law”).
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142

ents. “The relationship [between father absence and juvenile delinquency] is so strong that controlling for family configuration erases
the relationships between race and crime and between low income
143
and crime.”
One might expect father absence to negatively impact boys more
than girls based on a theory that children identify with and emulate
the parent who shares their gender. However, studies have found that
father absence negatively impacts daughters as well. A recent thir144
teen-year study analyzing the correlation between father absence
and teenage pregnancy in the United States and New Zealand revealed that “early father absence” (where fathers leave before their
daughters’ fifth birthdays) is strongly associated with an elevated risk
145
of early sexual activity and teen pregnancy. After controlling for all
of the measures of “familial and ecological stressors” generally associated with father absence—e.g., socioeconomic status, race, whether
the teenage girl was cooperative or defiant in kindergarten (an indicator of future behavioral problems), whether her mother was herself a
teenage mother, quality of neighborhood, quality and level of parental supervision, and quantity and level of stressful life events—teenage
pregnancy rates in the United States sample were still five times
146
higher among early father-absent girls than father-present girls. Notably, teenage girls whose fathers were present were less likely to be142

See Whitehead, supra note 13, at 77 (“[E]ven after the groups of subjects are
controlled for income, boys from single-mother homes are significantly more likely
than others to commit crimes . . . .”). Studies show that children of fatherless homes
account for seventy percent of those at state juvenile reform institutions, but only forty
percent of the general population. Gibbs, supra note 5, at 54-55. These studies include both nonmarital children and children whose parents are separated or divorced.
143
Whitehead, supra note 13, at 77 (quoting an unidentified study); see also
POPENOE, supra note 3, at 56-57 (discussing behavioral and emotional problems associated with absent fathers).
144
The study followed a sample of girls from the summer before kindergarten
through the twelfth grade. Bruce J. Ellis et al., Does Father Absence Place Daughters at Special Risk for Early Sexual Activity and Teenage Pregnancy?, 74 CHILD DEV. 801, 803 (2003).
145
The United States and New Zealand have the first and second highest teen
pregnancy rates, respectively, among all Western industrialized nations. Id. at 801.
The researchers noted that:
A widely held assumption is that it is not father absence per se that is harmful
to children but the stress associated with divorce, family conflict, loss of a second parent, loss of an adult male income, and so on. The current research
suggests that, in relation to daughters’ sexual development, the social address
of father absence is important in its own right and not just as a proxy for its
many correlates.
Id. at 818.
146
Id. at 813-17.

2005]

BEYOND ECONOMIC FATHERHOOD

953

come pregnant even where risk factors such as poverty, inadequate
parental supervision, stressful life events, and defiant behavior in
147
grade school existed.
Some scholars argue that father-absent children’s lower academic
performance and increased behavioral and social problems stem from
148
poverty rather than father absence per se. Thus, they argue that the
main problem for father-absent families “is not the absence of a male
149
Many studies,
but rather the lack of income produced by a male.”
however, are “adjusted for differences . . . such as race, parents’ edu150
cation, number of siblings, and residential location.”
Thus, “socioeconomic status [alone] cannot explain why children from one-parent
151
families are doing worse” than children from two-parent families.
Although it is not possible to conclusively establish a causal link between paternal presence and children’s educational and social outcomes, the persistence of these differences between father-absent and
father-present children after controlling for socioeconomic factors
suggests that fathers may have a substantial impact on their children’s
educational and social success independent of their economic contri152
butions.
147

Id. at 818. The researchers speculated that girls in early father-absent families
may come to believe that fathers are unreliable and unimportant, thereby accelerating
the onset of sexual activity and reproduction. Id. at 817. Boys raised in father-absent
homes are also more likely than boys in intact families to get a girl pregnant while in
their teens. Id. One scholar has suggested, from an anthropological standpoint, that
this is because these boys have learned from their absent fathers that men are not expected to contribute to child care. POPENOE, supra note 3, at 157.
148
See Downey, supra note 25, at 131-32 (highlighting scholarship addressing the
role of lower incomes in the educational attainment of single-mother families).
149
Id. at 132; see also FINEMAN, supra note 22, at 104-05 (citing “family values” researchers who admit that poverty may be the primary reason children in single parent
homes face increased mental health risks compared to those in intact families); Louise
B. Silverstein & Carl F. Auerbach, Deconstructing the Essential Father, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 397, 399 (1999) (citing research showing that father-absent families are
much more likely than two-parent families to be poor, and that “it is the negative effects of poverty, rather than the absence of a father, that lead[s] to negative developmental outcomes” for children).
150
McLanahan, supra note 124, at 91-92; Whitehead, supra note 13, at 66 (“Even
after controlling for race, income, and religion, scholars find significant differences in
educational attainment between children who grow up in intact families and children
who do not.”).
151
McLanahan, supra note 124, at 91.
152
See id. at 92 (identifying parental involvement and supervision as two of the important noneconomic factors affecting divorced children’s well-being, while loss of
economic resources explains only half of the negative social and behavioral outcomes
associated with divorce); see also PARKE, supra note 126 at 203 (noting that children of
divorce “who maintained positive relationships with both parents had the lowest scores
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One could logically attribute the better performance of children
in father-present families to the fact that two persons, as opposed to
153
one, are dedicating time and resources to the children.
After all,
quality of parenting is higher when two parents are responsible for
154
child rearing.
In addition, inadequate parental supervision is associated with poor school performance and higher drop-out rates.
Many mothers who worked part-time, or not at all, during the marriage have to work full-time after divorce, resulting in less time for the
children. The father, because he is no longer residing with the children, is not able to provide the level (however minimal) of supervision he provided during the marriage. Thus, it is not surprising that
children in single-mother homes receive less supervision than children in two-parent homes and suffer the effects of low levels of paren155
tal monitoring.
However, even if all that children in single-parent families need
are second pairs of hands and eyes to assist the primary parent with
child rearing, in our society that second person is likely to be the father. In most families, even the most traditional father is likely to be
involved (at least somewhat) in his children’s lives, if only because
they reside with him. Further, especially during the months immediately following the marital disruption, fathers are likely to feel a close
attachment to their children and continue to be involved in their
156
Thus, it is unlikely that many fathers will need to be coaxed
lives.
into fulfilling some parental responsibilities. In contrast, it may be
difficult to find a third party who is willing to be that “second pair of
hands” that the mother needs to help her raise the children. Even if a
second pair of hands to assist with child rearing were found (for example, a grandparent or stepparent), third parties are unable, in most
cases, to confer on children the benefits of paternal involvement.
Children who are raised by their mothers along with a stepfather or
on measures of stress and aggression and were rated more highly on work effectiveness
and social interaction with peers”).
153
POPENOE, supra note 3, at 139; Gibbs, supra note 5, at 61.
154
See Schepard, supra note 131, at 705 (“Regular contact with both parents not
only provides emotional comfort for the child whose parents divorce but also increases
the quality of parenting the child receives as a result of it.”).
155
Seltzer, supra note 84, at 79.
156
MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 13, at 171 fig.8.4 (discovering that six
months after separation, and before a final custody order is issued, the vast majority
(over 75%) of fathers have arranged for some amount of visitation with their children
and approximately 47% even have overnight visits); Kruk, supra note 13, at 23 (“The
majority of fathers want and are prepared to assume partial physical care of their children after divorce.”).

2005]

BEYOND ECONOMIC FATHERHOOD

955

grandparent do not do as well as children who are raised by their
mothers and fathers. Indeed, their behavior and performance in
school is comparable to, or worse than, that of children raised by a
157
Thus, it appears that merely devoting more
single parent alone.
time and resources to children may not be sufficient. It matters to
children who is devoting the time and the resources.
Although many social scientists believe that fathers are important
to children’s well-being—and, as noted, there is empirical evidence
supporting that view—according to some scholars, “fathers are essen158
tially redundant.” These scholars rely on studies showing that children raised by highly educated, relatively affluent single mothers do
better emotionally, educationally, and socially than those raised by two
159
married parents with fewer economic and educational resources.
They conclude that responsible parenting and economic security, as
160
opposed to fathers, are what is essential to children.
They further
dismiss older studies finding a positive correlation between paternal
161
involvement and children’s well-being in favor of more recent studies finding little or no correlation between paternal visitation and
162
children’s educational and social outcomes.
Although social scien157

See McLanahan, supra note 124, at 90 (“Children in stepfamilies do not do better than children whose mothers never remarry. Despite significantly higher family
income and the presence of two parents, the average child in a stepparent family has
about the same chance of dropping out of high school as the average child in a singleparent family.”); id. (noting that having a grandmother in the home does not lower
the risk of dropping out of school or teen childbearing in single-mother families);
Whitehead, supra note 13, at 71 (noting that children growing up with stepparents are
doing worse than children in single families, because “[o]ther difficulties seem to offset” the benefits of increased income and another adult).
158
Hawkins & Eggebeen, supra note 11, at 959 (quoting Michael E. Lamb et al., A
Biosocial Perspective on Paternal Behavior and Involvement, in PARENTING ACROSS THE LIFE
SPAN: BIOSOCIAL DIMENSIONS 111, 123 (Jane B. Lancaster et al. eds., 1987)).
159
Stacey, supra note 118, at 70.
160
Id. at 71.
161
See, e.g., WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 21, at 219 (finding that five years
after divorce, “good father-child relationships appeared linked to high self-esteem and
the absence of depression in children of both sexes and at all ages”); Hess & Camara,
supra note 134, at 94 (finding that a child’s relationship with the noncustodial father
was as important as the relationship with the custodial mother); Seltzer, supra note 84,
at 79 (“[W]hen both divorced parents share . . . responsibilities of child care, children
appear to adapt better to their changed living arrangements than when mothers bear
these responsibilities alone.” (citations omitted)).
162
See FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 23, at 72-73 (finding that those teenagers who regularly saw their noncustodial fathers were as likely as teens who had little
contact with their noncustodial fathers to “engage in delinquent acts and precocious
sexual behavior”; “children’s behavioral adjustment was also unrelated to the level of
intimacy” shared with their fathers; and those children who had maintained close rela-
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tists have questioned the methodologies of these earlier studies, the
majority of recent national studies may be similarly flawed because
they do not distinguish between families characterized by high levels
of parental conflict and those experiencing little conflict. Indeed, the
few studies that have considered the conflict factor have found that
paternal visitation has a positive effect on children’s well-being if (and
164
only if) the parents get along. Although exposure to high levels of
parental conflict may pose a greater hazard to children than the loss
165
of a parent, this does not mean that paternal contact is insignificant
to children’s well-being and should be avoided when parents are uncooperative with each other. Rather than accepting parental conflict
as inevitable and discouraging paternal involvement where conflict is
present, the goal should be to reduce parental conflict so that children may benefit from their fathers’ involvement in their upbringing.
Even those researchers who have not found a positive correlation
between paternal visitation and children’s well-being have warned that
“the possibility that father visitation has beneficial effects for children
166
cannot be totally ruled out.” This is prudent. Needless to say, the
quantity of father-child contact must matter somewhat, because maintaining a close parent-child bond would be difficult absent some sig-

tionships with their fathers were no more likely, when interviewed at ages 18 to 23, to
be more or less successful than those who had not maintained close relationships with
their fathers); Fox & Blanton, supra note 101, at 268 (“Despite the assumption that
continuing contact with the noncustodial father is important to a child’s well-being
following divorce, the empirical evidence to support this assumption is surprisingly
thin.”); Furstenberg et al., supra note 25, at 697 (“[C]hildren in maritally disrupted
families were not doing better if they saw their fathers more regularly than if they saw
them occasionally or not at all.”); Hawkins & Eggebeen, supra note 11, at 959
(“[T]here is insufficient evidence ‘to demonstrate that fathers play a formatively significant role in child development . . . .’” (quoting Lamb et al., supra note 158)).
163
See Fox & Blanton, supra note 101, at 268 (explaining that “[t]he positive outcomes of noncustodial father contact were noted in early studies that involved small,
nonrepresentative samples of divorcing couples characterized by higher socioeconomic backgrounds” and researchers relying on survey data from larger and more representative samples have been unable to replicate results from the earlier results).
164
King, supra note 123, at 80; see also FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 23, at
75 (“[A] child who alternates between the homes of a distraught mother and an angry
father will be more troubled than a child who lives with a mother who is coping well
and who once a fortnight sees a father who has disengaged from his family.”).
165
See Stacey, supra note 118, at 68 (“Most of the harms that divorce appears to
inflict on children derive not from subsequent ‘fatherlessness’ but from negative circumstances . . . [such as] parental hostility . . . .”).
166
King, supra note 123, at 92.
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167

nificant level of contact. Further, although the amount of time a father spends with a child is not as important as whether the child feels
168
valued, a child is unlikely to feel valued if the parent does not maintain contact or make an effort to be involved in his child’s life.
2. Emotional and Psychological Benefits
There are reasons for encouraging paternal involvement independent of its likely positive effect on children’s educational and social development. First, children want to see their fathers, and they
169
feel rejected when contact with their fathers is infrequent. Indeed,
children at “every developmental level experience sadness and even
severe depression” when contact with the nonresidential parent is in-

167

Interestingly, for children the quantity of contact may be only loosely indicative
of the quality and depth of the father-child relationship. For example, in a 1981 study,
when children who had some contact with their fathers in the previous five years were
asked how close they were to their fathers, fifty-five percent replied “quite close” or
“extremely close,” even though only twenty-six percent of fathers in the study spent at
least twenty-four days per year with their children. Furstenberg et al., supra note 25, at
696, 698. Apparently, some children feel close to parents they do not usually see. Id.
However, based on this study alone, the researchers were not willing to advocate abandoning efforts to encourage greater involvement amongst noncustodial fathers. Id. at
700.
168
PARKE, supra note 126, at 202 (“[Q]uality of contact between fathers and their
children is more important than amount of contact.”); see also JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN
& SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES 149-50 (1989) (discussing how children feel
abandoned by their nonresidential fathers); Gallagher, supra note 129, at 163-64 (“The
real problem, from the child’s point of view, is not just ‘fatherlessness’ but father
abandonment . . . .”).
169
See WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 21, at 218-19 (noting that children have
lower self-esteem when the noncustodial parent has only limited contact with them);
WARSHAK, supra note 112, at 56 (same); Kelly, supra note 81, at 770 (noting that children have “a compelling need to maintain nourishing relationships with both loved
parents”).
Interestingly, having little or no contact with the nonresidential parent may increase the nonresidential parent’s importance to the child. See Katharine T. Bartlett,
Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 907-08 (1984) (“Total separation . . . rather than causing the child to forget his absent parent, may actually increase
the parent’s importance to the child.”); see also WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note
168, at 234 (noting that “most children do not give up on their biological fathers” who
abandoned them and instead “construct a credible image of the father they never
knew from any scraps of information that they can collect and tend to idealize him in
the process”); Richard S. Benedek & Elissa P. Benedek, Postdivorce Visitation: A Child’s
Right, 16 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 256, 261 (1977) (finding that children often
fantasize about the absent parent).
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170

frequent.
Studies have found that the relationship with the nonresidential parent is as important to children’s emotional stability af171
ter divorce as the relationship with the residential parent and may
172
help children deal with the grief of not living with both parents. In
one study, adult participants reported yearning for their fathers when
they were children, even though other men such as stepfathers, un173
cles, grandfathers, and older brothers had assumed a parental role.
As Professor Furstenberg has noted, “in a culture where biological
daddies are in short supply and other men often step in to fill the
breach, children still speak longingly (and sometimes bitterly) about
174
the fathering they missed out on.” Interestingly, children whose relationships with their fathers terminate as a result of paternal disengagement following divorce do worse than children whose parents die
175
Children can understand and accept death,
when they are young.
176
but they cannot accept rejection and abandonment by their fathers.
They blame themselves, reasoning that their fathers rejected them be-

170

Bartlett, supra note 169, at 907. Surprisingly, studies have found that children
who have no contact with the nonresidential parent suffer more detriment than children whose parents “openly reject” them, “hurt . . . [their] feelings,” or “exploit
[them] . . . for selfish purposes.” Id. at 909 n.146.
171
See Hess & Camara, supra note 134, at 94 (finding that a child’s relationship
with the noncustodial father “is of equal importance to his or her well being and separate from the relationship with the custodial mother”); cf. Bartlett, supra note 169, at
909 n.147 (citing a study, WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 21, at 266, which “found
both a clear negative effect of the noncustodial parent’s relative abandonment and a
positive contribution by the noncustodial parent who maintained a reliable relationship with the child”); Michael E. Lamb, Noncustodial Fathers and Their Impact on the Children of Divorce, in THE POSTDIVORCE FAMILY: CHILDREN, PARENTING AND SOCIETY 105,
111-17 (Ross A. Thompson & Paul R. Amato eds., 1999) (discussing several studies
suggesting the importance of fathers to children’s adjustment after divorce).
172
Bartlett, supra note 169, at 909 (noting that “loss of contact with absent parents
is more likely to aggravate . . . [loyalty] problems”).
173
See Furstenberg, supra note 4, at 128 (studying perceptions of fatherhood
among inner-city African Americans).
174
Id.; Kelly, supra note 81, at 770 (arguing that although joint custody may be difficult for young children, this difficulty “must be balanced against the emptiness and
longing” the child will experience as she grows up not having close relationships with
both parents).
175
See POPENOE, supra note 3, at 152 (“[C]hildren [whose fathers have died] suffer
much less than the children of divorce and nonmarital birth from a sense of rejection,
with its associated loss of self-esteem and behavioral problems.”).
176
See Gallagher, supra note 129, at 164 (“The real problem, from the child’s point
of view, is not just ‘fatherlessness’ but father abandonment; not simply the absence of
fathers in the home but the presence somewhere close by of a father who does not
seem to care.”).
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177

cause they were “bad” or simply unlovable. Further, although studies have found that a close relationship with their fathers during
childhood contributes to a sense of well-being and healthy self-esteem
178
among young adults, children who have little contact with their fathers are likely to have poor relationships with them later in adult179
hood.
Second, paternal involvement might benefit not only children,
but also fathers, mothers, and society in general. Parents who share
child-rearing responsibilities after divorce find their relationships with
their children and with each other to be more satisfying than do parents in families where one parent carries most of the child-rearing re180
sponsibilities after divorce. Paternal involvement is especially beneficial to mothers who get a break from the parenting role, even if only
for an evening or weekend. Thus, dual parenting protects against the
“overburden” single parents (usually mothers) bear and leads to bet181
ter parenting.
Frequent contact with their children may also be good for men
and for society. Studies have found that fathers who remain in close
contact with their children after divorce tend to enjoy both higher
self-esteem and significantly lower rates of depression and other mental health problems than fathers who have little or no contact with
182
their children. Studies have also found that children who are close
177

See WARSHAK, supra note 112, at 56-57 (noting that, when fathers disengage,
children think they did something to push them away); Loewen, supra note 105, at 196
(describing how children assume they must be unlovable or their fathers would want to
see them).
178
See supra note 136 and accompanying text for an analysis of the father-child
relationship’s impact on child well-being. See also Loewen, supra note 105, at 196 (noting studies finding that children’s well-being is lowered with father absence).
179
See Alan L. Otten, The Lasting Impact of Divorce on Children, WALL ST. J., July 20,
1993, at B1 (reporting a study’s findings that “among the 18- to 22-year-olds from disrupted families, two-thirds had poor relationships with their fathers”).
180
See Lee, supra note 138, at 675 (citing studies showing that joint custody can
improve parent well-being).
181
Id.; see also Schepard, supra note 131, at 705 (“Regular contact with both parents . . . increases the quality of parenting the child receives . . . .”).
182
Fox & Blanton, supra note 101, at 273; see also Adler, supra note 3, at 63-64 (arguing that paternal involvement benefits fathers); Greif, supra note 126, at 82 (noting
the results of a study showing that a majority of fathers who claimed not to want any
contact with their children were dissatisfied with their relationship with their children
or felt unhappiness toward them); E. Mavis Hetherington et al., Effects of Divorce on Parents and Children, in NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES: PARENTING AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT
233, 246 (Michael E. Lamb ed., 1982) (noting that fathers who were highly involved
during the marriage but rarely saw their children after divorce felt “a great sense of
loss and depression”); Ihinger-Tallman et al., supra note 104, at 72 (finding that “con-
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to both of their parents tend to have stronger personal values, have
higher levels of cognitive development, and to be more stable emo183
tionally than children who have no relationship with one parent.
184
They also tend to be more empathetic and socially competent and
185
These
might be less likely to disengage from their own children.
studies tentatively suggest that society as a whole would benefit from
fathers’ greater involvement in their children’s lives.
In light of these findings, even social scientists who have found no
correlation between paternal involvement and children’s well-being
have cautioned that “despite the mixed evidence [regarding the nonpecuniary benefits of paternal involvement], the idea that continuing
contact with fathers makes a difference to a child’s psychological wellbeing is so plausible and so seemingly grounded in theories of child
186
development that one is reluctant to discount it.” They further concede that the inconclusive evidence on the benefits of paternal involvement may be the result of the difficulty of finding involved fa187
Few nonresidential fathers are actively involved in
thers to study.
188
child rearing. Further, those few who are involved tend not to share
with their former spouses the type of cooperative parenting relationships that might be necessary for children to benefit from a relation189
ship with both parents. Thus, even researchers who have criticized
studies finding that paternal involvement benefits children “remain
tact with children has a stabilizing effect on men postdivorce”); Loewen, supra note
105, at 197-98 (lamenting the emotional costs experienced by noncustodial fathers).
183
See Czapanskiy, supra note 115, at 1441 (“There is some evidence that a child’s
mental, cognitive and emotional development may be improved when the child has a
close relationship with two parents.”).
184
See Louv, supra note 79, at 56 (discussing a twenty-six year study finding that
paternal involvement was the single strongest parent-related factor in the development
of empathy, and that fathers who spent time alone with their children more than twice
a week—bathing, feeding and caring for their children—reared the most compassionate adults); see also Jo-Ellen Paradise, Note, The Disparity Between Men and Women in Custody Disputes: Is Joint Custody the Answer to Everyone’s Problems?, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 517,
552-53 (1998) (asserting that children who “spend more time with their fathers are
more empathetic towards others”).
185
Furstenberg, supra note 4, at 134 (finding that men who had little contact with
their fathers as children reported feeling “emotionally undernourished” by their fathers, and, as a result, ill-prepared to nurture their own children, and that some researchers have concluded that boys who grow up with absent fathers are more likely to
be absent fathers themselves).
186
FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 23, at 73.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
See id. (noting that “most formerly married parents have difficulty establishing a
collaborative style of childrearing”).
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convinced that when parents are able to cooperate in child rearing after a divorce and when fathers are able to maintain an active and sup190
portive role, children will be better off in the long run.”
3. Child Support
Although studies analyzing the effects of frequent paternal visitation on children’s adjustment after divorce are conflicting, it is well
established that children whose fathers pay child support tend to experience fewer behavioral and social problems and to perform better
191
in school than children whose fathers do not.
Furthermore, even
when the parents’ relationship with each other is highly conflictual,
studies have shown that “the positive effects of child support for child
192
well-being outweigh[] the negative effects of parental conflict.” For
instance, children whose fathers pay child support do better academically and socially, even if their parents are always fighting, than chil193
Yet, despite harsh
dren whose fathers do not pay child support.
penalties and a billion-dollar budget devoted to child support en194
forcement, compliance rates are still relatively low.
Indeed, some
fathers who concede their financial ability to pay child support refuse
to do so because, in their view, the law has done little to facilitate ac195
Only twenty percent or less of fathers who
cess to their children.
196
In contrast,
have no contact with their children pay child support.
two-thirds of fathers who maintain frequent contact with their chil190

Id.; see also David L. Chambers, Fathers, the Welfare System, and the Virtues and Perils
of Child Support Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2575, 2601 (1995) (“Children of divorce are
reported to fare best when they have interactions with both parents, and the parents’
relationship is cooperative.”).
191
See Altman, supra note 64, at 190 (noting that children who receive child support have fewer behavioral problems than those who do not); Downey, supra note 25,
at 132 (observing that “the father’s financial support [is] related to lower problem behavior among children”); King, supra note 123, at 80 (“The strongest effects of father
involvement are found in studies that examine the payment of child support.”). For
example, “higher levels of child support . . . [are] associated with higher perceived
scholastic competence and with higher math and reading scores.” Id. at 87-88.
192
King, supra note 123, at 92.
193
Id.
194
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CHILD SUPPORT: 1999 tbl.4
(Apr. 2000) (showing that the majority of nonresidential parents do not comply fully
with child support orders); KNITZER & BERNARD, supra note 26, at app. C, at 162 tbl.6
(noting that the total collection rates in 1995 for Tennessee, the District of Columbia,
and Indiana were 11.2%, 10.5%, and 9.8%, respectively); see also ARENDELL, supra note
84, at 88 (noting that “the rate of noncompliance is higher than that of compliance”).
195
ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 127-28.
196
Seltzer, supra note 84, at 87.
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197

dren pay child support. Interestingly, children do better when their
fathers pay child support regardless of the amount paid. Thus, a
number of researchers have suggested that the payment of child sup198
port is important in and of itself, independent of the amount. Regardless of the reasons children experience fewer behavioral and social problems when their fathers pay child support, it is undisputed
that children benefit from their fathers’ economic support even when
it is minimal, and they are more likely to receive support if their fathers are involved in their upbringing.
III. REASONS FOR PATERNAL DISENGAGEMENT
A. Custody Law
Many divorced fathers believe child custody laws are biased against
them in favor of mothers. Given that approximately eighty percent of
199
children living with only one parent reside with their mothers, fathers’ perception of bias is not surprising. This is especially the case
because, until the mid-1970s, child custody laws expressly favored
200
mothers, entitling them to custody of children of “tender years” un-

197

Id.; Geoffrey L. Greif, Single Fathers with Custody Following Separation and Divorce,
20 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 213, 225 (1995) (noting a correlation between consistent
payment of child support and visitation).
198
King, supra note 123, at 91 (“This suggests the importance of factors beyond
pure economics.”). Social scientists have speculated that child support may serve as a
proxy for paternal characteristics that have positive effects on children such as the willingness to assume responsibility for the well-being of their children. See Altman, supra
note 64, at 190 (arguing that payment of child support is a demonstration of love and
consequently, “[c]hildren who receive support feel less rejected and have fewer behavioral problems and perform better in school;” thus, “[c]hild-support dollars provide a
larger benefit . . . than dollars from other sources”).
199
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
200
Children seven years of age or younger were defined as of “tender years.” See
State v. Baird, 21 N.J. Eq. 384, 393 (1869) (Dalrimple, J., dissenting) (“[T]he wife shall,
if not an improper guardian, be entitled to the custody of the children within the age
of seven years.”) (citing Act of March 20, 1860, ch. 167, 1860 N.J. Laws 437, awarding
custody of children younger than seven to their mothers, and its supplement, Act of
March 15, 1861, ch. 115, 1861 N.J. Laws 458, extending the scope of the act to all separations unless a divorce decree specifies otherwise); see also Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are
Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN’S
RTS. L. REP. 235, 235 (1982) (noting that “tender years has rarely been defined, [but]
the age of seven is frequently cited, perhaps as a derivation from the first English statute on the subject”) (citing Justice Talfourd’s Act, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., 54 (Eng.)). But see
Weaver v. Weaver, 261 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953) (applying maternal presumption to award mother custody of her ten-year-old son).
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201

less they were unfit.
Some courts justified this tender years presumption on the ground that, as children’s primary caretakers during
the marriage, mothers were better prepared than fathers to meet
202
Other courts reasoned
children’s physical and emotional needs.
that mothers love their children more than fathers and that children,
at least young children, needed their mothers more than they needed
203
their fathers. As one court stated: “Courts know that mother love is
a dominant trait in the heart of the mother, even in the weakest of
women. It is of divine origin, and in nearly all cases far exceeds and
204
Fathers claim this
surpasses the parental affection of the father.”
gender bias continues today.
In the 1970s, fathers began successfully challenging the tender
years presumption as inconsistent with women’s pursuit of equal op205
Furthermore, as women joined the
portunities in the workplace.

201

Until the mid-nineteenth century, child custody laws were expressly biased in
favor of fathers, granting them custody in the unlikely event of divorce or separation.
See, e.g., Baird, 21 N.J. Eq. at 388 (stating “the general rule is, that the claim of the father to the persons of his infant children, is paramount to those of the mother” and
that “[t]his rule is so entirely axiomatic that it would be idle to cite authorities in its
support”); Magee v. Holland, 27 N.J.L. 86, 86 (Sup. Ct. 1858) (finding that “[t]he right
of the father [to custody] was clearly paramount to that of the mother”). In the late
nineteenth century, mothers and mental health experts challenged fathers’ rights to
custody, emphasizing mothers’ role in children’s day-to-day care and arguing that children’s custody should be based on their best interests. See Martha Fineman, Dominant
Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101
HARV. L. REV. 727, 737 (1988) (detailing the “adoption of the best interest of the child
standard as the governing substantive principle in custody adjudications”).
202
See Sheehan v. Sheehan, 143 A.2d 874, 882 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958)
(explaining that the tender years presumption is based on the idea that mothers “will
take better and more expert care of . . . [the] child than the father”); Elizabeth S.
Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615, 619-20
(1992) (“Under the tender years presumption, mothers were awarded custody of their
children because they had cared for them, and thus were presumed more competent
to meet their needs than were fathers.”).
203
See, e.g., Jenkins v. Jenkins, 181 N.W. 826, 827 (Wis. 1921) (“[N]othing can be
an adequate substitute for mother love—for that constant ministration required during the period of nurture that only a mother can give because in her alone is duty swallowed up in desire; in her alone is service expressed in terms of love.”).
204
Bruce v. Bruce, 285 P. 30, 37 (Okla. 1930); see also Freeland v. Freeland, 159 P.
698, 699 (Wash. 1916) (discussing “mother love”).
205
See, e.g., Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 695 (Ala. 1981) (“[T]he tender years
presumption represents an unconstitutional gender-based classification which discriminates . . . solely on the basis of sex.”); Wetzler v. Wetzler, 570 P.2d 741, 743
(Alaska 1977) (per curiam) (rejecting the maternal presumption in favor of “the best
interests of the child”); King v. Vancil, 341 N.E.2d 65, 68-69 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (placing burden of proof on mother to change custody arrangement); State ex rel. Watts v.
Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 291 (Fam. Ct. 1973) (holding that maternal presumption is
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workforce and some fathers began assuming greater responsibility for
206
child rearing, a maternal preference no longer seemed justified. As
one court rejecting the tender years presumption remarked: “The
simple fact of being a mother does not, by itself, indicate a capacity or
willingness to render a quality of care different from that which the
207
father can provide.” The tender years presumption has been largely
208
abandoned, and currently, the vast majority of states decide custody
disputes based on the gender-neutral, best interests of the child stan209
dard. Fathers’ advocates and commentators contend, however, that
unconstitutional). Feminists initially supported abandoning the tender years presumption as it reinforced stereotypical gender roles and hindered women’s ability to
compete with men in the labor market. See Fineman, supra note 201, at 768
(“[M]others’ desire for sole custody or claims for preferential consideration based on
maternal status or on the functions they stereotypically perform are incompatible with
the symbolic presentation of equality by liberal mainstream feminism.”); Scott, supra
note 202, at 618 (“[W]omen have been disadvantaged by traditional marital
roles . . . .”).
206
According to the Supreme Court of Iowa:
The [maternal preference] is based at least partly on the assumption that the
mother keeps the home, performs the household duties and will have more
time to devote to the children and their welfare. Where, as here, both the
mother and the father work . . . and the evidence shows the husband performed a large share of the household duties ordinarily performed by a
mother [and] spent much free time with the children . . . the evidence discloses [that the maternal preference] would not be proper.
Forsyth v. Forsyth, 172 N.W.2d 111, 114 (Iowa 1969).
207
Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
208
See Stephen J. Bahr et al., Trends in Child Custody Awards: Has the Removal of Maternal Preference Made a Difference?, 28 FAM. L.Q. 247, 249 (1994) (“By 1990 all but five
states had abolished the maternal preference from their statutes.”).
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the tender years presumption would have survived
had it been addressed by the United States Supreme Court. See Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979) (stating that “maternal and paternal roles are not invariably
different in importance,” and “an unwed father may have a relationship with his children fully comparable to that of the mother”). But see DeCamp v. Hein, 541 So. 2d
708, 710 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that statute requiring that fathers be given
the same consideration as mothers in determining a child’s primary residence did not
abolish the tender years presumption and that common sense dictated that the girls in
this case, who were under three years of age, should reside with their mother), overruled by Kuutti v. Kuutti, 645 So. 2d 80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (en banc); Wheeler v.
Gill, 413 S.E.2d 860, 864 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that the tender years presumption may tip the scales in the mother’s favor when both parents are equally fit).
209
Although the term “best interests of the child” is used by “mental health professionals, child advocates, government officials, and scholars. . . . there is little consensus, in law, or science, about what ‘best interests’ means.” JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE, at xiii (1st
paperback ed. 1998). Generally, the “best interests of the child” is simply the “standard by which a court determines what arrangements would be to a child’s greatest
benefit.” A HANDBOOK OF FAMILY LAW TERMS 77 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 2001). “[T]he
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the best interests standard as applied is no different from the maternal preference; sole maternal custody is still the norm in the majority
210
of cases.
Even after the maternal preference was abolished as a result of the
211
parents’ agreement or the court’s decision, mothers obtained sole
custody in the vast majority of cases. Fathers were ordered to pay
212
child support and were granted biweekly overnight visitation. As the
sole custodial parent, the mother had the exclusive right to make major decisions concerning the child’s education, religion, and medical
213
treatment. As the noncustodial parent, the father had no legal deci-

best interests of the child . . . places the emphasis . . . on the child’s welfare rather than
on the parent’s interests.” HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES § 19.6, at 825 (2d student ed. 1988). In many jurisdictions, the
custody statute lists factors the court should consider in determining which custodial
arrangement would be in the child’s best interests, such as:
the parents’ ability to agree, communicate and cooperate in matters relating
to the child; the parents’ willingness to accept custody and any history of unwillingness to allow parenting time not based on substantiated abuse; the interaction and relationship of the child with its parents and siblings; the history
of domestic violence, if any; the safety of the child and the safety of either
parent from physical abuse by the other parent; the preference of the child
when of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent decision; the needs of the child; the stability of the home environment offered;
the quality and continuity of the child’s education; the fitness of the parents;
the geographical proximity of the parents’ homes; the extent and quality of
the time spent with the child prior to or subsequent to the separation; the
parents’ employment responsibilities; and the age and number of the children.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4(c) (West 2002).
210
See ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 77 (asserting that men feel that “[t]he ‘best interests of the child’ standard [is] a deceit for maternal custody”); MACCOBY &
MNOOKIN, supra note 13, at 283 (finding that although California has abandoned the
tender years presumption, it persists as a “social norm,” and in custody disputes between two fit parents, mothers usually prevail); Jed H. Abraham, Why Men Fight for Their
Kids: How Bias in the System Puts Dads at a Disadvantage, FAM. ADVOC., Summer 1994, at
48, 49 (“Physical custody to the mother is still the default award across the country.”);
Stephanie B. Goldberg, Make Room for Daddy, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1997, at 48, 48 (mentioning anti-male “gender bias in the courts”).
211
A study of 933 divorced families found that in nearly eighty percent of the families (705 families), parents agreed as to which parent should have custody, and in 500
of these 705 families that were in agreement, the parents requested maternal physical
custody. MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 13, at 98, 103.
212
See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Birnbaum (In re Marriage of Birnbaum), 260 Cal. Rptr.
210, 215 (Ct. App. 1989) (“The parent without custody pays child support and commonly has visitation twice a month.”); see also MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 13, at
72 (noting that visitation every other weekend is traditional).
213
See In re Marriage of Birnbaum, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 215 (noting that noncustodial
parents may have input but no authority in major decisions).
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sion-making authority concerning the child’s upbringing.
Feeling
that sole custody relegated fathers to the role of visitor, at the same
time they were challenging the tender years presumption in the
215
Fathers’
courts, fathers’ groups began lobbying for joint custody.
advocates argued that both parents are important to children’s psychological, emotional, and mental development, and, thus, it would
be in children’s best interests to maintain a close relationship with
216
both parents. Many child development experts supported joint custody, reasoning that children, especially young children, needed more
than the traditional every-other-weekend visitation in order to main217
tain close relationships with their fathers. California passed the first
218
joint custody statute in 1979, and today all states recognize joint cus219
tody.
220
Although joint custody is more common today than ever before,
sole residential custody to one parent (usually the mother) is still the
221
most common custodial arrangement after divorce. As discussed be-

214

Id.
See Fineman, supra note 201, at 739-40 (“[J]oint custody[] was a virtually inevitable result of the successful attacks on the old rules . . . .”); Elizabeth Scott & Andre
Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 462 (1984) (discussing fathers’
lobbying efforts).
216
Steinman, supra note 2, at 758.
217
These scholars also argued that when both parents are good enough parents
and each supports the other’s relationship with the child, there is no basis in psychology or in law for making a rational choice between the two. Thus, the legal system,
along with mental health professionals, could serve children’s development by encouraging both parents to be active participants in their child’s upbringing. Kelly, supra
note 81, at 767 (calling for fair and balanced further research about joint custody);
Steinman, supra note 2, at 758-60.
218
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(a) (Deering 1979 & Supp. 1984) (creating a presumption favoring joint custody) (repealed Jan. 1, 1994).
219
All states recognize joint custody either by statute or court ruling. Goldberg,
supra note 210, at 49. “[I]n states without joint custody statutes, courts have invoked
their ‘inherent’ authority to award joint custody.” SINGER & REYNOLDS, supra note 135,
at 497; see also Patel v. Patel, 599 S.E.2d 114, 121 (S.C. 2004) (holding that S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-7-402(42) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2003) “gives family court judges the authority
‘to order joint or divided custody where the court finds it in the best interests of the
child’”).
220
See Paradise, supra note 184, at 559 (showing that “joint custody has become
increasingly prevalent throughout the country”).
221
See ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 38 (finding that only a small percentage of fathers are awarded sole residential custody after divorce while mothers continue to obtain sole residential custody in most cases); MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 13, at 74
(finding that only a small percentage of fathers are awarded sole residential custody
after divorce, while mothers continue to obtain sole residential custody in most cases);
note 122 and accompanying text. According to one scholar:
215
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low, fathers argue that continuing gender bias in the courts and in society enables mothers to obtain residential custody and exclude fathers from their children’s lives.
B. Gender Bias: Reality or Perception?
Fathers’ advocates argue that the legal system, including judges,
attorneys, and child development professionals, is biased against fathers, making it almost impossible for them to obtain sole or joint custody and relegating them to the role of economic providers and little
222
else. In this Part, I explore fathers’ assertions of gender bias in the
legal system and conclude that, although gender bias continues to influence a number of custody decisions, in the majority of cases, fathers’ perception of bias discourages paternal involvement after divorce to a greater degree than any actual bias that might exist.
Unfortunately, legal actors may be influencing this perception of bias.
Many divorced fathers of different educational and socioeconomic
backgrounds, even those with residential custody, believe that child cus223
Some have expressed feeling
tody laws are biased against men.
224
Although conceding
“raped” by the divorce and custody process.
that child custody laws are generally gender-neutral, fathers’ advocates
contend that judges favor mothers when applying the law because they
225
view fathers as less competent parents than mothers.
This perception of bias is not unfounded. Studies have found that
the tender years presumption persists as a “social norm” and that

[Eighty-five percent] to 90% of children of formerly married parents reside
with their mothers while only about 10% live with their fathers. While joint
physical custody arrangements alter these figures somewhat, children in joint
custody are still much more likely to end up with their mothers than their fathers.
Ross A. Thompson, The Role of the Father After Divorce, FUTURE CHILD., Spring 1994, at
210, 215 (footnote omitted); see also infra Part IV.A.
222
Greif, supra note 197, at 224 (noting that “[d]espite custody laws being written
in a gender neutral language, the perception among many fathers is that the courts . . .
remain biased” in favor of mothers and that it is difficult for fathers to obtain sole or
joint custody).
223
Id.; see also ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 46-47 (discussing a father who obtained
primary custody but still felt that the legal system did not protect his rights simply because he was a man).
224
ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 47.
225
See LEVING, supra note 112, at 2-3 (informing fathers that although the tender
years presumption has been abolished, “overt gender bias inherent in the concept has
survived”).
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226

mothers usually prevail in custody disputes between two fit parents.
Some studies have found evidence of gender bias against fathers in
the courts. For example, in 1989, a study on gender bias issued by the
Massachusetts Supreme Court found that, “despite the absence of
statutory or decisional authority for a maternal preference for children of tender years,” some judges might be applying such a prefer227
ence. Similarly in 1991, the Georgia Commission on Gender Bias in
the Judicial System found that there are “[c]ulturally based gender228
biased beliefs that influence some judges and disadvantage fathers.”
The Commission found that some judges may have accepted societal
beliefs that mothers are better parents than fathers and that young
229
Based on these assumpchildren need to be with their mothers.
tions, the Commission found that some judges would not award fathers custody unless the mother was unfit, while other judges were
concerned that an award of paternal custody would necessarily imply
230
that the mother was unfit. Similarly, findings led the Massachusetts
Committee to conclude that “stereotypes about fathers may sometimes
231
affect case outcomes.”
Undeniably, some judges treat fathers who wish to remain involved in their children’s upbringing after divorce less favorably than
mothers. As one judge noted, “there remains a temptation for many
judges to consider the right to custody as the mother’s to lose and unless her fitness is legitimately challenged, the father’s right of equal

226

See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 13, at 283 (revealing that the maternal
presumption still exists in practice, even though it is no longer good law). One study
found that of 198 contested cases, mothers’ requests for custody were granted in 117
cases, whereas fathers’ requests for custody were granted in only 52 cases. Id. at 10304. “[T]he remaining 29 cases resulted in a compromise between the two requests in
the custody allocated.” Id. at 104.
227
Gender Bias Study Comm., Mass. Supreme Judicial Court, Gender Bias Study of
the Court System in Massachusetts, reprinted in 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 745, 827 n.47 (1990)
[hereinafter Massachusetts Report]. Regrettably, the study did not follow up and investigate how often judges apply a maternal preference.
228
Ga. Comm’n on Bias in the Judicial Sys., Supreme Court of Ga., Gender and Justice in the Courts: A Report to the Supreme Court of Georgia by the Commission on Gender Bias
in the Judicial System, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 539, 657 (1992) [hereinafter Georgia Report].
But see Mary Ann Mason & Ann Quirk, Are Mothers Losing Custody? Read My Lips: Trends
in Judicial Decision-Making in Custody Disputes—1920, 1960, 1990, and 1995, 31 FAM. L.Q.
215, 228 tbl.2 (1997) (showing that in 1995 fathers won sole custody in forty-two percent of custody disputes); Polikoff, supra note 200, at 236 (“When fathers do want custody, their chances of winning are substantial.”).
229
Georgia Report, supra note 228, at 657-59.
230
Id. at 659-60.
231
Massachusetts Report, supra note 227, at 748.
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232

consideration is often ignored.” Fathers’ advocates frequently point
to former Kings County (Brooklyn, New York) Family Court Chief
Judge Richard Huttner’s statement that there is no “bigger pain in the
233
ass than the father who wants to get involved; he can be repulsive.”
Judge Huttner chastised a father for wanting to pick up his child after
school, take him out to dinner, speak to him on the telephone daily,
see him on his birthday, attend open school night, and have overnight
weekend visitation, concluding that “[t]his type of involved father is
234
Similarly, one judge in Vermont, when presented
pathological.”
with a photograph showing the mother snorting what the judge suspected to be cocaine as well as additional evidence that she had
abused the child, nevertheless awarded the mother custody because
235
the unemployed father set a bad example for the child.
Although
the mother was not herself employed, the father was penalized for failing to conform to the norm of economic fatherhood—the expectation that fathers, but not necessarily mothers, will always be economic
236
providers.
Based on these types of incidents, many fathers conclude that the
majority of judges view nonresidential fathers as “visiting uncles,”
“someone who takes the kids to dinner one evening a week and every
237
other weekend takes them out to play somewhere.”
Many fathers
argue that most judges, who as a group are still predominantly male,
probably “delegate parenting responsibilities to their wives,” and as
such, still believe that a father’s primary role is to support the children
238
As a result, judges treat them as
while the mother raises them.
239
strangers with no right to participate in their children’s upbringing.
The story of bias in custody is not as clear or one-sided as some fathers’ advocates might argue. In fact, fathers are not the only ones
232

Ayyash v. Ayyash, 700 So. 2d 752, 755 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Robert E. Fay, The Disenfranchised Father, 36 ADVANCES PEDIATRICS 407, 417
(1989) (quoting former Chief Judge Richard Huttner, Kings County (Brooklyn, New
York) Family Court, The Fathers Also Rise, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, Nov. 18, 1985, at 72).
234
Id.
235
See Leslie A. Cadwell, Note, Gender Bias Against Fathers in Custody? The Important
Difference Between Outcome and Process, 18 VT. L. REV. 215, 249-50 (1993) (highlighting
the description of the case given by an attorney interviewed as part of an effort by the
Vermont Task Force on Gender Bias in the Legal System to gather data from divorce
cases).
236
See id. at 250 (discussing the judge’s biased decision making).
237
ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 80.
238
Id. (quoting an unidentified attorney/survey respondent)
239
See id. (noting that many judges, particularly “judges in older generations,” believe that fathers are not supposed to be involved in parenting).
233
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who are occasionally treated unjustly in custody proceedings. Mothers
experience bias as well. In custody disputes, trial courts sometimes
penalize mothers who work outside the home and hold them to a
240
For example,
higher standard of parenting than they do fathers.
some courts give disproportionate weight to any parenting tasks that
fathers assume while simply expecting those same activities of moth241
Further, courts scrutinize mothers’ behavior during the marers.
riage and improperly consider their misconduct (e.g., adultery) in determining custody although the law is clear that such behavior is
242
The same
relevant only if it has an adverse effect on the child.
240

Unfortunately, few child custody cases are appealed. Sylvia A. Law & Patricia
Hennessey, Is the Law Male?: The Case of Family Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 345, 351.
But when such suits are appealed, the appellate courts often find that trial courts improperly held mothers to a higher standard than fathers. See Burchard v. Garay, 724
P.2d 486, 488 (Cal. 1986) (reversing trial court award of custody to the father and rejecting trial court’s custody rationale that he was “financially better off” and had remarried a woman who did not work outside the home); In re Marriage of Tresnak, 297
N.W.2d 109, 111 (Iowa 1980) (discussing the trial court’s reasons for awarding father
custody, in part, because mother was attending law school); Linda R. v. Richard E., 561
N.Y.S.2d 29, 33 (App. Div. 1990) (holding that the trial court inappropriately focused
on mother’s employment); Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 133, 158 (1992) (attributing the bias against
mothers to “the different ways in which mothers and fathers utilize their time and the
resulting economic consequences”); Polikoff, supra note 200, at 237-42 (arguing that
fathers who seek custody are prevailing in large numbers because courts are considering inappropriate factors that prejudice mothers, such as availability of economic resources, parental employment, and fathers’ remarriage).
241
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Estelle, 592 S.W.2d 277, 277-78 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979)
(affirming custody to working father over working mother and emphasizing that father
often prepared the child’s breakfast and dinner and picked her up from daycare himself); Patricia Ann S. v. James Daniel S., 435 S.E.2d 6, 16 (W. Va. 1993) (Workman, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting that the family law master and circuit court were inappropriately
“bowled over” by the father’s contributions in the evenings and on weekends); Cadwell, supra note 235, at 220 (citing a female attorney’s opinion that “fathers’ small child
care contributions are ‘overvalued’ in comparison with mothers’ care because mothers
are expected to take primary responsibility for the care of their children”).
242
See, e.g., Linda R., 561 N.Y.S.2d at 31 (noting that the lower court improperly
focused on mother’s affair); Hansen v. Hansen, 562 A.2d 1051, 1054 (Vt. 1989)
(same); Katharine T. Bartlett, Preference, Presumption, Predisposition, and Common Sense:
From Traditional Custody Doctrines to the American Law Institute’s Family Dissolution Project,
36 FAM. L.Q. 11, 22-23 (2002) (“[C]ourts tend to give fathers more credit than mothers for doing what is expected of mothers, to penalize mothers more than men for extramarital affairs, and to think that a mother’s investment in her career is selfish while
a father’s is the act of a responsible provider.” (footnotes omitted)); Nancy D. Polikoff,
Gender and Child-Custody Determinations: Exploding the Myths, in FAMILIES, POLITICS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY: A FEMINIST DIALOGUE ON WOMEN AND THE STATE 183, 191 (Irene
Diamond ed., 1983) (noting that women are more likely than men to be penalized for
engaging in nonmarital sexual behavior); Cadwell, supra note 235, at 220, 221 (ex-
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Georgia Commission that found that culturally based gender-biased
beliefs may disadvantage fathers similarly found that some
“[c]ulturally based gender-biased beliefs . . . [may also] disadvantage
243
For example, the Commission found that some judges
mothers.”
may have adopted the view that “a mother who works outside the
home, whether because of ambition or economic necessity is less fit to
be awarded custody than a man . . . because these women are not
244
‘good mothers.’” Thus, to the extent that gender bias exists, it may
work against mothers as well as fathers. Few fathers’ advocates, however, believe that mothers are subject to bias. Indeed, a Vermont
study finding many instances of gender bias against mothers noted a
“widespread perception” among fathers of bias in favor of mothers—
245
and against fathers.
Even when there is little or no evidence of gender bias, there is a
widespread perception among nonresidential fathers that the prevalence of maternal residential custody can only be explained by gender
bias. This is inaccurate. In reality, mothers’ greater likelihood of obtaining custody is a result of their significantly greater involvement in
246
In determining
their children’s upbringing during the marriage.
custody, courts may consider the parents’ caregiving responsibilities
during the marriage—in other words, who was the primary care247
Because most mothers, even those who work outside the
giver.
248
home, devote more time to child care than fathers, courts are
plaining that “the Task Force found that mothers’ ‘misconduct’ during or after marriage was used improperly”).
243
Georgia Report, supra note 228, at 657-60, 662; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Child
Custody in the 21st Century: How the American Law Institute Proposes to Achieve Predictability
and Still Protect the Individual Child’s Best Interests, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 467, 474
(1999) (“[G]ender bias against mothers, especially those that do not conform to gender role stereotypes, is as [sic] least as serious a problem as bias against fathers.”).
244
Georgia Report, supra note 228, at 662.
245
Cadwell, supra note 235, at 215.
246
See Massachusetts Report, supra note 227, at 825 (concluding that most women
obtained primary physical custody of the children after divorce not because of any maternal preference, but based on the parties’ agreement or the fact that the mother had
been the primary caretaker).
247
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 2003) (stating that “the court shall consider . . . the extent and quality of time spent with the child prior to or subsequent to
the separation”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(b)(6) (1989) (considering “the quality
of the child’s relationship with the primary care provider”); Young v. Hector, 740 So.
2d 1153, 1157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the court “should attempt to preserve and continue the caretaking roles that the parties had established” when awarding custody).
248
See Czapanskiy, supra note 115, at 1435 (“The average father living with his
child spends less than ten minutes a day caring for his child, while the average mother
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merely attempting to continue the patterns in place during the marriage by awarding mothers responsibility for the children’s upbringing
249
after divorce. The perception, however, is that courts favor mothers
250
and see fathers as merely economic providers.
Legal and social actors reinforce these perceptions every day. Attorneys frequently shape litigants’ views and expectations of the legal
system. This is most true in custody cases where decisions are generally made, not by judges, but by the parties themselves, with the advice
251
and assistance of their attorneys. Attorneys who believe the legal system is biased against fathers are likely to convey those views to fathers
252
Although as shown
who, as lay persons, are likely to believe them.
above, there is some bias against both fathers and mothers, attorneys
may be playing a significant role in perpetuating the perception that
253
bias against fathers in the child custody system is rampant. Fathers
claim that attorneys discourage them from seeking custody by ques254
tioning their motives and warning them that unless a mother is a
spends several hours.”); Adler, supra note 3, at 61 (“Women are still doing twice as
much [child care] as men”). According to one source:
[F]athers are “available” (that is, present and accessible) to their children for
about half as much time as are mothers; mothers spend about three times as
much time in face-to-face interaction with children as do fathers. And mothers are overwhelmingly more likely to be the person responsible for the children—the only person at home with them, the one who stays home from work
with them if they are ill, the person who arranges the child care, makes medical appointments . . . .
MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 13, at 26.
249
Fathers advocates argue that granting mothers custody because they perform
most of the caregiving penalizes men for being financial providers. See ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 78 (discussing problems with the primary caretaker theory); Ronald K.
Henry, ‘Primary Caretaker’: Is It a Ruse?, FAM. ADVOC., Summer 1994, at 53, 53-56 (same).
250
See ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 78 (quoting one father as saying, “[n]o one
asked me if I loved my children, they only asked to see my paycheck”).
251
Loewen, supra note 105, at 199 (noting that “9 out of 10 custody arrangements
are worked out privately among the parents and their attorneys”).
252
See id. at 200 (stating that “many lawyers still tell their male clients they have
little chance for sole or joint custody” and citing studies finding that “‘considerably
more . . . men would have contested the custody issue had the lawyer not advised
against such a course’” (quoting PETER AMBROSE ET AL., SURVIVING DIVORCE: MEN
BEYOND MARRIAGE 140 (1983))).
253
For example, on the cover of his book, Jeffery Leving, who describes himself as
“America’s Leading Fathers’ Rights Attorney,” promises to teach his readers how to
“[o]vercome the ‘tender years’ bias,” thereby leading fathers to believe the tender
years presumption still exists. LEVING, supra note 112, at front cover.
254
See, e.g., ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 185-86 (noting that one father reported
that his wife’s attorney kept asking him why he was seeking custody, searching for an
ulterior motive, apparently finding it insufficient that he wanted custody because he
was their father).
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drug addict or child abuser, a father will almost never obtain cus255
Indeed, one attorney surveyed by a Vermont task force on
tody.
gender bias expressed these views, stating that in Vermont, “mothers
‘always get[] custody unless you can prove beyond all doubt [their]
256
Further, close to seventy percent of the surveyed
incompetence.’”
attorneys and half the judges “believed that Vermont custody awards
are ‘always’ or ‘often’ based ‘on the assumption that, other things be257
ing equal, young children belong with their mothers.’” Thus, attorneys and judges may be reinforcing the perception that the law favors
mothers as custodial parents simply because they are women.
In their initial consultations, divorce attorneys frequently warn fathers who are considering seeking sole or joint custody that mothers
258
obtain residential custody in eighty-five percent of all cases.
Attorneys fail to explain to fathers that most parents agree to maternal custody without judicial intervention and that this eighty-five percent fig259
ure reflects such agreements. Although this warning may be useful,
attorneys fuel fathers’ perceptions that they will not be treated fairly in
a custody dispute by not providing them with all of the facts. In real260
ity, however, judges decide only five percent of custody disputes.
Thus, parents, not judges, are agreeing to grant mothers sole legal
and residential custody. In the relatively small number of cases where
parents litigate custody, fathers are awarded sole or joint custody in

255

See Cadwell, supra note 235, at 244 (noting the concern that some attorneys discourage fathers from seeking custody). The Vermont Task Force asked attorneys
whether they would ever “discourage a father from seeking custody because the judge
would ‘not give the request fair consideration.’” Id. at 244 n.204. Fourteen percent of
male attorneys reported that they discourage fathers for this reason “often,” and 24.5%
discourage them “sometimes.” Id. Only 4.8% of female attorneys reported that they
discourage fathers for this reason “often,” and 22.6% discourage them “sometimes.”
Id.
256
Id. at 220.
257
Id. at 219.
258
See ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 79 (“Most men did not pursue sole or shared
custody because . . . [of] the national pattern in which over 85% of children whose
parents divorce go into their mother’s custody.”).
259
Most parents do not wish to subject their children to a custody hearing and
manage to come to an agreement concerning custody that a judge then approves in
almost all cases. When parties do not litigate custody, they usually agree to award sole
physical custody to the mother. See Bahr et al., supra note 208, at 256-57 (citing a 1993
study which found that couples agreed to sole maternal custody in eight-six percent of
cases and sole paternal custody in only four percent of cases).
260
Loewen, supra note 105, at 201.
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fifty to sixty-five percent of cases even where the mother was the
261
child’s primary caretaker.
If fathers’ likelihood of obtaining custody is comparable to, and
possibly higher than, that of mothers, why do most children reside
with their mothers after divorce? Apparently, although many fathers
report wanting sole or joint custody, they do not seek it. For example,
although thirty-two percent of fathers claim to want sole custody and
another thirty-five percent claim to want joint custody, the leading
study on joint custody found that only twelve percent of divorcing fa262
thers seek sole custody and another six percent seek joint custody.
The majority of fathers never filed a custody petition or even opposed
263
the mother’s petition for sole custody. Thus, most children end up
in their mother’s custody by default or as a result of their parents’ mu264
tual agreement.
There are many reasons fathers do not seek or challenge custody.
Some fathers attribute to their attorneys the gap between their stated
265
desire for custody and the infrequency with which they seek it.
Some commentators have speculated that fathers may not be seeking
custody because they have been conditioned by society to believe that
women alone should be residential parents and that men should not

261

See id. (noting that fathers who seek custody prevail in half or more cases); Mason & Quirk, supra note 228, at 228 tbl.2 (citing statistics showing that fathers won custody in forty-two percent of custody appeals, mothers prevailed in forty-five percent of
cases, and twelve percent of the cases involved some form of shared custody, including
9.2% with split custody and 2.8% with joint physical custody); Massachusetts Report, supra note 227, at 825 (finding that fathers obtain custody in 70% of cases). But see
MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 13, at 103-04 (finding that mothers obtained their
preferred custodial arrangement twice as often as fathers); Bahr et al., supra note 208,
at 257 (showing that fathers in Utah were awarded sole custody in only twenty-one percent of disputed cases, mothers received sole custody in fifty percent of cases, seventeen percent of fathers were awarded joint legal custody, and thirteen percent had split
custody); Fox & Blanton, supra note 101, at 261 (finding that when fathers in California sought joint custody and mothers sought sole custody, mothers prevailed in sixtyseven percent of the cases).
262
MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 13, at 99-100.
263
Id.
264
See id. at 100 (concluding that with respect to custody requests, “mothers are
more likely to act on their stated desires than are fathers”); Massachusetts Report, supra
note 227, at 825 (discussing a gender bias study which found that the “pattern [of
mothers receiving primary physical custody of children following divorce] does not
reflect judicial bias, but the agreement of the parties and the fact that in most families
mothers have been the primary caretakers”).
265
See Cadwell, supra note 235, at 244-45 (discussing the influence of attorneys’
bias on clients’ custody choices).
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266

seek custody barring exceptional circumstances. In other words, social norms dictate that divorced fathers not be residential parents.
Consequently, relatives and friends are often unsupportive of fathers’ desire to have custody and try to discourage them from seeking
267
it. Along those same lines, fathers who have not been primary care268
takers may doubt their competence and importance as parents.
These feelings of inadequacy, combined with mothers’ and society’s
expectations that mothers should and will be awarded custody, may
lead some fathers to believe that mothers always get custody. Feeling
defeated before they even assert a claim, they settle for liberal visita269
tion—as their attorneys advise—and never assert a claim for custody.
As the Massachusetts and Georgia studies conclude, even when judges
are not influenced by gender bias, “perceptions of gender bias dis270
courage fathers from seeking custody, creating a chilling effect.”
C. The Visiting Father
How and why do so many fathers, including those who were very
271
involved in their children’s upbringing during the marriage, abandon them after divorce? As discussed above, one reason fathers are
not seeking custody may be that they are convinced that the custody
system is stacked against them. However, this does not explain why
fathers fail to maintain contact with their children, or why so many fathers with visitation rights see their children significantly less often

266

ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 79; Loewen, supra note 105, at 200; see also supra

Part I.
267

Loewen, supra note 105, at 200.
Supra note 105 and accompanying text (noting that divorced fathers doubt
their importance to their children).
269
See ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 79 (finding that many men did not seek sole or
joint custody because they were sure they would fail once they learned that eighty-five
percent of children live with their mothers after divorce); Abraham, supra note 210, at
48 (discussing the influence of attorneys on custody decisions); Greif, supra note 197,
at 223 (“[Fathers] tended to go to court only when they believed they had a good
chance of winning.”). Further, because in some states courts will only award joint custody where both parents agree to it, fathers may not seek it unless they are sure the
mothers will not object. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 107.169(3) (1999) (“The court shall
not order joint custody, unless both parents agree to the terms and conditions of that
order.”); infra Part III.A (discussing joint custody).
270
Georgia Report, supra note 228, at 660; see also Massachusetts Report, supra note
227, at 825 (describing the discouraging effects of gender bias on fathers).
271
See supra note 126 and accompanying text (arguing that the fathers who were
most involved in their children’s upbringing during the marriage were among those
fathers most likely to disengage from their children after the divorce).
268
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than they are entitled under their visitation agreements or court or272
In this Part, I explore the reasons nonresidential fathers disders.
engage from their children after divorce and conclude that paternal
visitation itself may discourage fathers from maintaining a relationship
with their children. In other words, contrary to popular belief, many
fathers disengage not because they do not love their children, but
rather because of the legal and social limitations imposed by a visiting
relationship. Thus, the law’s actual or perceived treatment of nonresidential fathers may lead some fathers to terminate contact with
their children.
1. Vanilla Visitation and Disneyland Daddies
Although many judges and attorneys consider the typical visitation
arrangement of one weeknight and alternating weekends and holidays
to be generous, many fathers complain that this “vanilla visitation”
schedule is “barely enough to remain a familiar face to their children,
273
They argue that visitalet alone an effective and involved parent.”
tion every other weekend is not frequent enough to maintain a parental relationship because, especially with young children, it takes time
to reconnect after not seeing each other even for a short period of
274
time. Further, reestablishing a connection becomes increasingly dif275
Thus, faficult as the time living apart since the divorce increases.
thers who see their children once or twice a week and on alternate
weekends are likely to become Disneyland Daddies—fathers who spoil
their children, entertain them all weekend, but who do not play a pa276
rental role.
272

Over one-third of men in one study who complained that maternal custody
negatively influenced their relationship with their children had substantially less contact with the children than allowed under the visitation agreement. ARENDELL, supra
note 84, at 82.
273
Smith, supra note 118, at 42; see also Kruk, supra note 13, at 23 (“Fathers have a
strong desire and need to maintain regular and frequent contact with their children
after divorce. For the majority of noncustodial fathers, traditional access arrangements
are extremely inadequate.”).
274
Children’s perception of time differs from that of adults. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 209, at 41-43 (explaining that “children have a built-in time sense based on
the urgency of their instinctual or emotional needs” and describing three months as
“forever” for a young child).
275
See ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 153 (describing fathers’ attempts to reconnect
with their children as “awkward”).
276
See WARSHAK, supra note 112, at 77 (“As an occasional ‘visitor’ with his children,
the noncustodial father finds it difficult to retain the same depth and diversity of parental involvement.”); see also supra Part II.B (discussing Disneyland Daddies).
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Some fathers see their children infrequently precisely because
they refuse to be “visitors.” They claim that “[v]isitation puts you in
277
the position that you’re a visitor to your child.” As one father who
ceased contact with his children after he was denied joint custody expressed: “I’m a parent and parents do not visit their children. If I see
my child only every other weekend, I become nothing more than a vis278
iting uncle. I am a father in name only at this point.”
This father
refused to be reduced to anything less than a full parent. Many fathers agree that visitation demeans them as parents by restricting
279
them to seeing their children only at scheduled times, and argue
that by relegating them to the role of a visitor, the law has taken away
280
their parental authority. They are not entirely wrong. Although legally responsible for supporting their children, unless they share legal
and physical custody, fathers may depend on the residential mother
for information about their children’s health, performance in school,
281
athletic activities, friends, etc. For many fathers, the superficial nature of the visiting relationship leads to increased frustration as they
realize, in the words of one nonresidential father, that “a father who is
282
a visitor is not a father at all,” and may eventually lead to termination of all contact.

277

ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 147.
Id. at 146-47.
279
Id. at 167. In Arendell’s study of seventy-five fathers, only five had unfettered
access to their kids; the rest were limited to the terms of the visitation agreement. Id.
Some custodial mothers allow fathers to call or see their children whenever they wish,
but others have accused fathers of constantly calling as a way of monitoring the mothers’ activities and have obtained court orders prohibiting fathers from calling or dropping by during nonscheduled times. According to one father:
All I want is good access so that I am not a visitor. I want to have the freedom
to phone them, and I want the freedom for them to phone me. I want to be
able to see them when I want without asking for permission all the time.
Carl Bertola & Janice Drakich, The Fathers’ Rights Movement: Contradictions in Rhetoric
and Practice, 14 J. FAM. ISSUES 592, 600 (1993).
280
As one father noted: “How much control does any noncustodial parent have in
their child’s life? How much input, how much input?” ARENDELL, supra note 84, at
147.
281
“[T]he noncustodial parent generally . . . ha[d] no common law right of access
to information about the child from sources such as public school records.” Schepard,
supra note 131, at 695 n.15 (1985) (citations omitted). Although statutes now require
that noncustodial parents be granted access to all school, medical and dental records,
id., many parents still encounter difficulties. See ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 186 (discussing the problems encountered by one noncustodial father in trying to obtain information regarding his child).
282
Judith Bond Jennison, The Search for Equality in a Woman’s World: Fathers’ Rights
to Child Custody, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1141, 1178 (1991) (internal quotations omitted).
278
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2. Emotional Pain
Researchers have discovered that many men experience a “severe
283
sense of loss” after a divorce and find visitation emotionally painful.
Understandably, the anguish is greater for fathers who were highly involved in their children’s upbringing during the marriage since they
must become accustomed to having drastically reduced, structured,
and scheduled contact, as well as losing the daily routine (i.e., bath284
ing, dressing, feeding) of their relationship with their children.
Some fathers, especially those who were very involved and attached to
their children during the marriage, deal with the pain of trying to
maintain a close relationship with them after divorce by limiting or
285
Rather than be “emotional wrecks” during and
curtailing contact.
after a visit because they dread the anguish they will endure once the
286
visit is over, many fathers avoid contact altogether.
Scholars have
concluded that “[t]he pain of the visits themselves—their brevity,

283

See H. Jay Folberg & Marva Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following Divorce, 12
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 523, 555 (1979) (explaining that many men are so “overwhelmed”
by the situation that they simply “give up”).
284
See Kruk, supra note 13, at 21 (“Those fathers most attached to their children
before divorce are most likely to suffer the negative effects of the loss or absence of
their children and their fathering role . . . .”). Interestingly, for some less involved fathers—more traditional fathers—bimonthly visitation results in greater involvement in
their children’s upbringing than during the marriage. They are actually spending
more time alone with the children than ever before. Id.
285
Id. at 20-21 (finding that fathers who were highly involved during the marriage
deal with the pain of losing the daily interaction with their children and their daily parental responsibilities by completely disengaging over time and that disengaged fathers
tend to be those who were highly involved during the marriage); Seltzer, supra note 84,
at 80 (“By avoiding contact, some fathers face fewer reminders of their ‘lost’ children.”).
286
For example, one father who had chosen not to see his child for nine months
expressed:
Every time I pulled up to the driveway to let him off, it was like part of me was
dying all over again. I could barely keep myself together long enough to give
him a hug good-bye. I knew it wasn’t good for him to leave seeing me so visibly upset every time. He would open the door, step out of the car, and I
would feel as if I would never see him again. He would walk up the sidewalk
and a sense of grief would utterly overcome me. It would take me several days
to pull myself together enough to even function at work. I’d have to keep his
bedroom door closed; I couldn’t bear to see his empty room. I had to break it
off totally just to survive. The visits themselves were terrible because I had this
constant unease, knowing what was coming.
ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 154. Another father stated, “[b]y the time your coat is off,
you’re not interacting, you’re worrying about when they’ll go back. You’re tearing
your heart and guts out saying, ‘You’re only going to see them for a few hours.’ . . .
You’re disoriented and it’s hard to interact with your children that way.” Id. at 154-55.
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their intensity, their insufficiency—and the father’s sense of guilt and
anger over the divorce also inhibit consistent and frequent visita287
tion.” Although disengaging generally did not alleviate nonresiden288
tial fathers’ sense of loss and depression, one study found that
within two years of divorce, many fathers who found seeing their children “intermittently” unbearable were coping by seeing them infre289
quently. Unlike mothers, many fathers feel they are entitled to distance themselves from their children if necessary to minimize the pain
290
Because
of not residing with them or parenting them every day.
there is not yet a norm of involved post-divorce fatherhood, it is less
291
difficult socially, although no less painful emotionally, for fathers to
walk away from their children if seeing them only occasionally causes
them unbearable anguish.
3. Conflict With the Child’s Mother
Nonresidential fathers’ relationships with their children’s mothers
play a large and sometimes determinative role in fathers’ level of in292
volvement in their children’s upbringing. Indeed, the relationship
between the parents, rather than the level of paternal involvement or
strength of the father-child bond during the marriage, is the strongest
293
predictor of frequent paternal contact after divorce. Even the small

287

Fox & Blanton, supra note 101, at 264.
See E. Mavis Hetherington et al., Divorced Fathers, 25 FAM. COORDINATOR 417,
422 (1976) (noting that these fathers often felt “shut out, rootless and at loose ends”);
see also Dowd, supra note 89, at 523-24 (disagreeing with the notion that fatherhood is
unimportant to most fathers and that fathers do not suffer when they lose contact with
their children); Kruk, supra note 13, at 19 (concluding that noncustodial fathers who
were highly involved with and attached to their children during the marriage suffered
high levels of distress several years after the divorce as a result of the actual or feared
loss of their children).
289
Folberg & Graham, supra note 283, at 555.
290
See ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 144 (reporting that some fathers in the study
believed that the emotional costs of maintaining a relationship with their children
would likely drive them away in the near future).
291
See supra text accompanying notes 79-94 (describing how there is no social
norm of fathers remaining involved in parenting after divorce).
292
See ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 145 (“[F]ormer spousal conflict was the primary explanation for fathers’ parental disengagement . . . .”). In fact, one study
showed that sixty-four percent of fathers who chose to see their children infrequently
or not at all cited problems with their former spouses as the main reason for this lack
of contact. Greif, supra note 126, at 79.
293
See Dowd, supra note 89, at 525 (finding the father’s relationship with his exwife to be of paramount importance); McKenry et al., supra note 21, at 307 (arguing
288
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percentage of fathers who claim to be satisfied having little or no contact with their children admit, upon further probing, that they blame
294
Thus, they do not
their children’s mother for the lack of contact.
perceive their lack of involvement as voluntary, but rather as co295
erced.
Fathers’ petitions to enforce visitation rights are relatively com296
mon, second only to child support complaints.
Some researchers
estimate that one-third to one-half of residential mothers interfere
297
with visitation
by “forgetting” appointments, insisting on rigid
schedules, denying visitation if the father’s girlfriend will be present,
relocating without notifying the father, making the children feel guilty
for seeing their father, and disparaging the father in front of the chil298
dren.
that “fathers’ feelings about the former spouse appear to be a more influential predictor of frequency of visitation than fathers’ feelings about their children”).
294
Greif, supra note 126, at 82 (finding that most of the fathers without contact
“are unhappy with their situation”). Although fourteen percent of fathers stated that
they were content with their current level of contact and did not desire more contact
with their children, sixty-four percent of those fathers blamed the other parent for the
low level of contact. Id. at 78-79.
295
For example, one father stated that the mother had “worked very hard for
three years” to successfully alienate the children from him. Id. at 80. Another father
who had not seen his teenage children in three years wrote that their mother had
“brainwashed” them to have no contact with him. Id. These fathers’ statements that
they do not desire increased contact with their children are colored by their statements
that contact ceased as a result of the custodial mother’s interference with the relationship. Thus, the percentage of fathers who want no contact with their children is likely
less than the reported fourteen percent.
296
Fox & Blanton, supra note 101, at 262.
297
See PARKE, supra note 126, at 195-96 (1981) (finding that “between 25 and 50
percent of mothers may interfere with or make visitation more difficult” and “nearly 40
percent” of mothers have refused visitation and their decision was not influenced by
the child’s “health, safety, or wishes”); Czapanskiy, supra note 115, at 1449 (noting that
custodial mothers deny fathers visitation in about twenty to twenty-five percent of all
cases); Loewen, supra note 105, at 195, 202 (citing studies pertaining to the mother’s
role in visitation). In one study of 820 college students whose parents had been divorced on average for ten years, the students reported that their mothers were generally opposed to them having more time with their fathers, although forty-eight percent
of the children wanted substantially more time with their fathers. William V. Fabricius
& Jeff A. Hall, Young Adults’ Perspectives on Divorce: Living Arrangements, 38 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 446, 446, 451-52 (2000).
298
See, e.g., Schutz v. Schutz, 581 So. 2d 1290, 1291-92 (Fla. 1991) (finding the custodial mother relocated with the children repeatedly without notifying the father and
“brainwashed” the children into “hat[ing], despis[ing] and fear[ing]” their father);
WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 21, at 125 (describing how former wives have used
“a thousand mischievous, mostly petty, devices designed to humiliate the visiting parent and to deprecate him in the eyes of his children”). Sometimes mothers interfere
with visitation because the father has not paid child support. See Furstenberg, supra
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Currently, when mothers interfere with visitation there is little
nonresidential fathers can do to enforce their rights to see their children without incurring significant expenses, both financial and emo299
tional. Although many states have criminalized such interference
and courts have held mothers who interfere with visitation in contempt and imprisoned them until they agreed to comply with the visi300
tation order, this is rare, as most parents do not wish to send their
301
In extreme cases, courts have dechildren’s other parent to jail.
prived mothers of child support payments until they comply with visi302
tation orders, but most judges have refused to impose this sanction,
303
in part, because it punishes the children. Courts have also been reluctant to impose fines for interfering with visitation because they may
force divorced mothers, who may be struggling financially, to use

note 15, at 664 (noting that mothers discouraged or prevented fathers’ contact with
children especially when dissatisfied with the level of child support paid). Although
mothers’ attempts to motivate fathers to pay support by making access to the children
contingent on payment is understandable, the law treats child support and visitation
separately. One is not dependent on the other.
299
See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-5.5 (West 2002) (making “unlawful
visitation interference” a petty offense); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-3-4 (West 1998)
(criminalizing violations of custody orders by hiding, kidnapping, or taking a child out
of state); MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.400.7 (West 2003) (providing for application of court’s
powers of contempt when a parent interferes with custody).
300
See, e.g., Morgan v. Foretich, 528 A.2d 425, 428-29 (D.C. 1987) (upholding a
judgment of civil contempt when the mother refused to comply with a visitation order); Smith v. Smith, 434 N.E.2d 749, 753 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (affirming as not
grossly excessive a five-day civil contempt sentence against a mother for interfering
with visitation); LEVING, supra note 112, at 7 (“Sanctions imposed to punish violation
of a family court’s visitation orders can include fines, forfeiture of child support, and
sometimes incarceration.”).
301
Thus, many fathers fail to seek the courts’ aid in enforcing visitation. However,
some fathers claim that when they have sought to enforce visitation, they have not received any assistance. For example, although California has criminalized a custodial
parent’s interference with visitation, when fathers have asked the police to enforce visitation, they have been told, “[t]his is a civil matter. Go talk to your attorney.” McCant,
supra note 79, at 138. When they go to the district attorney’s office, they are told that
the office lacks the resources to assist them in enforcing visitation. Id.
302
Sipos v. Sipos, 425 N.Y.S.2d 414, 415 (App. Div. 1980); cf. Hecht v. Hecht, 635
N.Y.S.2d 280, 281 (App. Div. 1995) (reversing suspension of child support because the
interference with visitation did not constitute “deliberate frustration”).
303
See Kemp v. Kemp, 399 A.2d 923, 930 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (finding error
in chancellor’s cancellation of child support payments because visitation and support
are not “mutually dependent” terms), rev’d on other grounds, 411 A.2d 1028 (Md. 1980);
State ex rel. Southwell v. Chamberland, 361 N.W.2d 814, 817 (Minn. 1985)
(“[W]rongful deprivation of visitation rights will not affect the obligation of child support.”).
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304

child support money to pay the fines. If all else fails, courts can take
residential custody away from a parent who continually interferes with
305
Howvisitation and grant residential custody to the other parent.
ever, courts are hesitant to remove children from a residential arrangement to which they have become accustomed, unless there is a
306
risk of physical or emotional harm.
Courts’ apparent failure to enforce visitation has led many fathers
to believe that the law does not value their relationships with their
children outside of their financial contributions. Although government agencies are responsible for enforcement of child support or307
ders, there is no similar streamlined enforcement mechanism for
visitation. When mothers interfere with visitation, fathers frequently
308
must hire attorneys to assist them in enforcing their visitation rights.
As a result of the difficulties and expenses of enforcing visitation,
309
some fathers stop trying.
Fathers’ stated reasons for disengaging from their children are
many and complex, encompassing legal, social, cultural, and emotional factors. As shown below, legal mechanisms can influence most,
if not all, of these factors and encourage fathers to remain involved
after divorce.

304

See supra note 23 and accompanying text (showing that the standard of living of
residential mothers and their children decreases after divorce).
305
See Egle v. Egle, 715 F.2d 999, 1016-17 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that interference with visitation may be grounds for changing custody).
306
For example, one father found his daughter two years after the mother took
the child out of the state in violation of the joint legal custody order. ARENDELL, supra
note 84, at 87. Although the judge found that the mother was unfit and had moved
the children from place to place, the judge refused to modify custody in favor of the
father because the children would be upset if taken away from their mother. The
judge agreed that in the long term, the children would be better off with the father,
but in the short term, they would be too distraught. Id.
307
See Laura Morgan, What Every Parent Must Know About Child Support, FAM.
ADVOC., Summer 2003, at 22, 22-24 (explaining the process of obtaining and enforcing
child support).
308
A father can file a petition pro se, but as with any legal matter, legal representation is generally recommended. Some states authorize an award of attorneys’ fees for
legal expenses incurred in enforcing visitation. See ALA. CODE §§ 30-3-168 (Supp.
2003) (authorizing award of attorney fees and costs to fathers enforcing visitation
rights); MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.377 (West 2003) (same); MINN. STAT. § 518.1751 (2004)
(same). But since many residential mothers lack any assets from which to pay the
judgment, fees are frequently impossible to recover.
309
See Loewen, supra note 105, at 202 (noting that when the relationship between
parents is hostile, a visitation father will “withdraw from this unequal power relationship”).
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IV. CHANGING THE NORM: ENCOURAGING
PATERNAL ENGAGEMENT
In Part III, I focused on the many reasons why nonresidential fathers disengage from their children after divorce. My focus, however,
is not limited to this area. As many scholars have noted, fathers’ reasons for their lack of involvement in their children’s upbringing must
be examined with some skepticism. Given that the majority of mar310
ried fathers’ involvement with their children is limited, we should be
at least somewhat doubtful of fathers’ sudden claim of interest in the
children once the marriage ends. Yet traditional fathers (those who
did little of the day-to-day child rearing during the marriage) are not
the only ones who are abandoning their children at alarming rates.
Modern nurturing fathers (those who have proven their commitment
to their children during the marriage) are also disengaging at high
311
rates and at a great emotional cost to both them and their children.
I argue that legal and social forces may be pushing away those fathers
who, by all historical indicators, one might expect to remain involved
in their children’s lives. In the end, fathers’ stated reasons for disengaging may not be as important as the sociolegal forces that discourage paternal involvement and fail to provide incentives for them to
remain involved. Regardless of fathers’ reasons for disengaging, chil312
dren generally benefit from their fathers’ involvement and thus,
public policy should encourage paternal involvement. Thus, my general focus is less on the reasons fathers disengage and more on how
the law can encourage and even gently pressure paternal engagement
when necessary.
In this Part, I argue that, in the same manner that the law has influenced social norms of marital commitment and parental financial
313
responsibility, it can facilitate a social norm of paternal involvement
after divorce by adopting a presumption of joint legal custody and requiring that nonresidential parents participate in their children’s up-

310

See supra note 11 and sources cited (documenting the continued lack of parental involvement among married fathers).
311
See supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing the connection between
parental involvement during the marriage and parental disengagement post-divorce).
312
See discussion supra Part II.C on the wealth of evidence that children’s wellbeing is affected by parental involvement post-divorce.
313
See supra Part I for a summary of Professor Scott’s evidence of the influence of
law on social norms in the marital and parenting contexts.
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314

bringing. Drawing on norms theorists’ analyses of how social norms
arise, I argue that even with minimal or no legal enforcement, these
legal reforms can trigger a norm of paternal involvement after divorce.
A. Presumption of Joint Legal Custody
As discussed in Part II.A, when parents divorce, current social
norms dictate that mothers have custody and fathers have the right to
visitation. Although an increasing number of fathers are seeking and
obtaining sole or joint custody (either by court order or agreement),
society still assumes that mothers without residential custody must be
315
unfit. The societal pressure on women to have residential custody is
so great that mothers who may not want custody may seek it to avoid
316
social stigma. On the other hand, fathers who want custody may not
317
seek it for reasons discussed herein and may fail to exercise visitation rights because they have internalized the message that their role
after divorce is primarily economic. They also may not realize the importance of their presence and involvement to their children’s well318
being. By adopting a presumption of joint legal custody, the law can
signal to fathers that they are important to their children for more
than just their financial contributions. Fathers who believe they can

314

I am not arguing that the law can make every nonresidential father into an incredibly involved father—one who assumes half of the child-rearing responsibilities.
Given that most married couples do not share co-equal parenting, see supra note 11, it
would be unrealistic to expect the law to facilitate that result when the child no longer
lives with both parents. What I seek is some level of paternal involvement after divorce
sufficient to maintain a significant parental relationship and to convey to children that
they still have two parents after divorce.
315
See supra note 81 and accompanying text (noting that society presumes that
nonresidential mothers must be unfit).
316
See Brinig & Buckley, supra note 42, at 401 (“When joint custody was uncommon, fathers did not seek custody, and women were regarded as poor mothers if they
did not do so.”); SUSAN ANDERSON-KHLIEF, DIVORCED BUT NOT DISASTROUS 87, 90
(1981) (“[W]omen are under a great deal of pressure to take custody after divorce. . . .
It is, indeed, possible that most women feel they have ‘no choice.’”).
317
See supra Part III.B (hypothesizing that fathers’ perceptions of gender bias discourages their parental involvement after divorce to a greater extent than actual bias
does).
318
See supra note 105 and accompanying text (describing some misconceptions
commonly held by fathers regarding their influence on their children).
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play important roles and influence their children’s lives are more
319
likely to be involved in their upbringing.
As with sole custody, courts decide whether to award joint cus320
tody based on the best interests of the child standard. Joint custody
embodies two components—legal custody and physical/residential
321
custody.
When parents have joint legal custody, they share legal
authority to make major decisions concerning the child’s welfare,
322
However,
such as educational, religious, and medical decisions.
joint legal custody does not necessarily affect the child’s physical custody or residence. Thus, the court may issue a joint legal custody
award, but designate one parent, usually the mother, the sole residen323
tial custodian or primary residential parent. The child resides with
the primary residential parent who is responsible for the “minor day324
to-day decisions,” and the other parent, in effect, has visitation.
In the twenty-five years since California adopted the first joint custody statute in the country, joint legal custody has become quite
325
common. Indeed, almost half the states have adopted a preference

319

See McKenry et al., supra note 21, at 312 (finding that fathers’ perceived satisfaction and influence on their children’s lives is a statistically significant factor predicting level of physical involvement).
320
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020 (West 2004) (requiring the choice of joint,
sole, or other custody arrangements to be made in the best interests of the child); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 2002) (same); Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964, 969 (Md. 1986)
(same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.2(1) (Supp. 2004) (stating that joint legal or joint
physical custody may awarded if it is in the best interests of the child).
321
See Taylor, 508 A.2d at 967 (“Embraced within the meaning of ‘custody’ are the
concepts of ‘legal’ and ‘physical’ custody.”); PARKE, supra note 126, at 213 (noting that
“joint custody can take two main forms”).
322
See Taylor, 508 A.2d at 967 (defining legal custody as “the right and obligation
to make long range decisions [on] . . . matters of major significance concerning the
child’s life and welfare”); Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63, 66 (N.J. 1981) (finding that where
the parents have joint legal custody, “the legal authority and responsibility for making
‘major’ decisions regarding the child’s welfare—is shared at all times by both parents”).
323
See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.1(1)(c)-(e) (Supp. 2004) (providing that
joint legal custody does not determine the child’s physical custody and the court may
“specify[] one parent as the primary caretaker and one home as the primary residence
of the child”); HOMER H. CLARK, JR. & ANN LAQUER ESTIN, CASES AND PROBLEMS IN
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 1002 (6th ed. 2000) (describing trends in custody awards).
324
Beck, 432 A.2d at 66.
325
See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 13, at 106-08 (studying divorced families
in California and finding that nearly eighty percent had joint legal custody); Nord &
Zill, supra note 15 (“[J]ust over 1 million [persons] have joint legal only arrangements
with one of the parents, usually the mother, having physical custody.”). Joint physical
custody is still rare, however. See Pascale v. Pascale, 660 A.2d 485, 491-92 (N.J. 1995)
(declaring that joint physical custody is rare in New Jersey and citing sources that show
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326

or presumption of joint legal custody, although in many states the
327
preference or presumption applies only if the parents agree. In the
remaining states, joint custody is merely an option and in some of
these states, courts can order joint custody only if both parents agree;
328
thus one parent can defeat joint custody merely by objecting to it.

the same is true in Massachusetts, Vermont, and New Hampshire); Nord & Zill, supra
note 15 (“Of the 1.3 million persons with joint custody arrangements . . . . [only
262,000] report joint legal and physical arrangements.”).
326
Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have presumptions or preferences for joint legal custody. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914(a)(2) (2001) (creating
a rebuttable presumption of joint custody); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West
2004) (stating that there is a presumption of joint custody unless it would be detrimental to the child); IDAHO CODE § 32-717B(4) (Michie 1996) (same as D.C. statute); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 598.41.2 (West 2001) (requiring a court to consider joint custody if either parent requests it, and if the court does not grant joint custody it must cite clear
and convincing evidence that joint custody is unreasonable and not in the child’s best
interests); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (West 1990)(same as Iowa statute); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 458.17 (Supp. 2003) (same as D.C. statute); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1
(Michie 1999) (same as D.C. statute); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131 (Vernon 2002)
(creating a rebuttable presumption of joint appointment of both parents as conservators of the child); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124(1) (2004) (encouraging “parents to
share the rights and responsibilities of child-rearing”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 601610(4)(A) (Supp. 2003) (suggesting joint custody as the preferred custody arrangement); MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.375.4 (West 2003) (citing the state’s policy of encouraging child contact with both parents after divorce); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1)(a)
(Supp. II 1998) (same).
327
See ALA. CODE § 30-3-152(c) (1998) (presuming joint custody to be in a child’s
best interest if it is requested by both parents); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a(b)
w(West 2004) (same); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 132 (West Supp. 2005) (same); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19A, § 1653.2.D.1 (Supp. 2003) (same); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
722.26a(2) (West 2002) (same); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(4) (1999 & Supp. 2003)
(same); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 125.490.1 (Michie 2004) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. §
36-6-101(2)(A) (2001) (same); see also Smith, supra note 118, at 41 (stating that eleven
states and D.C. have a “general presumption in favor of joint custody” while twelve
other states have a “preference” for joint custody if both parents agree); cf. CAL. FAM.
CODE § 3080 (West 2004) (describing California statute that creates a presumption in
favor of joint custody where parents cannot agree on a custody plan). In addition, according to Professor Bartlett:
[Although t]here is a widespread belief that the law has become highly favorable to joint custody. . . . [and m]any states express the policy goal that
there be frequent and continuing contact between the child and both parents
after divorce. . . . few states actually follow up that policy commitment with a
meaningful presumption in favor of joint custody. Those states generally represented as having a presumption in favor of joint custody apply the presumption only when the parents agree to it, which is a presumption in favor of parental agreement, not joint custody.
Katharine T. Bartlett, U.S. Custody Law and Trends in the Context of the ALI Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL.’Y & L. 5, 21-22 (2002) (footnote omitted).
328
E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 107.169(3) (1990) (“The court shall not order joint custody, unless both parents agree . . . .”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.2(1) (1998 & Supp.

2005]

BEYOND ECONOMIC FATHERHOOD

987

Even if a statute does not require both parents’ consent to joint legal
329
custody, in practice, most courts award it only if both parents agree.
Although an increasing number of fathers seek joint legal custody,
many mothers object, thereby defeating the possibility of a joint legal
custody award in many jurisdictions. Some women object to joint custody for good reasons—for example, the father is emotionally and/or
330
physically abusive.
Yet others object because they want to punish
their former husbands for ending the marriage, for their infidelity, or
for other reasons having little to do with the children’s best inter331
ests. Others have been advised by friends or family members not to
grant the father more than the traditional every-other-weekend visita332
tion.
One parent should not have the power to veto joint custody without evidence that it would be detrimental to the child’s best interests.
A true presumption of joint legal custody would limit one parent’s
ability to veto joint legal custody for the wrong reasons. Under my
proposal, only if the parent opposed to sharing legal custody with the
other parent rebuts the presumption by showing that the other parent
is unfit would the court consider another custodial arrangement, e.g.,
sole maternal or sole paternal custody. Either parent, a law guardian,
a guardian ad litem, a social worker, or a mental health expert could
submit evidence that joint legal custody would be detrimental to the
child. For example, evidence of domestic violence, mental illness, alcohol or drug abuse, or historical lack of parental interest in the child
333
A presumpwould be highly relevant and possibly determinative.

2004) (requiring a parenting plan for joint legal custody); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
665(a) (2002) (“When the parents cannot agree . . . [to joint custody,] the court shall
award parental rights and responsibilities primarily or solely to one parent.”).
329
See In re Marriage of Drummond, 509 N.E.2d 707, 712-13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)
(“Since joint custody requires extensive contact and intensive communication, it cannot work between belligerent parents.”); Braiman v. Braiman, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1021
(N.Y. 1978) (holding that joint custody award is not appropriate where the parents are
“embattled and embittered”). But see Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63, 71 (N.J. 1981) (holding that the parents’ opposition to joint custody does not preclude the court from ordering it); cf. Squires v. Squires, 854 S.W.2d 765, 775 (Ky. 1993) (appealing to the legislature to change the law and make parental agreement a prerequisite for joint
custody).
330
Kelly, supra note 81, at 769.
331
Id.
332
Id.
333
Because “batterers are more likely than . . . nonbattering fathers to seek custody,” LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY G. SILVERMAN, THE BATTERER AS PARENT: ADDRESSING
THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS 113 (2002), I would not recommend joint legal custody when there is evidence of domestic violence. Many courts
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tion of joint legal custody would decrease the likelihood that a parent
would object to sharing legal custody with the other parent, absent
evidence of the other parent’s unfitness. Thus, the majority of par334
ents might agree to joint legal custody and drastically reduce cus335
tody litigation.
Some feminists have opposed joint legal custody, fearing that fathers who do not really want legal custody will seek it (or threaten to
seek it) with the intention of coercing their former wives into accepting smaller property settlements than they are entitled to under the
law. They argue that mothers’ fear of sharing custody with fathers
who use children as bargaining chips gives fathers power in obtaining
336
more favorable property settlements.
There is no empirical evidence suggesting that a significant number of fathers seek joint cus-

agree. See Borchgrevink v. Borchgrevink, 941 P.2d 132, 140-41 (Alaska 1997) (affirming grant of legal and physical custody to mother where sufficient evidence of domestic
violence was present); Knock v. Knock, 621 A.2d 267, 273-74 (Conn. 1993) (stating
that evidence of spousal abuse can influence court to award sole custody to nonabusive
parent). But see Michael E. Lamb, Placing Children’s Interests First: Developmentally Appropriate Parenting Plans, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 98, 116-18 (2002) (discussing studies
suggesting “that minor or isolated instances of domestic violence should not affect decisions regarding custody and visitation”).
334
Although courts generally approve parents’ agreements concerning custody,
courts have an obligation to evaluate such agreements and must modify or overrule
parents’ proposed arrangements when they are not in the children’s best interests. See
AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.06 cmt. a (2002) (“The law in most jurisdictions grants
courts . . . the authority to review a private agreement at divorce to determine whether
it serves the child’s interests.”).
335
See Schepard, supra note 131, at 716 (arguing that if the law “favors joint custody unless one of the parents is ‘unfit,’ parents would have far less incentive to oppose
joint custody” because of the strong likelihood of such a ruling in court). A presumption of joint legal custody would also create greater certainty in custody disputes and
provide a disincentive to litigate. Id. at 733.
336
See, e.g., LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 310-18
(1985) (discussing male/female differences in custody and support negotiations);
Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed,
3 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 168, 179 (1984) (“The everyday occurrence of children being
traded for money should be sufficient in and of itself to prompt a reëvaluation [sic] of
a system that turns custody awards into bargaining chips.”); Singer & Reynolds, supra
note 135, at 515-16 (“[D]ivorcing fathers routinely and successfully use the threat of a
custody battle to extract damaging financial concessions from their ex-wives during
divorce negotiations.”). Of course, a preference for sole custody may give the parent
likely to be awarded custody an incentive to veto joint custody in return for a higher
property settlement. See Schepard, supra note 131, at 715-16 (discussing the “complex
interplay between custody and financial issues in divorce settlement negotiations”).
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tody for leverage in property settlement negotiations. But even if this
phenomenon did exist, a presumption of joint legal custody would in
fact reduce the likelihood that fathers would use the threat of joint
custody as a bargaining chip. Under my proposal, courts would presume that joint legal custody is in the children’s best interests even if
only one parent is seeking custody and the other parent does not object. Thus, a parent who threatens to seek custody for the purpose of
negotiating a more favorable property settlement would gain little leverage in the bargaining. In other words, a father would not be able to
say to the mother, “I won’t seek custody if you agree not to seek alimony” because whether he seeks custody or not, the presumption of
joint legal custody would still apply.
It would not be in children’s best interests (nor would it be possible) for the law to force legal custody on a parent who is adamantly
opposed to it. Thus, a parent who does not want joint legal custody
and favors sole custody residing in the other parent must be able to
rebut the presumption of joint legal custody. But merely expressing
lack of interest in legal custody would not suffice.
Parents wishing to avoid the responsibilities of parenting would
have to participate in what I call a “Refusal of Parental Responsibilities” hearing, which would be similar to a plea allocution in criminal
cases. To illustrate, the court would inform parents rejecting legal
custody that they have a right to joint legal custody, that the law has a
preference for joint legal custody, that research shows that children
benefit from both parents’ involvement in their upbringing, that children want both parents to be involved in their upbringing, that an order of sole custody shows that the noncustodial parent conceded unfitness or was found unfit by the court, and that the parents are legally
bound to pay child support even if the other parent has sole custody.
The court would also ask the parent to state on the record his reasons
for rejecting the children. While this would not be a formal plea hearing, the inquiry would, in effect, ask a parent to admit that he is a
“bad” parent in order to avoid receiving joint custody. Parents who
fail to attend the Refusal of Parental Responsibilities hearing would be
found unfit by default. As shown below, over time, fewer parents
would refuse to assume the duties of parenthood because of the social
stigma—parental unfitness—that would attach to parents lacking legal
custody. Further, parents would be unlikely to refuse joint legal cus337

See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 13, at 156 (studying divorced families in
California and finding “no statistically persuasive evidence that those mothers who experienced more legal conflict had to give up support to win the custody they wanted”).
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tody in exchange for a greater share of the marital property for that
same reason. Thus, as social norms become more powerful, there
would be fewer Refusal of Parental Responsibilities hearings and cases
of unfitness by default.
1. Symbolic Function and Paternal Involvement
Although a number of studies have found that joint legal custody
338
leads to greater paternal involvement, others have found that fathers with joint legal custody are no more likely than sole maternal
custody fathers to see their children frequently or to participate in either day-to-day or major decisions about their children’s upbring339
ing.
Given the inconclusive evidence that joint legal custody leads to
greater paternal engagement, why should courts adopt a presumption
of joint legal custody? First and foremost, a presumption of joint legal
custody serves an important symbolic function. Even if fathers with
joint legal custody do not spend more time with their children than
sole maternal custody fathers, a presumption of joint legal custody
signals to fathers that the law and society respect their rights and responsibilities as parents and sends a message that fathers are impor340
Some
tant and should be involved in their children’s upbringing.
social scientists have recommended a presumption of joint legal custody because it affirms that both mothers and fathers have rights and
341
Thus, the priresponsibilities vis-à-vis their children after divorce.
338

See, e.g., Bahr et al., supra note 208, at 258 (finding that joint legal custody increased fathers’ involvement with their children (citing Madonna E. Bowman & Constance R. Ahrons, Impact of Legal Custody Status on Fathers’ Parenting Postdivorce, 47 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 481 (1985))); Judith A. Seltzer, Father by Law: Effects of Joint Legal
Custody on Nonresident Fathers’ Involvement with Children, 35 DEMOGRAPHY 135, 135, 14144 (1998) (reporting that, after “controlling for socioeconomic status and the quality
of the relationship before separation, fathers with joint legal custody see their children
more frequently and have more overnight visits than noncustodial fathers”—in a national survey, thirty-nine percent of fathers with joint legal custody saw their children
at least once a week as opposed to twenty-four percent of fathers in other custody arrangements, and spent fourteen more overnights per year with their children than
non-joint custody fathers); see also Seltzer, supra, at 135 (“[T]hese findings support the
view that joint legal custody may encourage some aspects of paternal involvement after
divorce.”).
339
See, e.g., FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 23, at 74 (finding no definitive
link as of 1991); PARKE, supra note 126, at 215 (same).
340
FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 23, at 113.
341
See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 13, at 289 (noting that joint legal custody
“affirm[s] the idea that in the eyes of the law fathers should play a continuing role in
their children’s lives”); PARKE, supra note 126, at 217 (noting that the symbolic value
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mary benefit of joint legal custody may be its symbolic value. As noted
in Part II.A, fathers receive ambiguous messages about their parental
responsibilities after divorce. A presumption of joint legal custody
would clarify that paternal responsibilities entail more than just finan342
cial support. “By clarifying that divorced fathers are ‘by law’ still fathers, parents’ negotiations about fathers’ participation in childrearing after divorce may shift from trying to resolve whether fathers will be
343
involved in childrearing to how fathers will be involved.”
As discussed above, attorneys are key actors in reinforcing percep344
tions of bias against fathers in custody disputes. Attorneys effectively
discourage fathers from seeking a greater role in their children’s upbringing by questioning fathers’ motives for wanting to be more involved in their children’s lives and advising them that their likelihood
345
Attorneys further foster
of obtaining sole or joint custody is slim.
the perception that the law does not consider fathers’ noneconomic
contributions important by advising fathers not to seek more than the
standard biweekly visitation schedule. A presumption of joint legal
custody would necessarily change the advice that attorneys give fathers
since it would be misleading for them to advise fathers that their likelihood of obtaining joint legal custody is low. Attorneys might also
risk malpractice suits if they advise fathers not to seek joint custody
when they are likely to succeed. In other words, attorneys would have
to notify fathers that the law favors joint custody. As a result, fathers
who are currently dissuaded from seeking custody by their attorneys’
advice might be more proactive in securing increased parenting time
with their children.
If the law is to signal to nonresidential fathers that they are as important as residential mothers, courts must make it easier and less
costly to enforce visitation. Courts must be willing to hold residential
parents in contempt for interfering with visitation without justifica346
tion. Courts must also be willing to modify children’s residential arrangements if the residential parent repeatedly interferes with the
signals to fathers that they have “rights and responsibilities” and to children that the
fathers are still part of the family).
342
“The status of legal custodian may reduce ambiguity in fathers’ and mothers’
expectations about nonresident fathers’ rights and responsibilities to children after
divorce.” Seltzer, supra note 338, at 145.
343
Id.
344
See supra Part III.B for a discussion of gender bias in custody disputes.
345
See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
346
A mother’s allegation of physical or sexual abuse would constitute good reason.
A father’s failure to pay child support would not.
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nonresidential parent’s relationship with the children. Some states
have found creative ways of enforcing access, for example, by providing makeup visitation to compensate nonresidential parents for lost
347
parenting time caused by the residential parents’ interference. Suspending driving privileges and professional licenses of residential parents who repeatedly interfere with visitation or posting their names in
the family court waiting area are other possible remedies. Courts have
also required that residential parents who have interfered with visita348
tion post bond with the court to ensure compliance with visitation.
Other states have authorized attorney’s fee awards to parents for their
349
These types of measures signal to
expenses in enforcing visitation.
nonresidential parents that the law considers them full parents and
values their noneconomic contributions to their children.
Some commentators have argued that fathers’ lack of involvement
with their children during the marriage stems, in part, from their fear
that in the event of divorce “[they] will lose access to [their]
350
They contend that fathers distance themselves from
child[ren].”
their children and do not allow themselves to grow as attached as they
otherwise might be if they did not feel a need to guard against the
351
pain of losing them. As these scholars have noted, a presumption of
joint custody may lead fathers to grow more attached to their children
during the marriage since they would not fear losing access to them in
352
the event of divorce. Thus, in addition to serving the symbolic purpose of indicating to divorced fathers that they continue to be parents
and bear the same paternal rights and responsibilities as before the
separation, a presumption of joint legal custody may lead to greater

347

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-129.5(2)(d) (West 2003) (authorizing
makeup parenting time); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.642 (West 2004) (same); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. 125C.020 (Michie 2004) (same).
348
See, e.g., Solberg v. Wenker, 163 Cal. App. 3d 475, 480 (Ct. App. 1985) (noting
that a bond may be used “to assure compliance with a visitation order”).
349
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 14-10-129.5(4) (Lexis 2003) (authorizing attorney’s fees). Awarding attorneys’ fees to the noncustodial parent may backfire as the
custodial parent may have to use child support payments to pay the award.
350
Brinig & Buckley, supra note 42, at 402.
351
See id. (noting that some fathers fear that they will lose their children after a
divorce).
352
Id. (“When divorce is not a final separation, fathers may permit themselves to
bond more closely with their children.”). Brinig and Buckley argue that joint custody
laws may reduce divorce rates because fathers who do not fear losing access to their
children will invest more in them emotionally, which leads to a better marriage and
reduces the possibility of divorce. Id.
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involvement among married fathers as well, assuming, of course, that
353
they are aware of the presumption.
Joint legal custody by itself may not achieve greater paternal involvement, but it might when coupled with significant child-rearing
responsibilities for both parents. Currently, joint legal custody gives
nonresidential parents (usually fathers) rights to participate in major
child-rearing decisions, but imposes no concomitant responsibilities
to provide physical care to their children. Some feminist scholars
have opposed joint legal custody, in part, because it gives fathers decision-making authority without imposing responsibility for their chil354
Instead, children’s physical care is most often
dren’s upbringing.
355
left to the residential mothers.
The law must impose child-rearing
responsibilities on nonresidential fathers just as it does on residential
mothers. By changing the notion of post-divorce nonresidential parenting from a right to a responsibility that parents cannot avoid, my
proposal would grant both parents decision-making authority, but obligations would attach to that authority. Both parents would be expected to participate in their children’s upbringing, spend significant
time with them, and participate in their educational development.
One of fathers’ major complaints is that visitation does not allow
356
them enough time with their children to enable them to be parents.
Children and mothers similarly complain that nonresidential fathers
357
do not spend enough time with their children.
Indeed, mothers
353

Too many parents are not aware of the laws that apply in the event of a custody
dispute; such a lack of knowledge would allow the perception of bias against fathers to
flourish even if legal obstacles were removed. I would recommend giving all parents
an informational brochure explaining their parental rights and responsibilities, including social science data indicating that paternal involvement benefits children, as they
are exiting the hospital after a child’s birth in the same manner that an immunization
guide is provided. This would not only increase the likelihood that all parents would
be aware of their parental responsibilities and help facilitate a norm of involved fatherhood after divorce, but might also facilitate a norm of paternal involvement during
the marriage. I thank Sarah Waldeck for this suggestion.
354
Singer & Reynolds, supra note 135, at 502.
355
See Anne Marie Delorey, Joint Legal Custody: A Reversion to Patriachal Power, 3
CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 33, 39 (1989) (arguing that “[j]oint legal custody does not provide a mechanism to ensure equal sharing of the rights and responsibilities of childrearing,” but rather grants “legal decisionmaking power to [both] parents without
corresponding responsibility for the physical care of children”) (quoted in Kay, supra
note 114, at 37).
356
See supra Part III.C.1 for a discussion of the problems of “vanilla visitation.”
357
See, e.g., WALLERSTEIN & KELLY, supra note 21, at 203 (“Even where there was
regular contact with the father, several of [the boys studied] experienced this contact
as insufficient to their needs.”); Fabricius & Hall, supra note 297, at 451 (relating the
results of a study showing that forty-eight percent of children wanted to spend more
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have sought legal assistance to force fathers to see their children only
358
Children need
to be told that visitation is not legally enforceable.
frequent contact with nonresidential parents in order to avoid the
359
Disneyland Daddy syndrome. Preschool children especially, because
of their “immature sense of time and lack of memory for relation360
Freships, need contact with each parent several times a week.”
quent contact is important, but uninterrupted contact is also necessary. When children spend only one evening or weekend with their
fathers, fathers feel the need to entertain them and the children ex361
pect to be entertained.
If fathers have residential custody for two
months during the summer, long weekends, one week during Christmas, one week for spring break, etc., they might be able to develop a
more “normal” parent-child relationship as opposed to the Disneyland
362
trip to their father’s house.
Because no visitation schedule will accommodate all families, as
Professor Schepard has advocated, each parent should be required to
“submit a weekly physical custody plan . . . that describes parental re-

time with their fathers); supra notes 173-74 (discussing children’s desire to see their
nonresidential fathers).
358
See In re Marriage of Mitchell, 745 N.E.2d 167, 172 (Ill. App. 2001) (“[W]hile
some courts have upheld the rights of parents to enforce visitation with their children,
we are aware of no case that has recognized a reciprocal right of children to enforce
visitation with a parent. . . . a court simply cannot order a parent to love his or her
children or to maintain a meaningful relationship with them.” (citation omitted)); Czapanskiy, supra note 115, at 1450 n.123 (citing a letter from the Chief Assistant Friend of
the Court for Oakland County, Michigan, stating, “I have had more custodial parents
come into my office and ask for my assistance in getting the noncustodial parent, typically the father, to visit the children, than I have had situations of noncustodial parents
asking for assistance because of the denial of visitation.”); see also UNIF. MARRIAGE &
DIVORCE ACT § 407, 9A U.L.A., cmt., at 398 (1998) (“[T]he judge should never compel
the noncustodial parent to visit the child . . . .”).
359
See supra notes 130-32 (discussing Disneyland Daddies); notes 273-75 and accompanying text (describing the difficulties of infrequent visits by noncustodial parents—the “vanilla visitation” schedule).
360
Kelly, supra note 81, at 770; see supra note 274 and accompanying text (arguing
that children’s perception of time differs from that of adults). “Infants and toddlers
with a bond to a nurturing father” may need frequent “overnight [visits] together in
order to remember who their fathers are.” Kelly, supra note 81, at 768.
361
See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text (describing how the relationship
of noncustodial parents with their children is often more social than parental, particularly if the children are not included in mundane, day-to-day activities).
362
See ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 179 (asserting that shorter and less frequent
visits with a nonresidential father are often vacation-like); Kelly, supra note 81, at 770
(noting that preschoolers are best served by “contact with each parent several times
per week”).

2005]

BEYOND ECONOMIC FATHERHOOD

995

363

sponsibilities for the child’s physical care.” The court would adopt
or modify the plan that best provides each parent with enough time to
maintain a significant relationship and be actively involved in the
364
children’s upbringing.
How can the law motivate nonresidential parents, even those with
joint legal custody, to comply with their obligations of frequent and
continuing contact with their children if they are not inclined to do
so? First, the law must stop treating visitation or parenting time as a
right and treat it instead as a legally enforceable duty. Currently, fathers’ responsibilities to their children, other than child support, are
365
voluntary. When fathers fail to pick up their children for an evening
or weekend visit, there are no legal or social sanctions, even if such
parenting time was part of the custody and visitation order. This must
change. Judges can order nonresidential parents to comply with the
physical custody plan they helped draft in the same manner they or366
der them to pay a certain amount of child support each month. In363

Schepard, supra note 131, at 762; see also AM. LAW INST., supra note 334, §
2.05(1), (5)(a)(i) (requiring parenting plans, including “a custodial schedule that designates in which parent’s home each minor child will reside on given days of the
year”).
364
Another benefit of joint legal custody and significant parenting time is that it
might lead to greater rates of child support payment. See Jessica Perason & Nancy
Thoennes, Child Custody and Child Support After Divorce, in JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED
PARENTING 185, 199 (Jay Folberg ed., 2d ed. 1991) (finding that, aside from cases in
which support was collected through automatic wage withholding, sixty-four percent of
mothers with joint legal custody received all of the child support ordered, while only
forty-six percent of mothers with sole maternal custody received their full support).
Further, because the conflict between residential mothers and nonresidential fathers
often involves money—the mother is angry because the father has not paid child support and as a result, denies him access to the children, making him angry—the payment of child support may help reduce conflict between parents. See FURSTENBERG &
CHERLIN, supra note 23, at 60 (discussing fathers withholding support in response to
withheld visitation). In high conflict families, this reduction of conflict would allow
children to reap the nonpecuniary benefits of their fathers’ nurturing.
365
“Men’s rights and responsibilities to children may be codified in custody and
child support laws, but the role of father for separated and divorced men is largely voluntary.” Judith Seltzer & Yvonne Brandreth, What Fathers Say About Involvement with
Children After Separation, in FATHERHOOD: CONTEMPORARY THEORY, RESEARCH, AND
SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 4, at 168; see also supra Part II.A (discussing current norms of
post-divorce fatherhood as primarily economic).
366
Some commentators may wonder whether the law can order parents to spend
time with their children. Under the doctrine of parens patriae, courts have a legitimate
interest in promoting paternal contact if it is in the children’s best interests. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (“The State, of course, has a duty of the highest order to protect the interests of minor children . . . .”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003) (“Protecting the welfare of children is a
paramount State policy.”). Thus, the law can require that a parent be involved in his
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dividuals are more likely to do something if a judge has ordered them
to do it as opposed to giving them the right or option of doing it. If
parents are ordered to spend Monday and Wednesday evenings with
their children, based, in part, on their proposed physical custody plan,
they are more likely to comply than if they are just given the option of
367
To illustrate, parents
exercising visitation rights if they so choose.
who pay child support pursuant to a court order are more consistent
in making the scheduled payments than those who have informally
368
agreed to pay the residential parent child support.
Although court orders mandating that nonresidential fathers parent their children for a certain number of hours per week will likely
lead to greater paternal involvement even without legal enforcement,
there will always be some parents who will not comply. How can the
law force an unwilling parent to spend time with his children? It cannot and should not. Forcing a parent to spend time with his child
against the parent’s will is unlikely to foster parental involvement or a
369
significant parental relationship with the child.
However, the law
can impose public penalties as a means of shaming nonresidential
parents into parenting their children. For example, courts can impose a few hours of community service when parents fail to comply
with the physical custody order and have made no attempts to make
370
The purpose of community service would be
up the time missed.
similar to that of Virginia’s policy of “booting” the cars of parents who
have not complied with child support orders; it would alert the community that the person sweeping the park wearing a uniform with a
371
photograph of a child is an “emotional deadbeat.” Courts could folor her children’s upbringing on the ground that parental involvement is necessary to
protect the child’s emotional well-being. See Czapanskiy, supra note 115, at 1441
(“Whether state intervention into family life is justified . . . [as] protecting the mental
health of a child or . . . [as] promoting generally accepted notions about appropriate
family functioning, family law can legitimately express expectations that the child receive whatever benefits are available from contact with two parents.”).
367
Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1598-1600 (2000) (noting that many individuals
obey the law simply because it is the law); Cooter, supra note 31, at 594 (“[C]itizens
respect the law and feel obligated to obey it.”).
368
ARENDELL, supra note 84, at 89 (“Payment is even more irregular in the absence of formal child support agreements.” (citations omitted)).
369
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mitchell, 745 N.E.2d 167, 172 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)
(noting that forcing a parent who views spending time with the children as a punishment would probably not be in the children’s best interests).
370
I thank Charlie Sullivan for this suggestion of community service.
371
See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text (discussing “emotional deadbeats”). Sanctioning parents is not a new or radical idea. Nancy Dowd and Karen
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low Virginia’s example and boot the cars of parents who have failed to
see their children in violation of the parenting plan. They could also
impose many of the same public penalties imposed on nonresidential
parents who fail to pay child support such as posting on government
agency websites the names and photographs of parents who have had
no contact with their children for a certain period of time, or posting
their names in post offices, family courts, and other public build372
ings. Thus, courts could impose “sanctions that are likely to become
373
Courts could also reknown and to generate community gossip.”
quire nonresidential parents who fail to pick up their children at the
scheduled time to reimburse the residential parents for their time, as
374
some states have done, or impose minor fines that could be used to
create billboards asking, “Have you seen your child this week?” As discussed below, my proposal does not rely on the law’s legal enforcement mechanisms, but on its ability to trigger community enforcement and self-sanctioning. First, however, I will address some
alternatives to joint legal custody and discuss why joint legal custody is
the better approach.
2. Why Not Joint Physical Custody?
Many fathers reject joint legal custody in favor of joint physical
custody, arguing that the former does not provide them greater access
to their children because the children still live with the mother in
most cases, and the father has only visitation. Thus, they argue, joint
legal custody is, in effect, no different from sole maternal custody with
paternal visitation, and the law should recognize fathers’ equal role in
their children’s upbringing by awarding them joint physical custody.

Czapanskiy have criticized the law’s failure to support or sanction fathers’ nurturing or
lack thereof, noting how the law does not sanction fathers for failure to spend time
with their children even after they have agreed to do so in a custody and visitation
agreement. Czapanskiy, supra note 115, at 1437-38 (advocating holding parents who
do not comply with visitation orders in contempt); Dowd, supra note 89, at 526 (“The
model of fatherhood embedded in law is dominantly biological and economic. . . .
support for the nurturing aspect of fatherhood is very limited, hidden, and indirect.”)
372
See supra note 65 (discussing sanctions imposed on parents who did not pay
child support).
373
Scott, supra note 29, at 1949 n.129.
374
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3028(a)-(b) (West 2004) (allowing the court to order financial compensation for periods when a parent fails to assume caretaking responsibility,
while limiting compensation to reasonable expenses incurred consequently by or on
behalf of the child); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14 -10-129.5(4) (2003) (requiring courts to
order parents failing to exercise court-ordered parenting time to pay attorney’s fees,
court costs, etc., for the complying parent bringing an action against them).
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Social scientists have found that fathers with joint physical custody are
very involved in their children’s upbringing and tend to share close
375
Some studies have also found that a dual
relationships with them.
residence arrangement has a positive impact on children’s adjust376
ment. Joint physical custody may be conducive to a better relationship between the child and the parent who would likely have had residential custody because of the decreased likelihood of the “burnout”
phenomenon that occurs when one parent has almost exclusive re377
Given all these benefits
sponsibility for the child’s day-to-day care.
of joint physical custody, why do I instead recommend joint legal custody?
First, joint physical custody is difficult to implement logistically.
Living in two places is hard for many children. Many young children
need the stability of one home and one set of rules while older children, although better able to juggle schedules, may resent having to
move from home to home. A dual residence arrangement requires
the parents’ geographical proximity so that the children can attend
the same school and activities, and have the same set of friends. After
divorce, one parent may not want to live in the same neighborhood as
the other parent or may not be able to find or afford a home that is in
close proximity to the other parent’s home. Maintenance of dual
residences is costly, since the children would require two sets of everything (toys, clothes, computers, etc.) and each parent would need a
home that is large enough to accommodate the children for long periods of time. For most divorcing couples, supporting two households
is a struggle. For this reason, in part, the majority of couples who attempt joint physical custody are upper middle class or wealthier, and
378
Further, althus, have the means to maintain separate homes.
though there are not many studies on joint physical custody, two have
“suggest[ed] that children in joint physical custody [arrangements]
375

See, e.g., Lee, supra note 138, at 675-76 (describing a study finding more paternal involvement among fathers sharing physical custody).
376
See Eleanor E. Maccoby et al., Postdivorce Roles of Mothers and Fathers in the Lives of
Their Children, 7 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 24, 25-27, 34 (1993) (discussing a four-year longitudinal study of children under age sixteen at the time of divorce, finding that child satisfaction was greatest when the children had dual residences, although the benefits
were contingent on the parents’ low-conflict relationship). In one study of 820 college
students whose parents had been divorced for approximately ten years, seventy percent
reported that the best living arrangement would have been “equal time” with their fathers and nearly twenty percent selected “substantial overnights” with their fathers.
Fabricius & Hall, supra note 297, at 454 fig.4.
377
Lee, supra note 138, at 675-76.
378
Cohen, supra note 18, at 45.
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were no better adjusted than children” in families where the mother
379
Thus, the empirical evidence does not yet
has physical custody.
support joint physical custody in the majority of cases.
Second, and more importantly, the law is effective in influencing
social norms where there already is some consensus in the community
that the norm the legal rule is seeking to establish is legitimate and
380
desirable.
“Legal initiatives that deviate substantially from an
emerging community consensus . . . are unlikely to have substantial
381
impact on the target norm.”
Although most Americans agree that
paternal involvement benefits children, most are still opposed to joint
physical custody and many who believe it is desirable find themselves
unable to implement a dual residence arrangement successfully. In
California, possibly the state most supportive of joint custody, the majority of couples who shared physical custody reverted to a traditional
maternal residence (or paternal residence in some cases) within two
382
Even with a joint physical custody decree, most
years of divorce.
parents reverted to maternal residential custody after a short period of
time. How can the law enforce joint physical custody if both parents
ignore the decree and, in effect, choose maternal residential custody?
As Professor Scott has observed, “reforms favoring joint physical custody failed to influence behavior because they were apparently inconsistent with the private preferences of parents regarding custodial ar383
Thus, so long as parents and society in general are
rangements.”
opposed to joint physical custody, it is unlikely that the law can create
a norm of shared physical custody. In contrast, Americans believe that
both parents should share decision-making authority and both should
spend significant periods of time with their children, thereby making
it more likely that society will accept a presumption of joint legal cus384
tody.
379

Gallagher, supra note 129, at 178 (internal quotation marks omitted);
FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 23, at 75.
380
See Scott, supra note 29, at 1969 (“[T]he success of a legal reform may depend
on the coincidence between the legal prescription and community opinion.”).
381
Id.
382
MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 13, at 113 fig.5.3, 275-76 (noting that only
twenty percent of couples even attempt joint physical custody).
383
Scott, supra note 29, at 1969 n.190.
384
Another approach to custody is the American Law Institute’s Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution which bases parents’ access to the children after divorce on
the proportion of time they each devoted to the children and child rearing during the
marriage. AM. LAW INST., supra note 334, § 2.08(a). Thus, if the children spent eighty
percent of their time with their mother during the marriage and only twenty percent
with their father, the father would be entitled to spend one quarter as much time with
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B. Creating a Norm of Nurturing Fatherhood
The legal reforms and sanctions discussed above may be sufficient
to motivate some nonresidential parents to remain actively involved in
385
their children’s lives.
Some parents, however, will not comply with
court orders, and legal enforcement of parental responsibilities is
costly and not necessarily desirable. Courts do not have the resources
to hold a hearing or order community service every time a nonresidential parent fails to pick up the children for the weekend. Rather
than relying on legal enforcement of these reforms and sanctions to

the children as the mother. This rule is based on the notion that the parents’ time
with the children after divorce will approximate their time with them during the marriage. Id. at § 2.08 cmt. a, at 180; see also Lucy S. McGough, Starting Over: The Heuristics
of Family Relocation Decision Making, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 291, 314 (2003) (discussing
this approximation principle); Scott, supra note 202, at 617 (proposing that custody be
based on the approximation rule—this proposal was subsequently adopted by the
ALI). The rule “assumes that the division of past caretaking functions correlates well
with other factors associated with the child’s best interests, such as the quality of each
parent’s emotional attachment to the child [and] the parents’ respective parenting
abilities.” AM. LAW INST., supra, at § 2.08 cmt. b.
In theory, the approximation principle will encourage fathers who are still married to spend more time with their children because it will increase the amount of time
they will be able to spend with them if and when the marriage ends. Assuming that
happily married fathers think about what would happen in the event their marriage
fails, the approximation principle may encourage married fathers to be more involved.
However, it will have no effect on fathers who no longer reside with their children.
Indeed, it will discourage those fathers who were not significantly involved in their
children’s upbringing during the marriage from seeking to be involved after divorce.
Thus, the approximation principle not only fails to signal to fathers that they are important but limits access for those fathers who worked long hours while their spouses
assumed the traditional role of primary caregiver. It further “denies both spouses, except by mutual agreement, the right to change roles when the marriage terminates
[and] also refuses to recognize that comparative time spent may not adequately reflect
each parent’s emotional relationship with the child.” NAT’L INTERDISCIPLINARY
COLLOQUIUM ON CHILD CUSTODY, LEGAL AND MENTAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES ON
CHILD CUSTODY LAW: A DESKBOOK FOR JUDGES § 2:3, at 13 (1998). Fathers frequently
argue that they should not be penalized post-divorce merely because they were primary
economic providers during the marriage rather than primary caretakers. The approximation rule, in effect, would reward the primary caretaker even though the
breadwinner’s financial contributions made it possible for her to dedicate more time
to child rearing. By failing to consider a parent’s financial contributions to the child’s
upbringing, the approximation principle further ignores that families’ allocation of
caregiving responsibilities during the marriage are not necessarily indicative of the arrangement they would have chosen had they contemplated divorce when they first had
children. For these reasons, I reject the approximation principle in favor of a presumption of joint legal custody with significant parenting time and child-rearing responsibilities for both parents.
385
See Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens?, supra note 367, at 1598-1600 (noting that many citizens obey the law out of respect for the law itself).
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motivate nonresidential parents to remain actively involved in their
children’s lives, my goal is that they will lead to the creation of social
norms of involved fatherhood and stimulate community enforcement
and self-sanctioning. If paternal involvement were mandatory, even
with minimal legal enforcement, eventually neighbors, colleagues,
relatives, and friends would informally enforce paternal contact by
expressing disapproval of fathers who do not participate in their children’s upbringing. In time, some fathers might internalize this norm
of involved fatherhood and experience guilt or shame if they neglected to parent their children. The desire to avoid societal disapproval, along with internalization of the norm of involved fatherhood,
might lead fathers to better parent their children.
According to Richard McAdams’s esteem theory of norms, social
norms arise because individuals want others to think highly of them
and thus seek the approval of colleagues, neighbors, family members,
386
In other words, most individuals follow social
and even strangers.
norms, at least initially, because they do not want to be perceived as
387
deviant. But how do we know when a certain behavior has become a
social norm such that nonconformance will give rise to societal disapproval? Richard McAdams has argued that a norm arises if (1) there
is a consensus that certain behavior is desirable; (2) there is some risk
that others will detect a person’s failure to engage in the desired behavior; and (3) the relevant community is aware of this consensus and
388
of the risk of detection. Applying these factors, I argue that the law
can create a social norm of paternal involvement.
First, the law can create a consensus that paternal involvement is
desirable and that people disapprove of paternal disengagement.
Whether the law will influence a norm depends on whether the law is
consistent with community expectations about the behavior the norm
389
requires. There already is significant support for the notion that pa390
Indeed, there is a consensus that
ternal involvement is desirable.
married fathers should be more involved in their children’s upbring-

386

McAdams, supra note 30, at 355-57. Even individuals who may not intrinsically
value what other people think of them may still “value approval . . . instrumentally because it helps to achieve other ends.” McAdams, supra note 37, at 343.
387
McAdams, supra note 30, at 356.
388
Id. at 358.
389
Scott, supra note 29, at 1927.
390
See supra Part II.C (showing that paternal involvement, or lack thereof, can affect a child’s emotional and educational progress).
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391

ing. The premise behind joint custody laws is the acknowledgment
that children need both parents. The trend toward a presumption or
preference of joint legal custody is further evidence that Americans
recognize that both parents should be involved in their children’s up392
Thus, it is unbringing even after the parents’ marriage dissolves.
likely that society would be opposed to increasing divorced fathers’ involvement, especially in light of the empirical evidence suggesting that
paternal involvement benefits children, mothers, fathers, and society
in general. Many people, however, may not be aware of the societal
consensus that children benefit from a relationship with both parents
and that society disapproves of fathers who abandon their children af393
This is where the law can help. When it is unclear
ter divorce.
whether a community approves or disapproves of a certain behavior,
“a legislative proclamation can publicize [the approval pattern] and
394
create a norm.” As shown below, statutes requiring that nonresidential parents see their children would signal that paternal involvement
is necessary and desirable and that the community disapproves of par395
ents who do not nurture their children.
Politicians seriously consider their constituents’ positions on proposed legislation because their likelihood of reelection, or election to
a higher office, depends on constituents’ satisfaction with their voting
records. Thus, the legislature’s “decision to enact or not to enact legislation, as reported through the media, declares to the public a win396
ning side,” thereby providing evidence of a consensus. According to
Professor McAdams hypothetical analysis, before the law required that
citizens clean up after their dogs or that citizens not smoke in public
buildings, people assumed that public disapproval of these activities
was not very high. However, once legislators passed pooper-scooper
and no-smoking laws, people started to believe that public disapproval
391

See supra Introduction (highlighting the current cultural perception of the
modern father as an involved and attentive parent).
392
See supra notes 111-21, 133 and accompanying text (noting that many Americans believe that children benefit from contact with both parents). A consensus can
exist even if a majority of the population is indifferent so long as a significant minority
shares the same view. McAdams, supra note 30, at 358.
393
See Leo, supra note 105, at 22 (noting that fathers are not aware of their importance to their children).
394
McAdams, supra note 37, at 371.
395
Cf. McAdams, supra note 30, at 402-03 (describing the role of legislation in signaling a consensus).
396
Id. at 402; see also McAdams, supra note 37, at 340 (arguing that individuals’ beliefs about what other people approve or disapprove of are often wrong, but statutes
accurately indicate to the public of what people approve and disapprove).
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397

of these behaviors was high. Here, the enactment of laws mandating
paternal contact would publicize the consensus—of public opinion—
that paternal contact is desirable and that most individuals disapprove
of paternal disengagement. So long as “the other two conditions for
norm formation are present (inherent risk of detection and awareness
of that risk), [legislation] publicizing that most people disapprove of a
certain behavior[, e.g., paternal disengagement,] will create a new expected cost to acting in violation of the (previously unknown) consen398
sus” in favor of paternal involvement.
Highly publicized judicial opinions often reflect public opinion
399
and thus, similar to legislation, may also signal a consensus.
When
the media publicizes a $50,000 award for child support arrears, an order to “boot” a car, or a judge’s suspension of a lawyer’s or doctor’s
professional license for failure to pay child support, it signals “the un400
derlying attitudes of [the] community,” a general consensus that
parents must support their children financially. Similarly, if the media
were to publicize a judicial opinion sanctioning a parent for failure to
comply with a visitation order, citing social science studies finding that
children benefit from a relationship with both parents after divorce, it
would signal to the public a consensus in favor of paternal involvement.
Second, the risk that others will detect a nonresidential parent’s
failure to see his children is significant. The mother will know if the
father has failed to assume parental responsibilities and spend time
with the child. There is clearly a risk that she will inform others of the
father’s undesirable behavior. The father’s colleagues, neighbors, and
family members, as well as his children’s teachers, may all be able to
detect whether he is spending time with his children. One relative
who discovers that the father is not parenting his child may tell other
relatives, increasing the number of people who will likely express disapproval of the father’s behavior. In addition, public penalties—such
as community service, “booting” vehicles, or posting the names of parents who have not seen their children as agreed in the parenting plan
on government agencies’ websites, or in family courts or other public
buildings—increase the risk that the community will discover when a
father has failed to parent his children.
397

McAdams, supra note 37, at 365.
McAdams, supra note 30, at 402.
399
See generally McAdams, supra note 37, at 341, 378 (arguing that “judicial decisions are positively correlated with popular attitudes”).
400
Id. at 340.
398
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Third, the relevant community, including nonresidential fathers,
would be aware of the consensus in favor of paternal involvement because the law, by making parenting mandatory, will have publicized
this consensus. Further, the media is likely to publicize legislation
and/or judicial opinions requiring that nonresidential parents remain
involved in their children’s upbringing. One can only imagine the attention that talk shows, newspapers, magazines, and websites would
devote to laws “forcing fatherhood.” The relevant community will
undoubtedly be aware of the risk that others will detect when a nonresidential parents has failed to see his child. Thus, the three conditions for creation of a norm of paternal involvement are present.
Individuals choose to engage in certain acts based on the intrinsic
value of the act (e.g., the value of maintaining contact with my chil401
dren), the reputational costs of that choice (e.g., the community’s
expressed disapproval of my failure to nurture my children), and its
effects on one’s self-conception (e.g., wondering if I will feel that I am
402
a bad parent if I do not spend time with my children). Most fathers
403
want to continue their relationship with their children after divorce;
thus, the intrinsic value of spending time with their children may already be somewhat high. The obstacles discussed in Part III, however,
may make it costly (both emotionally and financially) for nonresidential parents to remain engaged, especially when there are few social
costs to paternal disengagement. As stated above, individuals follow
social norms, at least initially, because they want to gain others’ es404
teem or avoid the loss thereof. Thus, the community enforces social
norms and prevents potential norm violators from defecting by the
405
threat of disapproval. When a person violates a norm, public disap-

401

The intrinsic value of the choice is influenced by the social norm. See Sunstein,
supra note 32, at 915 (“[P]erceptions of intrinsic value will be often a function of social
norms.”). For example, although I may not consider sending my child to school to be
more intrinsically valuable than having her help with the family business, the fear of
societal disapproval may cause me to perceive my child’s education as more valuable
than I otherwise would were there no stigma attached to not sending children to
school.
402
See id. (concluding that the intrinsic value of an option, the reputational benefit or cost of an option, and the effects on one’s self-conception all influence individuals’ choices).
403
Supra text accompanying note 156.
404
See supra notes 386-87 and accompanying text (explaining that people follow
social norms in order to gain the approval of others and to avoid being thought of as
deviant).
405
Id.
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proval may cause embarrassment and even shame.
The negative
feelings brought about as a result of violating a norm can be intense,
and the social consequences of those feelings (wanting to hide or disappear in order to avoid the disapproval) can be significant. Their
407
A norm of paternal involvement
anticipation can be even worse.
would dramatically increase the reputational costs of not parenting
one’s children after divorce because neighbors, colleagues, friends,
and family members who would now be aware of the societal norm of
paternal involvement might express disapproval of a parent who fails
408
The father who desires their esteem or wishes to
to see his child.
avoid the loss thereof will likely weigh the costs of these informal sanc409
tions in his determination to parent or not parent his children. In
addition, community members might express disapproval not only of
the disengaged father, but also of his family members and close
410
To illustrate, we might expect people to express disapfriends.
proval of a woman who dates a man who does not support his children
financially. Similarly, once the law signals that most people disapprove of parents who refuse to be involved in their children’s upbringing, we might expect people to stigmatize the disengaged father’s parents or a woman who dates or marries him. The disengaged father’s
parents or his new wife who value their own reputations would have

406

Sunstein, supra note 39, at 2029-30.
See id. at 2030 (noting that “the most effective use of norms is ex ante,” and that
“[t]he expectation of shame . . . is usually enough to produce compliance”). Thus,
even if no one expresses disapproval, a parent may change his behavior in its anticipation.
408
Although one might expect that some individuals would refuse or fail to express disapproval of a parent who does not see his child, individuals who do shun the
disengaged father may withhold esteem from those people who do not censure the
disengaged father. See McAdams, supra note 30, at 372 (arguing that a primary norm
may produce a secondary enforcement norm that arises when individuals censure
those who fail to censure primary norm violators). Thus, the fear that they will lose
esteem if they do not express disapproval of disengaged fathers may lead more people
to censure such fathers.
409
“Individuals vary in the extent to which they are ready to tolerate the reputational costs of challenging existing norms. For each individual, this will depend on
how much the norm distorts private preferences, the level of anticipated sanctions for
violation, and the value of acting honestly on preferences.” Scott, supra note 29, at
1970. Thus, fathers who do not wish to see their children and do not care what community members think of them may not be influenced by the threat of societal disapproval, but these are likely to be few.
410
Kahan, supra note 28, at 643 n.215 (“[S]haming penalties . . . are likely to have
a spillover effect, stigmatizing not just offenders but their family members and
friends.”).
407
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an interest in ensuring that the father complies with the norm of involved fatherhood and may encourage him to parent his children.
In addition to the external sanctions the community imposes for
nonconformance with norms, many individuals internalize norms and
experience guilt when they fail to comply with them, even if others do
411
not detect the violation.
According to Professor Cooter’s internalization theory, norms develop when the community unanimously endorses certain behavior (e.g., spending time with one’s children) and
convinces “some members of the community to internalize the obliga412
tion, and to inculcate it in the young.” The internalization of norms
is so powerful that it may affect private thoughts, changing not only
individuals’ external behavior but also what they honestly believe is
413
acceptable or unacceptable.
Norm theorists such as Professors Cooter and McAdams have focused on individuals’ compliance with recycling, littering, smoking,
and pooper-scooper laws, even when no one from their community is
likely to detect noncompliance, to illustrate how individuals have in414
ternalized these norms. I believe parents are more likely to experience shame and guilt if they violate parenting norms than if they violate littering or recycling norms. All parents want to be perceived and
want to perceive themselves as good parents. Most parents have internalized the role of “parent” and experience guilt if they believe
415
Although what is required to
they have failed to be good parents.
411

See McAdams, supra note 30, at 381 (“After internalization, there is yet another
cost to violating a norm: guilt. The individual feels psychological discomfort whether
or not others detect her violation.”); see also id. at 408 (“Even absent external, informal
enforcement, the law can elicit internal enforcement.”); Richard E. Scott, The Limits of
Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1604 (2000) (arguing
that pooper-scooper and no-smoking-in-public-places laws “can have self-sanctioning
(or third order) effects to the extent that citizens internalize the legal rule and are deterred by the prospect of guilt”).
412
Cooter, supra note 28, at 224; see Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1643, 1666 (1996) (noting that “a consensus will convince some members of the
community to internalize the norm and to ingrain it in the young”). But see McAdams,
supra 30, at 380 (arguing that unanimity is not necessary—“a simple consensus may be
sufficient” to create a norm).
413
See Sunstein, supra note 32, at 929 (noting that because of norms that discourage pollution, smoking, or sexual harassment, individuals “may come in their private
thoughts to see such things as unacceptable”).
414
Cooter, supra note 38, at 6-7 (pooper-scooper laws); Cooter, supra note 412, at
1661 (smoking); McAdams, supra note 30, at 350, 382-83 (recycling and littering).
415
McAdams, supra note 30, at 408 (“[M]any [parents] feel guilt if they believe
they fail to be a ‘good’ mother or father.”); see also Nancy Samalin & Steve Bennett,
What Makes You Feel Guilty?, PARENTS, Oct. 1999, at 99, 99 (finding that parents frequently
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be a good parent can mean different things to different people, sometimes the law tells parents what good parents do—for example, requiring child safety car seats, school attendance, child vaccinations, etc.
Thus, “legal rules can clarify and announce the specific behavioral
416
expectations embodied in social norms” such as good parenting. To
use Professor McAdams’s illustration, by requiring parents to use child
safety devices, the law expresses a consensus that failure to do so is
417
“contrary to minimally acceptable parental behavior.” Most parents
accept the apparently informed judgment of legislators (in conjunction with child safety experts) about what child safety requires and feel
418
that they are not good parents if they fail to comply with the norm.
They would experience guilt if they do not comply with the law.
Similarly, I argue that by passing legislation requiring fathers to
spend time with their children, the law would express a consensus that
failure to do so indicates bad parenting. Although the majority of
Americans agree that children are better off when they maintain a relationship with both parents after divorce, there are currently no rules
to guide mothers and fathers in determining how a nonresidential fa419
ther should behave.
The law can and should clarify behavioral ex420
Indeed, the law has been
pectations of post-divorce fatherhood.
successful in clarifying parenting norms in other contexts. To use
Professor Scott’s example, before the enactment of compulsory school
attendance laws, there were no rules setting forth exactly how good
parents educate their children. Consequently, parents interpreted the
421
good parent norm “according to their own values and exigencies.”
Some parents sent their children to school while others “educated”
their children informally at home or on the farm. For example, my
grandfather took my father out of school when he was only twelve
years old. He believed that by teaching his son how to run the farm
(the family business) he was teaching him how to be a productive citizen. The enactment of compulsory attendance laws, however, sig-

experience guilt about almost every aspect of parenting, which in turn motivates them
to change their behavior).
416
Scott, supra note 29, at 1926.
417
McAdams, supra note 30, at 408.
418
See id. (“If one accepts that being a good person requires something, then it is
difficult to resist the (apparently) informed judgment of others about what child safety
requires . . . .”).
419
See supra Part II.
420
Cf. Scott, supra note 29, at 1926 (arguing that “legal regulation can play a role
in shaping normative behavior in marriage”).
421
Id. at 1927.
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naled to parents, including my grandfather who kept the younger
children in school, that compliance with the good-parent norm required that he provide his children with formal schooling. In addition to the threat of legal sanction, parents had to contend with the
disapproval of their neighbors if they did not behave as good parents
and send their children to school. “Eventually, parents internalized
the [compulsory attendance laws] as establishing a baseline of what
good parenting required,” feeling “guilty if they violated the norm”
422
and disapproving of parents who failed to comply.
Similarly, bright-line rules such as a requirement that parents
share joint legal custody and spend a significant amount of time with
their children would “clarify precisely” the behavior that is required
423
from divorced nonresidential parents. It would be difficult for parents to refute the judgment of legislators, who, with the assistance of
child-development experts, have concluded that paternal involvement
is beneficial to children. Thus, the law would express a consensus as
to what good parents do and some fathers who have internalized the
norm would experience guilt if they did not nurture their children.
Further, as Professor Waldeck has argued, “the existence of the norm
might even lead a person to exaggerate the personal guilt or loss of
external esteem that might result from failure to comply with the
424
norm.” Thus, once the law expresses that good fathers are actively
involved in their children’s upbringing, the norm itself may cause fathers to “misapprehend[] the actual consequences of compliance or
425
noncompliance with what they perceive to be the norm.” In other
words, even if the community’s disapproval and the guilt that parents
will experience are moderate, once a norm of involved fatherhood exists and the law defines the behavior required by the norm, fathers are
likely to exaggerate the potential sanctions and comply with the norm
even if the sanctions are unlikely to be severe. This misapprehension
of the actual consequences of not complying with the norm makes it
more likely that fathers will parent their children after divorce.

422

Id.
See id. at 1926-27 (noting generally that “[l]egal regulation functions to particularize the broader behavioral standards embodied in social norms”).
424
Waldeck, supra note 30, at 464.
425
Id. at 465.
423
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CONCLUSION
The law walks a dangerous line when it attempts to regulate human behavior. As commentators have noted, sometimes such at426
tempts backfire and push norms in the opposite direction. Further,
without empirical evidence, social norms theorists are relying on intuitive guesses to predict human behavior. This proposal is open to
those criticisms. Without empirical evidence, it is impossible to know
whether requiring fathers to parent their children will lead to greater
involvement and fewer cases of paternal abandonment. In an age of
individualism, neighbors might not care all that much whether a father has seen his children this week, and even if they do, they might
not care enough to express disapproval. Even if neighbors publicly
express disapproval of disengaged fathers, some fathers might not
care what others think and might never internalize the norm of paternal involvement. In the same manner that some fathers who do
not pay child support have convinced themselves that they are good
parents and that their reasons for not paying support are valid despite
427
the stigma attached to deadbeat fathers, some fathers may convince
themselves that they have valid reasons for not seeing their children.
But some might not. Many Americans recycle, clean up after their
dogs, and pay their taxes, even though the risk of legal sanction is
minimal, because they fear public disapproval and have internalized
these legal rules. For the same reasons, some fathers might be motivated to parent their children—because they do not wish to be perceived as emotional deadbeats and because they have internalized the
legal rule of paternal involvement, believing that good parents nurture their children even if they no longer reside with them. The law
should attempt to keep these fathers engaged not only for the benefits
to their children, but for the potential benefits to society overall.

426

See Sunstein, supra note 32, at 919 (noting how “legal efforts to inculcate social
norms” may be counterproductive and efforts to “stigmatize certain acts may have the
opposite effect”).
427
Fathers’ reasons may include: the amount is too high, the money is not going
to the children, the mother is using the money to finance her extravagant lifestyle, etc.

